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ABSTRACT

Information gathered via literature review, interview, and personal observation was used to examine the effectiveness of animation rurale programs in Senegal and Niger, French West Africa. Identifiable animation rurale assumptions tested as applicable to Senegal and Niger were: nationwide development programs at the grass roots level can be ordained/directed by the central government; traditional societies are amenable to evolution toward modern economic/political institutions; the socialist is more efficient than the capitalist mode of development; education of the masses and socioeconomic structures providing equal distribution are complementary; participation in modern economic/political structures can be the very basis for training people to operate in these structures; and educational programs are most effective when they are integrated into other development programs. Based on the study's conclusions, the following hypotheses were formulated re: the pre-conditions necessary for comprehensive rural development program implementation: a comprehensive education program for national development must be an integral part of national policy; administration of the national government must be decentralized enough to allow local education programs sufficient control; the government must have sufficient financial resources to invest in long-term programs; the national government must be politically/ideologically stable enough to afford opposition; there must be an infrastructure of communication and transportation links; village workers must be given incentives to stay in the village and act as liaisons between traditional and modern practices. (JC)

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ANIMATION RURALE: EDUCATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

by

Jeanne Marie Moulton

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

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The study is dedicated to the prospect that before long the privileged few of us will no longer earn a living from the poverty of millions, and the hope that in the meantime we will prove worthy of the cost.

ANIMATION RURALE: EDUCATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

JEANNE MARIE MOULTON

Center for International Education
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Amherst, Massachusetts

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FOREWORD

In recent years there has been increasing interest in non-traditional approaches to education for rural development. Consequently both international agencies and national governments are looking beyond formal schooling to nonformal educational strategies that may better serve the needs of rural populations. The more innovative of the new programs have a number of characteristic features. Instead of dependence upon continuous initiative and control from above, or the outside, there are attempts to induce grass roots initiative, participation, and even control, in educational planning. Rather than adherence to an academic curriculum that is derived from the formal schools and learned by rote memorization, more attention is given to a participatory pedagogy in which there is learning-by-doing and acquisition of skills that can be immediately used for personal and community benefit. Instead of a belief that education alone is the "key to development," as was typical in the 1960's, there is growing awareness that education needs to be coordinated and integrated with other social and economic development activities. Both the promise and the problem in such an approach is that for most countries it stands educational "business as usual" on its head. It is seldom easy to give the head and hands to the learners and users, or to help them to be ready to employ both.

The case of Animation Rurale is instructive for those concerned with this issue. With a history of trying to implement such an approach over nearly two decades, it is an example of an attempt to do this in the context of a system of centralized administration and socialist ideology that is common to much of the Third World. It provides a window for the English-speaking world to a French version of the participatory principle in education and development; and it portrays the Franco-African experience in using a national and integrated strategy for rural nonformal education which focuses on economic development as the goal and the community as the active unit.

The first function of this study by Ms. Jeanne Moulton is to provide such a descriptive introduction to the Animation Rurale concept and experiment. The concept itself is succinctly summarized in Chapter II, which can serve the reader as a single introduction to how the system is theoretically intended to work. The historical context in which it evolved and the two principal African examples of the program in practice are presented in Chapters III, IV and V. And for the student of this field, there is a critical review of the literature in the Appendix.

As the French are fond of noting, in practice there tends to be the paradox of "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose." Indeed, if the change intended by Animation Rurale involves standing educational business-as-usual on its head, it is important to know why in fact so much of the business continues as usual. An understanding of the reasons for this may help future planners to solve problems that need solution if the paradox is to be avoided. For instance, how can a bottom-up program orientation be developed in a setting where initiative and control traditionally come from the top-down, where a new power base from below can be seen as threatening to the political and administrative order? How can a participatory, learn-by-doing pedagogy be encouraged in a situation where program personnel and participants are accustomed to an educational climate where knowledge is seen as being academic and coming from above, and where the most substantive rewards are received for traditional behavior or certificate-oriented learning? Or how can educational programming of this type be integrated with other regional socio-economic development activities when the timing of action and locus of authority differ among various administrative sectors?

The second function of this work, then, is to analyze the factors affecting the performance of Animation Rurale. In her conclusion the author evaluates the assumptions underlying this approach, incorporating both the critiques of others and observations of her own derived from the study. In addition, she suggests some of the pre-conditions that would seem necessary for such a strategy to be effective.

This is one in a series of publications by members of the Center for International Education who have been working on problems related to nonformal education. We wish to share it with other colleagues in the field in the belief that it provides access for the English reader to an important but neglected example of an educational strategy for rural development. It is presented in the hope that such laudable efforts to bring education closer to the head and hands of the learner can be strengthened by constructive analysis.

David C. Kinsey
Amherst, Massachusetts
July, 1977

ABSTRACT

Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development

This is a study of animation rurale, an out-of-school adult education program which has been implemented in most nations in French West Africa. The purpose of the study is to define the problems and issues of nonformal education programs designed to enhance rural development, as exemplified in the two cases of animation rurale in Senegal and Niger.

The study begins with a discussion of these problems and issues in the context of nonformal education, and of the research methods and analytical framework employed to draw conclusions about them. The development and educational theory of animation rurale, from which the plans and programs were derived, is described. Subsequent sections are devoted to an account of the historical and philosophical roots of animation rurale and the events that occurred in the programs of Senegal and Niger. In a concluding analysis, the results of the programs are assessed in terms of the goals stated by the program planners, and the programs are analyzed within four different conceptual frameworks. Six assumptions which have been identified by the researcher as implicit and

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explicit in the theory of animation rurale are tested in accordance with their application in the two cases studied. Based on conclusions about the effectiveness of animation rurale, six hypotheses are formulated about the pre-conditions necessary for implementing a comprehensive educational program for rural development.

The study is of value to practitioners and students of education for rural development. The actual implementation over sixteen years of a comprehensive educational theory is traced. From an examination of the theory in light of its application, strengths and weaknesses are made apparent in the original concept, and influences on the course of its evolution and their effects are clarified.

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ANIMATION RURALE: EDUCATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Between 1958 and 1961 every one of the thirteen former French West African colonies became an independent nation. Their new leaders had to devise strategies for meeting goals of economic growth, equitable distribution of wealth, a higher standard of living for most of the population, a national consciousness, and economic and political strength in the international arena. Inevitably, education was one dimension of those development strategies because colonial administrators had not provided Africans with means for an education beyond what was needed to prepare a handful of civil servants. Rural education was often seen as counterproductive to the colonizers' interest in maintaining an obedient population. The new nations, as a consequence, had to seek new means of educating citizens to be active, productive and loyal to the government.

In many nations the traditional school system was an inadequate means of education both because it could reach only a small portion of the population and because its curriculum was not relevant to the needs and interests of the rural population struggling to rise above a level of poverty. Thus, programs were designed to supplement the existing educational system in reaching the rural people. Because they were not part of the formal school system, these programs can be categorized as nonformal education.

Nonformal education programs differ radically from formal schools in their objectives, clientele and the resources available to them. The clientele is a large population of uneducated adults and youth as well as children. The resources available to serve this population are much fewer in terms of time, personnel and facilities than those available to the formal school system. Objectives are not directed toward preparing a small group of educated elite for leadership, but rather toward preparing peasants to raise their standard of living and to participate in the economic and social development of their locale and their nation.

Because of these differences between the formal and nonformal modes of education, educators have had to learn by trial and error to adapt their pedagogical and planning tools to meet new demands and new conditions. In particular, they have had to design programs that serve the pressing needs of rural peasants rather than the long term needs of the society. The rural peasant does not have the luxury of delaying the benefits of his education. This concern for immediate and direct relevance to national development forces educational planners out of their relatively protected institutional fortresses and into the complex factors which constitute development schemes--production, employment, politics, marketing, health and social services.

In order to understand better the interrelationships between the various components of development and education and to plan better programs that take these factors into account, educational planners need more information about the characteristics of their new clientele, the resources available to them, and the broader development goals they are expected to serve.

The strategy of many nonformal education programs is influenced by the increasingly accepted theory that human resource development occurs more efficaciously when people are given the opportunity to define and meet their own needs rather than passively accept the laws and directives imposed upon them from the government. In the context of rural areas of developing nations, the application of this theory results in attempts to create rural institutions and pedagogical methods which permit local people to participate in the determination of their own economic development needs.

Paradoxically, programs designed to increase local initiative are often instituted as part of centralized national development plans and institutions with which they are expected to mesh compatibly. This paradox is typically reflected in two streams of planning and programming. The source of one stream is the rural peasant community. The source of the other is the central government and the national development plan. In this kind of "bottom-up"-"top-down" configuration of planning and program management, conflicts between the two will inevitably arise. Those responsible for the educational dimension of the development plan need information about the likely areas of conflict, the factors which contribute to them, and the related issues with which they must reckon.

In keeping with the trend towards involving rural peasants in the planning and implementation of economic and political institutions, educators have increased their interest in designing more effective educational planning methods and pedagogical tools based on learners' expressions of their own learning needs.

> In recent years the leading challenges to established pedagogical theory and practice hinge upon a reawakening to the fact that education is only as effective as the active participation of each individual in his own education. This general pedagogical direction could be characterized as a movement toward participatory pedagogy. Within a broad range of approaches, the stress is upon the development of the individual, particularly his capacity to choose his own objectives, learning pathway, career and further education, and on the basis of increasing self-understanding, to relate these choices clearly to his personal and social responsibilities to other people.[1]

Thus, in educational planning for development as well as in development planning in general, more attention is being given to the need to increase participation and direction from below. Conflicts between this bottom-up local source of educational planning and top-down centralized educational planning can be expected to parallel conflicts between bottom-up and top-down orientations in overall development planning institutions.

Animation Rurale

Animation rurale[2] is a concept behind programs designed to educate adults living in rural areas of developing nations to participate actively in the economic development of their country. The theory on which animation rurale is based represents both the kind of development theory which promotes mass participation in national development and the kind of educational planning theory characterized as "participatory pedagogy." Animation rurale is the educational component of a national rural development strategy; hence it can be analyzed in the light of both development and educational planning theories.

The concept is an outgrowth of the Liberal Catholic movement in France and has been implemented on national, sectoral and community levels throughout Francophone Africa and in certain countries in Latin America and Asia. The choice of the administrative level or productive economic sector in which a program takes place depends upon the nature of the development problems and the intentions and resources of the government.

Animation rurale is roughly the French equivalent of British and American-conceived community development programs in developing countries and "deprived" areas of developed countries. The Francophone programs can be distinguished generally from Anglophone community development programs in that they emphasize economic rather than social goals, and from rural extension programs in that they focus on rural communities rather than on individual farmers.[3]

The programs are intended to "animate" or activate the rural population to modernize their living conditions, means of agricultural production and economic and political institutions. To do this, government employees in the *Animation* service train village representatives, called *animateurs*,[4] in new methods of farming, marketing, health care and sanitation and support these *animateurs* when they work with their fellow villagers. Village level development projects are important not so much for the improvements they offer, however, as for the foundation they provide for inter-village institutions, which constitute the first mode of peasants' participation in national government policy-making and planning.

A study of *animation rurale* is of interest to planners of non-formal education programs for rural development because it sheds light on problems and issues inherent in such programs and draws conclusions about the planning and implementation decisions that led to those problems and issues.

Although animation rurale was not called "nonformal education" by those who designed it, the program can be given that classification by virtue of being the out-of-school education component of a national development plan. It is an excellent example of the kind of integrated rural development program which nonformal educators are currently attempting to work with in countries around the world. The case of animation rurale is even more interesting because it incorporates the pedagogical theory, extending to the theory of human resource development, that both individual and national development depend upon the participation of the learners in the definition of their own needs and in the establishment of institutions designed to meet those needs. Consequently, over the years, animation rurale has manifested the conflicts which arise between top-down and bottom-up sources of development and educational planning.

Purpose of Study and Issues

The guiding question of this study is: what appear to be the results and effectiveness of animation rurale programs, and what problems and issues should be considered in such an approach to education for rural development? Other purposes of the study, beyond examining the results, effectiveness, problems and issues of animation rurale, center on the question of how an educational theory was actually applied in certain situations. The programs are assessed in terms of the stated goals of their planners, and the influences on the programs' evolution are considered. Finally, the cases studied are used as a basis for formulating hypotheses about the pre-conditions necessary for implementing a program like animation rurale.

An important point of reference in discussing these issues is a set of certain underriding assumptions that the researcher has identified as both implicit and explicit in the theory of animation rurale. These assumptions are critical to the viability of the theory and to the success of its implementation. Three of them focus on the role of nonformal education in economic development planning; the other three, while more pertinent to issues of development theory than of educational theory, are inseparable from the planning considerations of any nonformal education program. The six assumptions are the following.

1. Nationwide development programs at the grass roots level can be ordained and directed from the highest level of the central government. The theory of animation rurale is founded on the belief that conflicts between the grass roots and central government planners will be nonexistent or at least insignificant and easily resolved. Much of the importance of the study centers on the evidence revealing that such conflicts are more critical than anticipated by the animation rurale theorists and that they might be endemic to development strategies and programs such as animation rurale.

2. Traditional societies are amenable to an evolution toward modern economic and political institutions. This assumption raises the question of what factors contribute to the conflicts between grass roots and central planning institutions. One of the critical factors in animation rurale appears to have been the misjudgment on the part of the plan-

ners about the nature of traditional African societies, their values, needs and expectations.

3. The socialist mode is more efficient than the capitalist mode of economic development. Concomitantly, development programs should be designed for communities rather than individuals in order that all people rather than an emergent group of elites be allowed to share and invest surplus wealth. In making this assumption, the theorists take a position on one of the critical issues in development theory; namely, that communities, rather than individuals, are the most effective for developing human resources. The issues of socialist versus capitalist strategies and community versus individual investments have been extensively debated, and their pertinence to this case will become clear in the course of the study.

4. Education of the masses and socioeconomic structures that provide for the equal distribution of national resources are complementary. Both are necessary in a development strategy that aims at both economic equity and growth. This assumption bears upon the question of the political feasibility of nonformal education programs based on local participation in the determination of needs and structures. Animation rurale entailed both the installation of modern economic and political structures and of new training programs. The program tested the belief that neither structures nor training can be effective without the other.

5. Participation in modern economic and political structures can be the very basis for training people to operate within these structures. Again, this relates to the question of political feasibility.

Whereas formal education generally separates the time period in one's life set aside for acquiring knowledge and skills from the period spent as a productive member of society, animation rurale assumes that both learning and action can, indeed must, occur simultaneously. Animation rurale was designed as part of a development strategy in which the resources needed for training rural peasants as a power base would be made available to them with the expectation that the investment would pay off.

6. Educational programs are most effective when they are integrated into other development programs such as agricultural production, marketing, forestry, health and sanitation. This assumption raises the pedagogical issue of the value of practical experience in learning activities. The school systems in most African nations have usually separated the student's education from his economic and social activities. Animation rurale is part of the trend, especially in nonformal education programs, to offer practical experience to learners by integrating training activities with actual tasks of economic development. To do this, Animation has had to coordinate its training program with the programs of other technical services. Their incomplete success in collaborating with other services suggests that nonformal education programs, simply by virtue of being outside of the formal school system, do not guarantee practical and relevant learning experiences.

Selection of Cases

Animation rurale programs have existed for nearly twenty years all over the world. They have been implemented on a national level in four African countries: Madagascar, Morocco, Niger and Senegal. This study will focus only on the programs in Niger and Senegal, because these particular cases shed the most light on the process of designing and implementing education programs for rural development. Whereas in Morocco and in Madagascar the programs were drastically curtailed for political reasons early in their history, in Senegal and Niger they survived initial struggles for power among national leaders. *Animation rurale* has continued since 1959 to the present in Senegal, and from 1962 until 1974 in Niger. This time span exceeds that of most nonformal education programs in the world with similar goals and designs, and it allows for a reasonable perspective on the influences, effects and problems that occur over time.

The case of Senegal is particularly interesting because it entails problems and issues that arose on both national and local levels and because its program has undergone significant revisions of goals and methods. The case of Niger is important because it took place within certain regions of a decentralized government, and thus the variety of local developments is more apparent.

The two cases have also been selected because they lend themselves to comparison. Both countries are situated in the West African Sahel, manifesting similar climatic, geographic and demographic conditions, and both have a common history of French colonial administration. Also, some of the same French advisors to the two governments influenced the plans and direction of the programs. From examining these two cases within the same analytical framework, we can better determine which characteristics are peculiar to each case, and which might be generalized to a wider range of cases. Finally, the cases of Senegal and Niger are reasonably well-documented, and the descriptive and analytical material available on them includes some informative studies published in English.

Research Methods

Research on the effects of educational programs geared to rural development is carried out in a combination of two general approaches: inductive and deductive. The deductive approach begins with *a priori* premises, on the basis of which phenomena are observed and logical conclusions drawn. An inductive approach uses no *a priori* frame of reference; instead, general inferences are made *a posteriori* from observations of many particular phenomena.

This study primarily employs the inductive approach, but views issues in terms of the analytical framework suggested by the guiding questions and in reference to the underriding assumptions stated above. Conclusions about the programs have been drawn from all the pertinent information that was obtained on the basis of this framework. The approach was also deductive insofar as the relative success of each program was measured against its goals as stated by those who designed and implemented the program. The programs' goals have been altered over the course of the years, and these changes are taken into account in assessing the extent to which they have been met.

Information was gathered in a three-phase procedure. First, the relevant literature from six documentation centers was reviewed. These centers are the Institute of Recherche et d'Application des

Methodes de Développement (IRAM) in Paris, the International Institute of Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes de Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris, the International Bureau of Education (IBE) in Geneva, and the National Archives of Senegal in Dakar.

Next, and at times simultaneous with the document review, individuals who had participated in the planning and implementation of animation rurale were interviewed. They included the Director of Animation Rurale in Senegal, members of his present staff, and other Senegalese, French and Americans who had either worked with or studied the program in Senegal or Niger. Their levels of responsibility ranged from the ministry to the village. Although the interviews were open-ended and followed the lead of the interviewees whenever possible, certain questions were used as guidelines for the discussion. These questions included items on the relationship between village level activities and national plans and policies, on significant historical events, and on the perceived problems that arose within the program and factors relevant to the causes and/or solutions to those problems.

After information had been gathered from documents and individuals available in Paris and Geneva, the researcher went to Senegal to visit five animation rurale projects in the regions of the Fleuve and the Casamance and to interview staff members of Promotion Humaine in the Secretariat in Dakar. Visits to the projects were arranged by the Minister of the Secretariat of Promotion Humaine and by Peace Corps Volunteers who were living and working in villages as animateurs.

Although quantitative data on the location and size of Animation programs was collected, it has been used sparingly in this study, since an account of the number of Animation centers that have been built, animateurs who have been trained, and villagers who have been affected by the program does not reveal as much about the impact of the program as does an analysis of historical events.

From the literature, reports of those interviewed, and personal observations, the researcher has assessed the progress of the programs in terms of the stated objectives of those who planned and implemented them. From this analysis of the programs' results, six assumptions have been identified. These assumptions are, in the judgment of the researcher, critical issues in the evolution of animation rurale.

The analysis of the information concludes with a re-examination of the six critical assumptions. The value of this analysis lies in the applicability it has to similar educational programs for rural development, whose planners must always choose to accept or reject, to some extent, the validity of the assumptions.

Short Review of the Literature

The literature relevant to this study is of two general types: that which describes and analyzes animation rurale programs and that which discusses fields of study and movements encompassing animation rurale. Because much of the literature is in French, and much of that in English is not easily accessible to American readers, a detailed annotated bibliography is presented, as an appendix to the study. In this chapter we will do no more than describe the most important sources of documentation on animation rurale and the various fields of study which come to bear on its theory and evolution.

Most of the documents on animation rurale have been issued by the Institut de Recherche et d'Application des Méthodes de Développement (IRAM) and the Institut International de Recherche et de Formation pour l'Education et le Développement (IRFED) in Paris. The personnel of these closely related institutes are development and educational planners, many of whom were influential in the conception of animation rurale programs in Senegal and Niger. In fact, many government publications of those two countries about animation rurale were written by IRAM consultants or personnel serving those governments.

These documents present some difficulties to American readers both because most of them are in French and because they were written in a characteristically French manner which appears to Anglophone readers as a confusion of theory and practice. Nonetheless, the reports of the Senegalese and Nigerien governments, often IRAM personnel, and of IRAM and IRFED provide the richest sources of information about animation rurale. The annotated bibliography suggests which documents are particularly important.

The four best analyses of the programs in Senegal and Niger are found in political science dissertations that view animation rurale in the larger context of rural development policy. Those on Senegal, are Schumacher's study of party politics in the 1960s,[5] DeDecker's comparative study of national and community development in Senegal and Guinea,[6] and Serreau's comparative study of rural development in Senegal and

Dahomey.[7] That on Niger is Charlick's excellent analysis of "induced participation" strategy in Matameye county.[8]

The most important critiques of animation rurale theory appear in the works of French-speaking development and educational theorists, Samir Amin,[9] Rene Dumont[10] and Albert Meister.[11] Their writings are important for an understanding of how French influenced development programs are viewed by their critics. Amin is a leftist-oriented economist; Dumont is an agricultural economist well known for his disapproval of French colonial and post-colonial development programs in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and Meister is an educator, highly critical of literacy and other basic education and community development strategies.

Various movements and schools of thought have converged in the theory and programs of animation rurale. The literature coming from those fields of study is reviewed in the annotated bibliography only as an indication of what the researcher has pursued. The most interesting of these movements, and the one which is most important in contemporary analyses of programs such as animation rurale, is the theory of participation in development and participatory pedagogy. At present, as reflected in the literature, this school of thought is headed by American researchers. A closely related field of study is nonformal education, and documents here include theoretical, practical and bibliographical items. Documents written by American and British scholars and practitioners on education in the context of rural development and on community development, like those on nonformal education, serve to place animation rurale in an educational context which is gaining sponsorship among international circles.

The literature which provides an historical background to the programs in Senegal and Niger includes that on the cooperative movement, African Socialism and the liberal French Catholic movement in economic development. The review of the literature suggests documents on these topics and on recent African history, particularly economic and political development in West Africa. The sources noted would be particularly useful to those students of education for development in Africa who need a general understanding of the economic and political context of current programs.

Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five chapters subsequent to this introduction. Chapter II is a description of animation rurale as it was theoretically conceived by its designers. This theory has been revised over the years during which it has been tested by its application in various contexts. On the whole, though, the theory remains intact, and it is instructive for both those who study the history of its application and those who are designing similar approaches to education programs.

Chapter III reviews the historical background of the theory of animation rurale and of the West African context in which it was implemented. It summarizes the schools of thought which gave rise to the theory and the political events in West Africa preceding the independence of the former French territories.

Chapters IV and V are case studies of the animation rurale programs in Senegal and Niger respectively. Each chapter begins with a sketch of the political and planning situation which gave rise to the program, and continues with a detailed account of the events that occurred during the program's implementation. The focus is put on events which are relevant to rural development planning dimensions of the programs; others, such as the extension of animation rurale into animation urbaine, are only touched on. These chapters do not include extensive analyses and interpretation of events except when it is necessary to explain historical progression.

Chapter VI has four main sections. The first is a summary of the results of the two programs and of their relative success in terms of their stated goals. The second is a recapitulation of the assumptions implicit in the theory of animation rurale which relate to the role of nonformal education in a national development plan. The third is a review of significant analyses and critiques of animation rurale both in theory and in the concrete cases of Senegal and Niger. The fourth is an examination of the validity of the six assumptions in light of the case histories and of relevant critiques. The study concludes with hypotheses about the pre-conditions necessary to implement a program like animation rurale.

ENDNOTES

[1] B. Hayward, "The Participatory Planning Process for Education," in *Participatory Planning in Education* (Paris: OECD), p. 14.

[2] *Animation rurale* is a French term with no English equivalent. In this study, *animation rurale* is sometimes abbreviated to *animation*. When the word is capitalized, it refers to the *Animation* service of a country, the government organization responsible for planning and implementing *animation rurale* programs.

[3] D. Hapgood, *Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow* (New York: Athenium, 1970), p. 320.

[4] *Animateurs* are men; their female counterparts are called *animatrices*. Here the term, *animateurs*, will be used in reference to both men and women.

[5] E.J. Schumacher, *Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Senegal* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975).

[6] H. DeDecker, *Nation et Développement Communautaire en Guinée et au Sénégal* (Paris: Mouton, 1967).

[7] J. Serreau, *Le Dévelóppement à la Base au Dahomey et au Sénégal* (Paris: Librarie du Droit et du Jurisprudence, 1966).

[8] R.B. Charlick, *Power and Participation in the Modernization of Rural Hausa Communities* (Los Angeles: University of California at Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, unpublished doctoral thesis, 1974).

[9] S. Amin, *L'Afrique de l'Ouest Bloquée* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1971).

[10] R. Dumont, *L'Afrique Noire est Mal Partie* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962).

[11] A. Meister, *L'Afrique, Peut-Elle Partir?* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966).

CHAPTER II

ANIMATION RURALE IN THEORY

The *animation rurale* programs in Senegal and Niger are particularly interesting cases of education for rural development because they were founded on a carefully conceived theory of economic development and of the role of education in development. In order to understand the rationale and assumptions that were seminal to the evolution of the programs, one should be familiar with the pure theory of *animation rurale* as it has been presented by those who originated it. Familiarity with the theory also facilitates a reading of the events that actually occurred in Senegal and Niger, since the progress of the programs in those two countries can be understood in terms of their theoretical design.

In this chapter the theory of *animation rurale* is described in the terms used by the French and African authors of the concept and initiators of the programs in Senegal and Niger. The most notable of these men are Dia, Lebret and Goussault. The subsequent historical account of events will reveal that the programs did not always work out as they were theoretically planned. We do not attempt to look at the shortcomings of the theory or the discrepancies between theory and practice in this chapter. Rather, the chapter should serve as a conceptual map and a description of one plan for a program for education for rural development.

Theoretical Definitions of Development and Pedagogy

Goussault has summarized the purpose and strategy of *animation rurale* as follows:

> It is not easy to give a single definition of *animation rurale* in French West Africa, because the situation of each country at the moment of its independence or on the occasion of political changes which affect its development program is unique, and the specific nature of any *animation* program depends upon the conditions peculiar to that country. A viable definition of any particular program, then, ought to reflect the general institutional evolutions of the country and the manner in which these institutions coordinate all the national elements--leaders, middle-level professionals and administrators, and workers in its development program.
>
> Thus, we must be satisfied with a general defintion: *animation rurale* is an ensemble of educational means designed in the framework of a national development plan in order to foster certain socioeconomic institutions which support the process of social change and growth stemming from the participation of the rural peasant population.
>
> Although it is the workers and the peasants who constitute the foundation of national life and development, it is not only on this grass roots level that *animation* is implemented. Although the initial steps are taken at the grass roots level, *animation*, when it goes beyond the level of a simple educational intervention, culminates in activity at all echelons of national life, particularly among those leaders responsible for development. However, *animation* continues to be the means of participation in development of the people on the grass roots level.
>
> *Animation* has, above all, an economic priority. Whether they be national, sectoral or community, *animation* programs aim to restructure the rural economy and to integrate economic life on the village level with regional and national economic institutions.[1]

Thus, *animation rurale* in French West Africa can be briefly defined as a program for training the rural population to participate in building institutions of economic and social development. *Animation* aims toward the cooperation of the total population, from rural peasants to national leaders, in development activities.

The theory of *animation rurale* is based on the belief that man is by nature a social animal who finds individual fulfillment through participating in activities which lead to the development of his community. This natural tendency toward social participation is even stronger in rural Africa than in Western society, because the latter has become highly individualized through the process of industrialization. Thus, the goal of development plans of African nations should be to strip away the influence of Western colonial rule and to nurture the roots of inherent African tendencies toward progress through helping individuals participate in social, economic and political institutions.[2]

Animation rurale belongs to a socialist-oriented rural development strategy. The program entails both rural training programs and the reformation of rural economic and political institutions. The reformation of institutions starts simultaneously on a grass roots and on a central government level, but moves primarily upward, progressing from village to inter-village to sub-regional to regional and finally back to central government institutions. These are called "ascending" or "bottom-up" institutions.

The training programs which enable rural peasants to create and maintain these institutions are based on a "learning by doing" pedagogy according to which the peasants, as learners, participate both in identifying their learning and development needs and in directly applying what they are learning to actual development problems. The pedagogical theory of animation rurale has five main points:[3]

1. The central purpose of education is to prepare individuals on all levels of society for the tasks of development. Through participation in the development plans of their own community

and nation, individuals will achieve personal learning and growth.

2. Training activities are in vain if they do not take place in economic and social institutions in which those who are being trained have the opportunity to act upon their training in actual development activities.
3. The educational program must be written into the national development plan, because there is an integral relationship between developmental and educational methods.
4. Adults are capable of learning the skills required to take responsibility for their own development.
5. Certain pedagogical principles are efficacious in programs designed for peasants. These are listed in Belloncle's Principles de Pédagogie Paysanne:[4]
   a. Training should be progressive, that is, moving from simple to more complicated lessons with opportunities for practical application at each step.
   b. Training activities should be active, that is, they should provoke interest and a desire to learn the lesson.
   c. The content of lessons should be concrete; abstract principles and even simple operations should be demonstrated and practiced with learning aids.
   d. The proverbs and images familiar to the peasants should be used to illustrate lessons.
   e. Visual aids should be used wherever possible.
   f. Learning should be founded on frequent repetition.

g. Lessons should be amusing, enjoyable, and capitalize on humor as much as possible.

The common point between education and development is considered to be the rural commune. In its educational functions the goal of animation rurale is to create rural communes out of networks of rural villages. This is to be achieved by preparing the villagers to be able to demonstrate certain capacities:

1. Awareness of development problems and the community's own needs in relation to development;
2. Involvement in projects, proposed and designed by the peasants themselves, for improving agriculture, technical operations and simple community participation activities; and
3. Capacity to manage technical and administrative organizations in the community.

Once rural villagers become aware, involved and capable of managing local organizations, economic and human institutions are transformed. Instead of a collection of people without direction, there is a coherent organization of peasants who cooperate with administrators and technicians to undertake tasks of development. With these inherent strengths, the communes are better able to become integrated into the regional and national institutions of which they constitute the fundamental component.

Initial Program Development: National and Sub-Regional Levels

In animation rurale programs implemented on a national level, such as those in Senegal and Niger, a national director is appointed to serve just below the level of minister. His primary responsibilities are to train the rural population in the tasks of development and to work with other government services in supporting economic institutions that are initiated on the grass roots level. The national director assigns a regional advisor to each region in which the program will be implemented. The most important administrative level of operations, however, is neither the national nor the regional, but the sub-regional. Here, an Animation chief of service and his staff are assigned. They are directly responsible for selecting, training and supporting animateurs to work in the villages and for helping the villagers build rural communes.

It is clear from the theory which underlies the program that institution-building and training are equally important. In practice, the two cannot easily be separated; for the purpose of description, however, we will first depict the institution-building process, then the selection and training of animateurs, and finally the sequence in which training activities lead back into institution-building.

Chronologically, animation rurale begins as an institution on the central government level; the educational program in rural areas is written into the national development plan and coordinated with goals and programs in other sectors of the economy. As soon as a national office has been established and staffed, and those in the central government have reached agreement on the goals and methods of animation, the staff members turn their attention directly to activities on the village level and begin to establish communication with the rural peasants.

The first step in implementing the program is to select those areas of the country that will be designated as "zones of *animation*" and given training centers. Zones of *animation* must correspond to administrative districts so that the necessary infrastructure and network of contacts with all levels of the government are available. During the time they were French territories, African countries were governed in the customary French hierarchical structure whereby the territory was divided into regions, sub-regions and sub-sub-regions. It is on the sub-regional level (called *départements* in Senegal and *arrondissements* in Niger) that zones of *animation* are selected and training centers built. The sub-regional level seems optimal because it offers adequate service from administrative and technical officials and because it is accessible to villagers, so that the *Animation* staff can work with them directly.

The choice of which sub-regions will become zones of *animation* depends both on the political inclinations of the government and the sub-regions' relative needs for and receptivity to a rural development training program. The initial selection of zones is tentative, because only when a program has been introduced into a zone can the *Animation* staff see clearly whether or not they can expect cooperation from the local administrative services. If it appears that they cannot, the program must be disbanded in order to prevent a waste of scarce resources in a vain effort to budge local bureaucratic resistance.

Once the zones of *animation* have been selected, a training cen- (*Centre d'Animation*) is built in the *département* or *arrondissement* capital and an *Animation* staff is posted to it. The staff consists of a chief of service and his assistants, numbering from one to fourteen, depending upon the conditions of the zone and the size of the population it covers. Ideally, the Animation staff in each zone would be constituted solely by citizens of the country, but a shortage of individuals with an adequate education and with sufficient familiarity with the rural milieu makes it necessary to hire some foreigners in the initial phase of the program. Thus, the staff consists of national citizens, most of whom have been transferred from other technical services such as agriculture, and of Frenchmen who have worked with the former colonial administration.[5]

To the extent that there is a training program for staff members, it is characterized by on-the-job training. In setting up animation rurale programs in the various zones, staff members come into contact with those who work for the services of agriculture, education and so on. From them they learn certain means of providing technical assistance in rural development. They are also taught the pedagogical principles and training methods of animation by officials from the ministry and, in the first few years, from consultants who have either designed or are experts in animation rurale theory and methods. Over the years, staff members who become more skillful in the training methods can begin to train other staff members.

Each training center is in a building constructed in keeping with local norms so that villagers who come to live in it for the duration of their training session will be comfortable. The center is equipped with the space, materials and supplies needed to carry out training sessions and to provide support to animateurs in the surrounding villages. Each center has a truck and one other vehicle, a driver and a custodian-guard.

The chief of service of Animation and his staff work closely with the administrative officials of the zone--the département or arrondissement--to which they are assigned. Their first task is to make a survey of the zone, the results of which are shared in a report to the zone administrator and, through him, other administrative officials. The report describes the physical characteristics of the zone, the demographic and ethnic characteristics of the population, communication and transportation facilities, and economic, social and political conditions, and it recommends what action should be taken by the Animation service.

On the basis of this report and of a map which incorporates information about the zone of animation, smaller "zones of recruitment" are designated, and from these zones the first animateurs are selected and brought to the training center.

Selection and Training of Animateurs

Careful selection and adequate training of animateurs are critical elements of the animation program. Once the training center has been established, and the staff members who have been posted to it are reasonably assured of the cooperation of the local administrative officials and technical services, initial contact is made with the peasants. This step is critical and cannot be made too hastily. Animation staff members tour the villages which have been selected for involvement in the program. These tours allow the staff members to have dialogues with the villagers--dialogues which are prolonged progressively with each visit. Interested villagers are eventually identified, their trust in the animation rurale program is established, and, in communication over a period of time with other villagers, this trust is extended throughout the village. The details of the process of establishing trust vary from village to village, depending upon the attitudes and patterns of relationships among the people.

One objective of these tours is to seek out individuals from each village to become animateurs. It is important that the selection of those who will be trained as animateurs be made freely by their own social group. First, in a measure of respect, the traditional village leaders and political officials are contacted and made aware of the purpose of animation rurale and the staff's mission to their village. After these tours, village leaders who have been approached within a district are called together for two or three days to learn more about the animation rurale program. The discussion focuses on several questions:

1. What problems do members of your village have?
2. How do you resolve these problems?
3. How would you like the government to help you?
4. What would be your role in a government program of assistance to your village?

Several days after this session, the animation rurale staff team makes another tour of those villages represented at the inter-village meeting. The staff can thus see how the information given to village leaders at the meeting has been interpreted by them to the villagers, and also they can pursue with the villagers themselves the same kind of dialogue they have had with village leaders. This long and repeated process of meetings has been found necessary to establish trust, because often the villagers' only previous contacts with government officials seeking volunteers were in instances of military recruitment and other imposed work orders. Thus, they must be patiently led to select a spokesman whom they respect and who can represent their village to the government.

When the time seems appropriate, the staff members ask the villagers to select some candidates who meet the following criteria:

1. Between the ages of 25 and 45 years; the animateur ought to be old enough to be considered an adult, but not too old to be open to new ideas and techniques;
2. A farmer respected for the quality of his work; because farming is an important role of villagers, this is a good indication of personal respect;
3. Able to command attention from key individuals and groups; a good family situation and respect for cultural and religious customs increases the likelihood of an animateur being respected;
4. Not a frequent traveler; the animateur should be around the village during all seasons of the year to confer with the people; and
5. Chosen by the village and willing to accept his role; the animateur must be the representative of the village in the domain of technical, economic and social activities, and as such must accept himself and be acceptable to others in the responsibilities implied.

In spite of the cares taken by the staff team in the recruitment process, sometimes they are not able to ease the unrest in the villagers' minds or to convince them to select someone who meets the qualifications. Thus, in larger and more important villages, two, three or four animateurs might be selected. Later, when a cadre of animateurs has been trained, they can go with the staff to help in the recruitment of others.

The relationship between peasants and government representatives in this selection phase of the animation program is a reversal of the one which prevailed during colonial rule, in that previously officials came to the village to impose their directives and advice, rather than to invite the villagers to use their services and resources.

The next phase of the program is the training, which includes four stages: the initiation, the return to the village, the "applied" training, and the refresher courses.

1. The initial stage consists of bringing the selected animateur candidates for 2 or 3 weeks to the training center where they are told about the government structure, its services, and various development projects of the past, present and future. The training program is based heavily on what the animation staff team learned from village leaders about the conditions and problems in that particular area. Administrative and technical personnel are brought in to cover especially relevant topics. The staff assists these specialists in preparing lessons which adhere to the pedagogical principles of animation rurale.

In order to assure participation of the trainees, they are divided into work groups of ten, each of which is responsible for its own chores in the way of meals and housekeeping at the training center. The work group members also cooperate in preparing assignments for certain lessons and other activities. A group leader, who is rotated every five days, represents his group in the trainers' and leaders' council. In this way, grass roots participation in development programs is demonstrated and practiced.

Employing the pedagogical principles, each lesson follows a certain pattern:

a. Each subject is introduced on a flannel board, which is used to motivate the trainees to express their views and discuss relevant issues.

b. Demonstrations and practical work are conducted in a manner which helps the trainees to assimilate the information and skills being taught.

c. The subjects introduced during the day are taken up again in the evening, either through discussions or sociodrama. Sociodrama has proven to be a remarkable training technique when adapted to groups of men living in an oral civilization in which gesture and speech in drama come naturally. It allows the trainees to express clearly their perceptions and ideas about conditions in their own villages--and it helps the trainers see how their lessons have been assimilated.

d. The trainees take part in a village survey, which is intended both to help them put to use immediately what they have learned and then reflect on it back at the center with their colleagues and staff members, and to give them a taste of what their first assignment in their own village will be like. Ten themes are given to the trainees for observation and later for discussion: standard of living, quality of community life, spontaneous development, natural resources in the village, infrastructure, agricultural equipment, commerce, credit, work forces, and uses of revenue.

The curriculum of the initiation stage of training includes three general topics: the civic universe (geography, history, administrative and political organization, the role of the police and the courts); the economic and social universe (the nation's economy, the national development plan, health, schooling, customs and trade, cooperatives and the economic structures of the country); and the technical universe (agriculture, agricultural industries, animal husbandry, water and forestry, rural engineering and public works).

This concrete analysis of their world coincides with the trainees' village survey. It provides them with a vocabulary of development and the technical knowledge necessary to understand and begin working in the dynamics of their own villages. The training program also allows them to make direct contact with those whose services they will call upon, and with other animateurs, who will be facing common problems. Finally, because individuals who have had special training are respected, the training program gives animateurs certain prestige when they return to their villages.

2. The second stage is the trainees' return to their own villages as animateurs. They are sent back to share what they have learned and to make an initial survey of their village. At this point the whole village begins to profit from animation, as the villagers learn more about the relationship between their village and the nation and about

the three "universes" that have been depicted. Also they are able to become involved immediately in a development activity--that of helping the animateur to carry out his survey.

In making their survey, the animateurs are asked to identify specific problems for which the village could use government assistance in solving. The kinds of problems they report and the services they request are wide-ranging: advice to heads of families about health and water purification, protection of trees when land is cleared, building of roads accessible to cars, improvement of relations with neighboring villagers, provision of fertilizer for fields, construction of animal pens, installation of family vegetable gardens, and similar problems.

When the animateurs' reports are ready, the Animation staff visits their villages again to go over their reports with them, to see where the strengths and weaknesses of the reports lie, and to determine if the problems identified are in fact of highest priority in the development of the village. Other villagers are invited to join in the meetings of the animateurs and the staff; and when advisable other government officials accompany the animation rurale staff to the villages. In the course of these village meetings, specific projects are designed in which the animateur can begin to work with the villagers. The village is then invited to designate others who might take part in the next series of training programs.

3. The third stage of the program is "applied" training. After the animateurs have been working for a few months in their villages, they go back to attend specialized training sessions or to help organize and present such sessions. An animateur who has had success in some

village project will work with a technical specialist in preparing a training session from which others can learn his technique. These sessions may cover agricultural techniques, health, education or other social projects, cooperative management and marketing. The "applied" training sessions help to spread innovative ideas among villages, to further acquaint the technical specialists with the animateurs and other villagers, and to keep up the motivation of the animateurs. The methods used in these sessions are not those of lecturing, but rather dialogues on common problems, with active participation in projects that are actually occurring.

4. The fourth stage consists of refresher courses. During the annual period following the first planting after the initial training stage, all the animateurs are brought together again at the training center to review the information they have learned, to discuss their various activities and their plans for the near future. Like the "applied" training sessions, these get-togethers of three or four days help maintain the morale of the animateurs and offer an opportunity for those who have become bogged down to talk about and better understand their difficulties. Here too the animateurs gain a new perspective on their village projects, and see how cooperation with neighboring villages and with government structures at higher levels might be efficacious. They increase their understanding of how economic development extends beyond their own locale and explore means for cooperating in broader range projects.

Institutionalization of the *Animation* Process

The *animation rurale* program thus arrives at a new level of activity. While *animateurs* continue their work in the villages, four new objectives are formulated for the *Animation* staff:

1. To assist in the regrouping of villages and inter-village institutions;
2. To instigate *animation rurale* programs among social groups in the zones which are outside the influence of *animateurs*;
3. To prepare specialized technical training courses; and
4. To help sub-regional specialists work with inter-village institutions as the first step in creating a vertical link between them.

In these tasks, more involvement is demanded on the part of administrators and specialists working at an administrative level higher than that of the local zone; thus it is time to build institutions on the sub-regional and regional levels.

While continuing to run training programs for village *animateurs*, the *Animation* staff begins to concentrate on helping *animateurs* to work together in inter-village institutions such as cooperatives. These institutions comprise the rural communes, which in theory are the initial "cells of development" and the first link between the villagers and the national government. The communes are the first of the ascending institutions to be formed. They are directed by representatives of the villages which belong to them; these representatives may or may not be *animateurs*. Their main function is often that of marketing local agricultural products and supplying farmers with farming tools and supplies.

When the villagers have assumed responsibility for the management of the commune, they begin to negotiate with neighboring communes and local government officials to establish sub-regional institutions. With the progressive building of each ascending institution, villagers gain better access to government services and profit from the wider range of resources and production activities in their area. When sub-regional institutions are running smoothly under the direction of village level representatives, regional institutions are reformed so that administrative and technical services will be more responsive to sub-regional and intervillage institutions and to the rural population at large.

Finally, representatives from the regions begin to participate in policy-making and planning for rural development on the national level. The national Animation service is reformed to the extent necessary to be efficiently aligned with the network of rural institutions extending to the villages.

ENDNOTES

[1] Y. Goussault, *L'Animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Francophone* (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1970), pp. [illegible].

[2] More elaborate accounts of these assumptions are given in L.J. Lebret's "La Coopération Technique devant les Perspectives du Développement Authentique," in *Développement et Civilisations*, 26 (June 1966), and in R. Colin's "L'Animation, Clé de Voûte du Développement," in *Développement et Civilisations*, 21 (January 1965).

[3] Y. Goussault, *Interventions Educatives et Animation dans les Développements Agraires* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970). The following theoretical description comes mainly from the collective works of Goussault.

[4] G. Belloncle, "Pédagogie de l'Implantation du Mouvement Coopératif au Niger," in *Archives Internationales de Sociologie de la Cooperation*, 23 (January-June, 1968).

[5] Volunteers from the Peace Corps and from its equivalent organization in France also have served as *animateurs* and as *Animation* staff members.

CHAPTER III

ANIMATION RURALE IN HISTORY

What were the ideas and experiences that accumulated in the shaping of animation rurale? They came for the most part from the pre-independence movement of African Socialism, which was influenced most strongly by Marxist socialist theory and the French liberal Catholic school of thought. They were given their particular form in the context of newly-independent Francophone West Africa. The ideas flowed through two channels to converge in the theory of animation rurale: one was the ideology of the new African leaders, and the other, of the Europeans from whom they sought advice. This chapter briefly traces the events that led to the African context in which socialism and Catholicism met.

Events Leading to the Independence of West African Nations

The French territories in sub-Saharan Africa were divided into two main blocks: West Africa and Central Africa. Senegal and Niger were both part of French West Africa, and as such, shared a common history of French colonial administration.

After World War II social and economic conditions throughout the world had been altered by shifting alliances and new governments. People were more conscious of the ideas of national sovereignty, and some of the African elite began to think in terms of increased autonomy

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and even complete independence for their territories. In France, with the advent of the Fourth Republic, the French "Empire" became the "Union," and the status of natives in French territories was changed from "subjects" to "citizens." The Fond d'Investissement pour le Développement Economic et Social (FIDES), a special investment fund for the territories, was created to promote economic and social development projects in the Union.

During this period certain members of the elite in the territories--those who came from important families and had been educated in French colonial schools--began to seek political power by aligning themselves with African branches of French political parties. In 1946 a group from various parts of the territories met together in Bamako and established the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). This political party, which attached itself to the Communist Party in France, represented French-speaking Africa in the Union, and sought to secure equal treatment of its citizens. The party was headed by Houphouët-Boigny, who became president of the Ivory Coast in 1960.

Tension increased between the RDA and the French government in the late 1940s, when the Communist Party dropped out of the coalition in power and became part of the opposition. In 1951 Houphouët-Boigny decided that his party would break relations with the Communist Party and cooperate with the French government; having abandoned their diffident attitude, the party and hence the African territories began to get more favorable treatment from Paris.

But the RDA's change in direction did not please all of its members. Another political force, the Independents d'Outre Mer (IOM), was founded by Leopold Senghor of Senegal as a group of African members of the French parliament, who, like those in the RDA, were working towards more autonomy of the territories in Africa. This group disagreed with the RDA over the issues of federation; Senghor wanted all the colonies in Africa to constitute a single federation, working cooperatively in economic and political affairs vis-à-vis France, while Houphouët-Boigny preferred each territory to have an independent government.

By 1954 France had agreed in principle to a constitutional reform in regard to the governing of the territories, but it was not until 1956 that action was taken. Under Guy Mollet's Socialist government, the *Loi Cadre* was put into effect, giving more power to African leaders within their own territories. Until that time, all the African territories had been treated by France as one political entity, and thus African leaders could only attain political power within the territorial representation in the Union. Now, attention was shifted away from the federation toward individual territorial interests, and the importance of political parties within each territory increased.

In July 1958 the small struggles between groups in the colonies were drastically overshadowed when the Fifth French Republic was installed, and DeGaulle returned to head the new government. By September he had proposed to members of the Union several alternative statuses vis-à-vis France. For the African colonies, the two viable alternatives were: (1) increased autonomy within a new Franco-African Community (which would replace the Union), or (2) complete independence with no economic or political ties to the Republic. Most of the colonies did not think they were ready for independence, since they still relied heavily on French administrative and economic support, and therefore voted in the Referendum to join the Community. The single exception was Sékou Touré's Guinea, which chose independence. Niger nearly went the same route, but then elected for membership in the community after an overthrow of the leftist colonial government which had advocated independence.

The idea of independence grew more popular, and by 1959 colonial leaders were organizing to break away from the Republic. Senghor sought to form an alliance between Senegal, Soudan (later Mali), Dahomey and Upper Volta. The latter two eventually broke away from the alliance, but in 1959 the Mali Federation, consisting of Senegal and Soudan, requested independence. It was granted in June 1960. Two months later the Federation broke up and became the two independent nations of Senegal and Mali. Meanwhile, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger formed a loose economic association, the Entente Council. Following in the path of Senegal and Mali, these four territories requested independence, which was granted to them in August 1960. Before long all the former African territories had become nations, and the course of economic and political development became an individual one for each nation.

During the period between the end of World War II and the birth of the independent African nations, France launched a series of programs designed to assist the Union in its economic development. These programs were initiated in the interest of France insofar as they contributed to the growth of resources which France derived from the territories, but the territories also profited from them during the years preceding independence, while they struggled to make the transition to economic and political autonomy and to determine what they wanted and needed as independent nations.

The first development assistance program, the Premier Plan d'Equipment, was drawn up in 1946 and aimed at massive technical aid concentrated in geographic regions in hopes of strengthening the African economy. This program maintained the Sociétés Indigenes de Prévoyance,[1] which were organizations that had been established with the purpose of preparing rural communities to create and manage agricultural cooperatives. These Sociétés suffered many administrative constraints and made only feeble attempts to train peasants to improve their lot.

Activities in existing agricultural projects, such as the Office of Niger along the Niger River, and the rice production project in Senegal, were intensified in an effort to increase agricultural production. Training of the peasants consisted of authoritative technical advice, given by technicians who were reported to be oblivious to the peasants' own practices, needs, learning styles and interests.

The official report on the outcome of the first Plan d'Equipment stated that "the program did not succeed in provoking substantial development in a short period of time" and it recommended that it be revised to include "a combination of diverse technical activities for the farmers and research into new means of extension, spreading of information and demonstration."[2]

Consequently, the second plan, the Deuxieme Plan d'Equipment, implemented during the years 1953-57, included increased provision for training. In addition to continuing large projects such as the Office of Niger, it contained schemes for managing small scale projects which could be pursued with traditional agricultural methods, a technical staff with training skills, and increased means of extension and information campaigns. The pace of technical activity was slowed down, and instead of trying to implement the program everywhere groups of farmers were selected to benefit from well-defined programs in limited areas.

From the standpoint of training and human development, the activities of this era were enhanced in November 1955 by the publication of two texts written by French officials who were responsible for development programs: the Teitgen Circular and the Note d'Orientation. These constituted a revised philosophy of development programs in their emphasis on the importance of human factors in technical activities. Specifically, the documents stated that "the notion of direct, real and permanent contact between the rural action organization and the peasant is the very basis of new operations."[3] The accent in these texts was put not only on adapting traditional techniques to new means of increasing production but also on training the technical specialists to understand the human aspect of communicating new techniques. The concept of development thus took on a new dimension whereby the rural population was to become more aware of the nationally designed efforts to change their traditional life patterns.

At the same time as more attention was being paid to training rural people, the economic institutions in rural areas were evolving. The Sociétés Indigenes de Prevoyance continued their activities with an increased effort to become organizations over which the rural peasants would have more control. In some countries, Paysannats were created; modeled after French post-war organizations in Morocco, Paysannats worked toward technical modernization, social progress and implementation of new rural institutions.

Between 1953 and 1956 the Sociétés were replaced by Sociétés Mutuelles de Développement Rural, which were less dependent on territorial administrative control; they were regarded as "pre-cooperatives" which would eventually become members of a cooperative union. In theory, these new Sociétés were to lead to economic autonomy of rural producers, but in fact, because the territorial governors did not take enough interest in preparing them for self-management, they remained under strict administrative control.[4]

Thus, the ideas and experiments which appeared around 1955 marked a turn of events toward a better understanding of the links between technical progress and development, and between development and training. And at this time, the term "animation" began to appear in documents on methods for improving the rural milieu. "Rural action" began to be discussed by those in the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Economy and by others responsible for planning and executing development programs.

In the Third Plan (1957-63), which coincided with independence, rural development was defined as "the expansion of the economic personality of the overseas peasant, who must become not only a producer reaping higher returns, but also an individual aware of his responsibilities to the group in which he belongs."[5]

By the time of independence, the process of economic and social development in African nations had been strongly influenced by nearly a century of French rule. In some ways it had become difficult to distinguish between French-directed patterns of development and what would have been traditional or indigenous patterns.[6] In any case, the years of French colonial rule made their mark on the society which post-independence development programs, such as animation rurale, were intended to transform.

One way of describing the French colonial system and its effects on the rural population is to characterize it in contrast to the British system. By and large, the British colonial administration attempted to keep local power structures intact and to do no more than supervise them and control local situations which might get out of hand. The administration was decentralized insofar as little effort was made to unite diverse communities or to impose upon them a consistent system of government. Likewise, the economic and social activities of the various communities were not integrated on a central level in any of the colonies.

The French colonial system, on the other hand, imitated the French national system in that it was characterized by centralized control, and hierarchical organization. There were over three times as many French as British civil servants sent to their respective colonies, and the French were assigned in large numbers to administrative posts in central and regional capitals of the territories. Administrative activities reaching down to the lowest levels, including the police forces, were manned almost exclusively by Frenchmen rather than Africans.

Communities, as such, were not the focus of service. In fact the British concept of "community" did not exist, and in its place was the concept of "public."[7] Communities and other groups were not expected to initiate activities nor to be self-reliant. Rather, the public masses were treated as the lowest level of a hierarchical structure of government, in which ideas and directives moved from the top down.

During the 1950's, in anticipation of independence, the British concentrated on improving the social, educational and health conditions among the Africans by creating community development programs in response to the people's "felt needs." The French, on the other hand, concentrated on helping the peasants adjust to their forthcoming self-rule and to programs of the incoming national government. They were concerned more with economic than social conditions, and they continued to give priority to large-scale regional projects such as the Office of Niger and to widely-instituted agricultural programs rather than to local community development efforts.

Meister suggests that the characteristics peculiar to the French brand of community development (animation rurale) might be found in its Roman Catholic origins.[8] Animation is based in a concept of hierarchy even more profound than a political administrative hierarchy, namely, that of the church. This concept of hierarchy has had a strong influence in the rural communities influenced by Catholicism (and in those non-Catholic communities where Catholic colonists ruled for many years). In these communities, the curé or religious leader often had more influence than the local traditional governor.

Roots in Catholicism have given rise to four characteristics in the French _animation rurale_ movement which distinguish it from Anglo community development. First, development projects are generally designed to encompass zones broader than local communities, since small communities would not be of significant size in a hierarchical system built up of many layers of government and amenable to large scale operations. Second, projects rely on political-administrative authority, which Anglophone community development workers, particularly liberal-minded North Americans, would resist. Then, the ultimate direction of the projects comes from some higher authority who is designated by sources outside of the community (often a priest, for example) over which the community has no control. And finally, the guiding tenets of the project are usually founded in reference to a definitive concept of society and of man, and much effort is made in the rationalization of the project's goals and activities to demonstrate the infallability of that concept. These four characteristics are evident in the _animation rurale_ programs which took place in West Africa.

Independence, African Socialism and the Liberal Catholic Movement

With the exodus of the French colonial rulers in the early 1960s, African leaders were left in a relative vacuum of political direction and organization. During the end of the colonial era, Africans had begun to take an active interest in their own political affairs, and had begun to make elaborate preparations for taking over their governments. Although the course of action taken by each nation was unique, they evidenced similar trends, since as elected delegates of their respective territories to Paris, the young African politicians shared similar experiences and ideas. In particular, the ideology of African Socialism characterized some of the new governments' policies and programs, including animation rurale.

African Socialism was not a single, well-defined philosophy, but rather a diffuse movement stemming from several sources of ideas and varying from country to country, depending upon the peculiarities of its spokesmen. The most notable doctrines of African Socialism were those of Nyerere in Tanzania, Nkrumah in Ghana, Touré in Guinea, and Senghor and Dia in Senegal. In fact, it was Senghor who coined the term, and he and Dia were two of the most articulate proponents of the movement. Whereas African Socialist ideas were fundamental in the government of Senegal, they did not directly influence the early leadership of Niger, because Niger's first leader, Diori, was closely allied with the Ivory Coast's Houphouët-Boigny, who favored a different strategy of development. Houphouët-Boigny had turned away from the Socialist-Communist movement in the early 'fifties, and had never expressed an interest in the ideas and activities of African Socialism.

Much of what was written and spoken about African Socialism was presented at the Dakar Colloquium in 1962, which was attended mainly by French-speaking, but also English-speaking, African leaders interested in sharing with each other their ideologies, goals and strategies for their emerging nations. From this emerged three main themes of the movement:[9]

1. Economic development was closely identified with socialism. Strong government control of economic activity and development in the

public sector was advocated.

2. Opposition was voiced to capitalism and its accompanying formation of classes. Political leadership, it was said, should depend on the will and participation of the people in all walks of life.

3. Continental unity was advocated so that African nations would search back in their own cultural roots for cultural identity, social patterns and a united approach to development and relations with non-Africans.

A close look at the Senegalese model of African Socialism can provide a more detailed picture of the ideology. The Senegalese model distinguishes itself from the others mainly in its emphasis on humanism and the importance of human as well as material resources. This emphasis results from the influence of two major philosophies, that of Marxist Socialism and that of the French Liberal Catholic movement.

The works of Marx and Lenin had been closely studied by Africans living in Paris during their student days and the periods during which they were representing their territorial governments. Senghor was particularly well-versed in Marxist philosophy. In his preoccupation with the painful transition process from a subsistence to a market economy, he was attracted more to the humanitarian character of Marx's solutions than to his economic and political analyses. Specifically, Senghor did not accept the concept of class struggle, the nationalization of the means of production or reliance on the working class to govern the nation--all of which were essential to Marxist doctrine. He did take from Marx the idea of economic planning and control on a central government level and participation of the masses in government.[10]

Senghor was sympathetic to the concept of "alienation," which was seminal in Marxist thought as well as in the Christian tradition. Thus, he could reconcile, and even synthesize, these two otherwise radically different philosophies. A Roman Catholic, Senghor was strongly impressed by Christian ideals, particularly as they were interpreted by Teilhard de Chardin, who placed materialistic development in the context of a move toward spiritual unity.[11]

With his profound humanitarian concerns, Senghor sought practical advice from two of his contemporary economic philosophers, François Perroux and Louis-Joseph Lebret, who were both principal figures in the French Liberal Catholic movement of that era.

Perroux, during this period, was writing numerous volumes on economics and the application of economics to development and to international relations.[12] His primary concern was with development as a human process, and his thinking was characterized by the phrase "economics of all men and of the whole man" (l'economie de tout l'homme et de tous les hommes"). Development, he wrote, "is the building of men by men . . . the awakening of the multitude." His economic programs attempted to reconcile two doctrines generally thought to be at odds with each other: development of the individual through the structures of capitalism, and development of the community through the structures of socialism. Perroux believed that individual development came about as individuals participated in the material development of their economy, and thus the goals of material and human development were not incompatible.

Lebret was a French Catholic priest, a participant in the "Club

Jean Moulin" during the French wartime resistance. He began his work with maritime communities, move on to the urban center of Lyon, and eventually began to work as an advisor to leaders of new nations in Latin America and Africa, including Senegal. He was a friend and follower of Perroux and a teacher of Dia. With Perroux he founded the institute of *Economie et Humanisme* in Southern France. Like his mentor, he was interested in the human dimension of economic development, and from early in his career instigated movements among workers and farmers to take responsibility for their own economic activities rather than allowing the government hierarchy, which did not have their interests at heart, to dictate policy in this area.

Among his many significant achievements, Lebret contributed to the papal encyclical of Pope Paul XII, *Populorium Progressio*, which expressed the Roman Catholic church's first concern for the problems and needs of people in developing countries and the advocacy of humanistic development similar to that described and practiced by the group in *Economie et Humanisme*. In the early 1940s in France, Lebret's work in communities, dubbed "the Lebret method," was characterized by its emphasis on participation of the grass-roots level workers in the government of their economic and social institutions. Lebret and his philosophy of *economie et humanisme* had a direct influence both on the national leaders of Senegal, where he served as counsel to the First Planning Commission in 1958, and on the theoreticians of IRAM, who worked closely with IRFED.

But it was Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia, the two leaders of the first Senegalese government, who expressly formulated the Senegalese version of African Socialism, and who, indeed, profoundly affected other African leaders.

A concise statement of the doctrine of African Socialism was given by Dia in his speech at the 1962 Dakar colloquium:

> African development is characterized by an underlying conception of man. Not man as an individual but man as a personality, who finds his full blossoming in the coherence of a living society, of an organic community. We can, in Africa, rely on the most authentic of our traditional values for achieving such a goal. That is why our way to development leads also to a community-centered socialism . . . to a socialism which, after having been the instrument of national liberation will be that of the liberation of man.[13]

The basic doctrines set forth by Senghor and Dia can be summarized as follows:

1. The requirements of the common good are binding on all members of the community, and the freedom to fulfill these requirements entails the choice of all members of the community to be collectively responsible for the development of their community. (This reflects Perroux' idea that it is only through working in and through society that individuals attain their own development.)

2. Economic development is an effort of all men and of the whole man. Development "embraces all sectors of social life; it results in harmonious growth of all sectors of human activity, many of which cannot be measured by production indices."[14] (Here again is Perroux' principle.)

3. Negritude,[15] a unique African phenomenon, is founded in the classless, community based society, in which power is grounded in spiritual and democratic values stemming from the indigenous African culture. (On this point, the class struggle defined by Marx and Lenin is re-

jected on the ground of its irrelevance to African society which consists of a single class--the poor.)

4. Differentiated classes will be deterred from evolving by means of a continuous dialogue between all members of the community--peasants, professionals and political leaders.

5. Socialism means that the power of the state is vested in its workers, not that the state rules its workers. The state does not control industry or commerce. (Although this concept of workers having power in their government is similar to that of Marx, the means of attaining the result is different, in that it requires workers' participation from the start instead of a class struggle which gives workers power.)

6. Capitalism as an economic structure is out-of-date and undesirable because it serves only the well-being of a minority. Private capital, especially from sources outside the state, is necessary in the first phase of development, but its uses must be controlled through the implementation of a centralized national plan.

7. In the world context, African nations should be committed to neither the capitalist nor the communist block of nations. Instead they should work toward a "synthesis of individualistic and socialistic values." (This again reflects Perroux.)

8. The common religious values of Islam and Christianity should be the basis for social values and activities. The communist concept of atheism is rejected.

9. Economic planning is a necessity.

> The [national development] plan is the instrument and center of all choices . . . the leading idea around which gather various

> popular forces called to participate actively in development. . . . It leads to the necessary dialogue between the technical elites and the masses, between the government and the citizens.[16]

10. Agriculture, not industry, is the sector of the economy to which primary attention must be paid, because most of the population depends upon the products of agriculture more than the products of industry. Consequently, it is the rural peasants rather than the industrial workers who must learn first to participate in national development. (Here again is divergence from Marx and Lenin.)

11. Agrarian reform is necessary. Rural economic and social institutions must be transformed so that peasants can express themselves through these institutions, and land must be distributed fairly to serve the common good.

These, then, are the main doctrines of African Socialism as outlined by Senghor and Dia, and the basis for the Senegalese national development plans. They stem from the ideas of Marx and of the French Liberal Catholic school. They lead to specific development programs, notably animation rurale, which was designed as the means of dialogue between national leaders and peasants on the grass roots level.

Cheikh Amidou Kane, who was the Commissioner General of the first Senegalese Development Plan, made a statement at the Dakar Colloquium which recapitulates this philosophical basis of animation rurale:

> Nothing can be resolved at the summit without a dialogue being established with the base. . . . Development at the base is absolutely essential, for it is at this level that the human emergence of socialism takes place, and nothing has meaning at the summit outside of this reality.[17]

Animation Rurale and IRAM

With their concept of African Socialism clearly in mind, the Senegalese leaders began in 1959 to prepare for independence by writing the first national development plan. To help them initiate the animation rurale program, they called upon the assistance of the Institut de Recherches et d'Application des Methodes de Développement (IRAM) in Paris. Since animation rurale, as instituted in Senegal and Niger as well as other countries, has been strongly influenced by the founders and other personnel of IRAM, the history of that organization and its activities is pertinent to the history of animation rurale.

IRAM was an offspring of the Institute de Recherche et Formation pour l'Education et le Développement (IRFED), which was founded on 27 March 1958 in Paris by Lebret and a group of colleagues who had directed the Institut d'Economie et Humanisme in southern France. It differed from its predecessor in focusing attention on the problems of developing countries rather than domestic concerns. It was (and continues to be) a private, non-profit organization, with research and training activities which were built upon thirty years of research done by the members of the Institut d'Economie et Humanisme.

The kind of work undertaken by IRFED reflects the philosophy of Lebret, and is expressed in the first statement of the organization's goals:

1. To help train people from developing countries who will work directly in the development process of their nation;
2. To implement concrete projects, particularly the prepara-

tion of development program plans;

3. To diffuse studies on development, especially through the publication of a quarterly journal, Développement et Civilisations; and
4. To explore theoretical models of development.[18]

IRAM came into existence in 1956 as a separate organization closely linked with IRFED. Its orientation and goals were not so much in research and training as in actual technical assistance in development programs. Its first secretary-general was Yves Goussault, who was assisted on the directorate level by a staff of Frenchmen including Roland Colin and Guy Belloncle. All three were influential in development programs in West Africa.

"The institute, IRAM," stated a brochure circulated by the secretariat-general in 1961, "is an organization specialized in designing interventions which develop human resources in underprivileged economic sectors."[19] Because its activities were directed primarily toward economic goals, IRAM distinguished its efforts from exclusively educational programs such as those of literacy and basic education. The Institute's hypothesis was that progress in education should be, first of all, education in the tasks of development, making peasants aware of the links between their personal progress and the improvement of their standard of living. "The objective is the participation of human beings in development, and not only the awakening of the masses; the latter is only a preparatory step for the first."[20]

The first country in which IRAM was given an opportunity to test its theories of development and education was Morocco. In 1955-56, at the time Morocco was gaining its independence as a nation composed of former French and Spanish colonies, IRAM was contracted by the new government to help implement a program intended to increase the participation of people at the grass roots in technical and agricultural projects and to explain the Moroccan national development plan to the people in order that they might invest, through the products of their labor, in national financing. The government wanted the program to resist building a heavy administrative structure which would only duplicate the one that already existed. Thus, the peasants themselves were to become to the fullest extent possible, their own trainers and organizers. Here we find the necessity that led to the invention of some of the rudimentary techniques of training and programming used later in other animation rurale programs.

In the initial phase of the program in Morocco, existing small peasant organizations were transformed into centers where farmers were trained thoroughly in certain agricultural techniques. At first, the program touched only a small segment of the population. But its grand design was to teach farmers not only agricultural methods, but also the skills needed to run their own local economy, an understanding of how their communities would be represented on higher government levels, and how the rural economy would form the basis of the whole nation's economic reform.

But the program was stalemated before it could reach enough people to form an effective political force, and there was not time to teach more than a few rudimentary agricultural techniques. The newborn nation's government was very unstable, and the inability of the central government to control regional factions and opposition groups allowed low-level government administrators, who feared losing their own power, to co-opt the grass roots movement by forming a competitive association of collectives at the district level. Thus, the first case of an *animation rurale* program instituted on the national level was stifled within a few years.[21]

However, this was not a fair trial of *animation*, because the program was cut short not by its results, but by premature fears and intergovernmental rivalries. The lesson learned from this failure was an awareness of the considerable importance of involving administrative personnel in the *animation* program so that they would understand and favor its goals. All reports indicated a lack of enthusiasm on the part of public officials and technical experts working in development programs. In the province of Rabat, for example, the *animateur* noted that it was impossible to carry out a planned irrigation project, because political haggling prevented general development goals from being translated into precise directives at the local level. It was apparent that agreement upon and commitment to specific development goals by groups at all levels was necessary to carry out actual programs.[22]

The experience in Morocco also gave the IRAM staff an opportunity to witness a negligence on the part of the government which led to a costly loss. Before independence Morocco had acquired a relatively large amount of capital, part of which was invested in an extensive irrigation project, managed by the *Office National des Irrigations*. In spite of large sums of money put into the infrastructure of several agricultural projects attached to the irrigation scheme, the results were almost negligible because the peasants, who had been expected to provide manpower, had not been encouraged or taught effectively to use the new techniques nor to understand the reasons for them and their effective change in their life activities. Thus, instead of increased production due to improved technical machinery and farming practices, the result was a decrease in production due to peasant disinterest. In this case, Morocco bore the burden of proof of the theoretical pillar of animation rurale--the need for participation in development programs on the grass roots level.[23]

Although the program in Morocco had failed to reach its goals, the theory on which it was built was gaining recognition by African leaders, and IRAM personnel were soon invited to Dakar to try again to put their theory into practice.

ENDNOTES

[1] These societies are described in detail by A. Magnen in Les Sociétés de Prévoyance in Afrique Noire, Groups d'Etudes 1957-58 (Paris: CHEAM, 1959).

[2] Y. Goussault, L'Animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Francophone, p. 2.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 4.

[5] Ibid.

[6] P. Easton, "Rural Adult Education in a Dependent African Economy," Stanford University, unpublished paper, 1973.

[7] K. Post, The New States of West Africa (Middlesex: Penguin African Library, 1964).

[8] A. Meister, Participation, Animation et Développement à partir d'une Etude Rurale en Argentine (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1969), pp. 210-12.

[9] W.H. Friedland and C.G. Rosberg, "The Anatomy of African Socialism," in African Socialism, edited by Friedland and Rosberg. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

[10] I.L. Markovitz, Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 133.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Perroux is known as an economist primarily for his theory of development poles which has a major influence on regional economic planning in many countries, including Senegal. "Growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it appears in points or development poles, with variable intensities; it spreads along diverse channels and with varying terminal effects to the whole of the economy" (L'Economie du XXe Siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961)).

[13] M. Dia, Déclaration à l'Ouverture de la Conférence Syndicale Panafricaine (Dakar, 9 January 1962).

[14] M. Dia, "Le Développement de Tout l'Homme et de Tous les Hommes," in *Déclaration d'Investiture* (Dakar, 4 April 1959).

[15] A close study of Senghor's ideas on *Negritude* has been made by I.L. Markovitz, *Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude*.

[16] M. Dia, *Déclaration à l'Ouverture de la Conférence Syndicale Panafricaine*.

[17] C.H. Kane, *Plan National et Option Sénégalaise pour une Politique de Développement Socialiste* (Dakar, December 1962).

[18] L.J. Lebret, "Où en est l'IFRED?" *Développement et Civilisations* 4 (October-December 1960).

[19] Y. Goussault, "La Participation des Collectivités Rurales au Développement," in *L'Animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Francophone*, p. 28.

[20] G. Belloncle, "Le Développement des Collectivités Rurales par la Formation d'Animateurs," *Archives Internationales de Sociologie de la Coopération* 10 (July-December 1961).

[21] René Dumont, *L'Afrique Noire est mal Partie* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962). This opinion was also expressed by A. Magnen in a personal interview (August 1976).

[22] Belloncle, "Le Développement des Collectivités Rurales par la Formation d'Animateurs," pp. 24-25.

[23] Ibid., pp. 6-8.

CHAPTER IV

ANIMATION RURALE IN SENEGAL

The case of *animation rurale* in Senegal is significant because its sixteen-year history makes it the longest running *animation rurale* program on a national scale and thus provides an opportunity to view its changes over time and their effects. Changes have come in part from the political and economic shifts in direction at the national level early in the nation's history, in part from the alterations in the program at times when the assumptions originally held by the planners no longer appeared valid, and in part from compensations needed when the plan was not implemented as anticipated. The Senegal case also offers a chance to study the relationship between national level development policy and local rural development programs, and the problems that arose from simultaneously centralized and decentralized orientations.

This chapter traces the history of the program in Senegal through a description of the changes in the course of its evolution and the reasons for those changes. We begin with an overview of the political and planning context in which *animation rurale* was initially situated. Then the program's development is depicted in terms of four distinct time periods: the consciousness-raising and institution-building phase of 1960-62; the local improvement project period of 1963-67; the period between 1968 and 1971, when the *Animation* strategy lost favor with national leaders; and the period following 1971, which saw the rebirth of *animation* *rurale* in the Secretariat of *Promotion Humaine*. We conclude with a brief comparison of the original concept and the current activities of *Animation*.

The Political and Planning Context

Animation rurale was an integral part of Senegal's initial national development strategy. To understand the program's role in national development, one must be familiar with the political context and economic development planning process that surrounded Senegal's independence.

During 1960 Senegal experienced its first two governments. The first was the Mali Federation in which Senegal and Soudan (later Mali) joined together, mainly for economic reasons, while maintaining separate national identities and governments. The Federation was granted independence from France in June 1960. Failure to agree upon who would become the leader of the Federation (Keita of Mali or Senghor of Senegal) and how much power the leader would have forced the two nations to separate only two months after they had become united.

On 26 August 1960, Senegal became a sovereign nation with a constitution patterned after that of the Fifth French Republic. One unusual feature of the new constitution was its bicephalous government--there were to be two leaders with a fairly equal division of powers. This arrangement emerged because two men, Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia, had both become powerful figures by the time the Federation was born, and they had worked out between themselves a distribution of responsibility within both the Federation and the Senegalese government.

With the breakup of the Federation Senghor and Dia avoided an internal power struggle by creating executive posts for each one. Senghor became the President, responsible for protecting the constitution and arbitrating matters in the government. Dia became Prime Minister, presiding over the Council of Ministers within the National Assembly. Whereas Senghor was more interested in public policy and foreign relations, Dia was concerned with domestic affairs and continued his pre-independence "strong personal commitment to economic planning and the rural development policies embodying Senegal's socialist option."[1]

In October 1958, Dia appointed four task forces to study constitutional, economic, social and administrative reforms. Lebret, who had been appointed economic advisor to the President's Council, was selected to head the group studying economic matters, and to coordinate the work of all four task forces in preparing a final report. The task forces worked in conjunction with teams preparing studies for the First Development Plan, initiated in January 1959 by two French consulting firms, the Compagnie d'Etudes Industrielles et d'Aménagement du Territoirre (CINAM) and the Société d'Etudes et de Realisations Economiques et Sociales dans l'Agriculture (SERESA).

The report of these consultants echoed the opinions of Senegalese politicians. They attacked the unresponsiveness of the colonial administration to the peoples' needs, the stultifying effect of the centralized bureaucracy, the ineffectiveness of field services, the low level of productivity and the corruption among public servants.[2] In carrying out the study, they chose a representative sample of 283 villages as a basis for gathering information about conditions in rural areas. Although participants were not consulted in all sectors of society, the task forces made a laudable effort to investigate rural problems.[3]

Resulting from the first reports of these studies, a structural reform law was passed in January 1960. This law, which anticipated the First Development Plan, sought to ameliorate the country's economic problems with institutional reforms. The new government was to have seven regions--delimited on the basis of social and economic homogeneity, existing networks of communications, and the location within them of towns that could serve as centers for the development of surrounding areas.

> By dividing the country administratively into its major economic zones, planners hoped to promote increased administrative decentralization and popular participation in development planning without compromising the rational allocation and use of national resources.[4]

Below the regional level were twenty-seven _cercles_ (later to become _départements_) and on the lowest level eighty-five _arrondissements_ which dealt directly with village organizations. Regional centers were to be the nexes of development, and administrators on the _cercle_ and _arrondissement_ levels were to extend government services to the villages and to communicate the needs of the villagers upward to the central government. These administrative reforms, together with a design of new rural institutions constituted the core of the First Development Plan, which was completed in early 1961.

Senegal's First Development Plan covered the years between 1961 and 1964. Its primary objectives were to institute the ideology of African Socialism in political and economic spheres, to diversify the economy, to destroy the *economie de traite* (the existing economic system in which most of the profits from the nation's resources did not stay in the country), and to modernize the economic and political institutions in rural areas. As a result of these measures the planners expected to achieve an eight percent increase in the annual Gross National Product.

Adopted by the National Assembly in May 1961, the Plan introduced a vast array of institutional reforms which were to be the basis of rural development. In the commercial sector, the *Office de Commercialisation Agricole* (OCA) was created to take control of production and marketing operations out of the hands of Lebanese-Syrian merchants and small African traders and to situate it in the government. The *Banque Sénégalaise de Développement* (BSD) had as its major purposes the financing of loans to farmers so that they would no longer have to depend on the private enterprise marketing system, and the dismantling of the centralized control of credit by French dominated institutions.[5] On the regional level, with extensions to the *cercle* level, *Centres Regionaux de l'Assistance pour le Développement* (CRADs) were formed to manage the field activities in the marketing, credit and equipment distribution.

To facilitate the economic planning dialogue between the national government and the rural communities a *Comité Regional de Développement* was established in each of the seven regions. This was not an elective organization, but top administrative officials and political leaders were to be members, in order that they become directly involved in development activities. These development centers clearly reflected the socialist emphasis on multivalent centers, multipurpose teamwork and inter-service coordination designed to better serve "the whole man."[6]

The OCA, the Bank and the Development Centers were national and regional institutions. On the local level three institutions were designed to transfer the control of economic activities to the peasants: cooperatives, Rurale Expansion Centers, and the Service of Animation Rurale.

The cooperative movement "on the level of real human communities constituted the kind of organization which allowed [Senegalese] to preserve old community values and to promote modern development which took place in the evolving currents of the modern world."[7] In their initial stage, the Senegalese cooperatives were conceived as organizations to handle small marketing, credit and supply services; it was planned that they would evolve into a more perfect form of "cooperatives of development," that is, they would take progressive responsibility for all the functions required in the harmonious development of the peasant community.

The planners believed that cooperative reform could succeed only with direct government intervention to incite, organize, finance and manage the cooperatives' activities. But the central government's intervention would diminish as members of the cooperatives learned to handle their own economic affairs. Once they had acquired experience, the government would relinquish its control and allow the cooperatives to manage themselves and thus to become vehicles for self-managed communities responsible for local development activities such as production, sales, consumption and credit.

The Rural Expansion Centers, institutions on the *arrondissement* level, were to provide technical aid to rural communities. These centers had polyvalent teams installed in each *arrondissement* where they would be accessible to rural communities. The Centers' staffs were composed of agents attached to the different technical services of the government: rural economy, health, public works, CRAD, education, cooperatives and social promotion. These agents were to work as a team to inform peasants on various political matters, to teach them new practices in agriculture, health, education and so on. The head of each Center, who would coordinate all activities, was to be directly responsible to the Minister of Planning and Development.

The third local level institution, the Service of *Animation Rurale*, was an organization designed to mobilize the human resources within villages. Its services were to be carried out in close conjunction with those of the cooperatives and the Rural Expansion Centers. A dedicated and dynamic young Senegalese, Ben Mady Cissé, was named Director. *Animation*'s particular function, he said, was to encourage a dialogue with the peasants and the government representatives "in order to unleash the revolutionary force which should be the leaven of our modern democratic structures, the foundation of Socialism for which we have opted."[8]

According to the Plan, *animation rurale* was to transform groups of villages into autonomous communes by training selected farmers to propagate the spirit of development. The training given to these *animateurs* was simple and practical; it was to help them build rural communes, true "cells of development."

In order to meet this goal, the *Animation Service* was organized to cover every administrative level, extending from the summit to the base: the national, to the regional, the *cercle* and the *arrondissement*. On the national level, the Directorate of *Animation* was situated in the Planning Department. It was commissioned to implement the specific technical components of the Plan in such a way as to turn responsibility for them over to the rural population, thereby "perfecting the socialist option and giving [the Plan] its human dimension."[9]

In each region, one person was given responsibility for coordinating the local program of *Animation* with the other administrative and technical services. The regional chief assisted the regional governor and his deputy in development projects and represented *Animation* in the Regional Development Committee (CRD). *Animation Centers* (CARs) were installed at the *cercle* level. Each Center had one or two permanent staff members. The director of the Center was a member of the staff of the Rural Expansion Centers (CERs) in the *arrondissements* covered in his *cercle*.

Thus, although the principal seat of *Animation*'s programs was in the *cercle*, its representatives had a voice in the preparation of the development activities on the regional and national levels as well.[10]

The *Animation* staff was also supposed to work with other rural programs, including the Rural Expansion Centers and the cooperative movement. The intended relationship with these other two local level institutions may be briefly summarized. The function of the Rural Expansion Centers (CERs) in the *arrondissements* was mainly educational: to train peasants in better farming, health, sanitation and other home and village development skills. CER staff members did not work directly in the villages; instead they intervened in an indirect fashion by concentrating their efforts on a few farmers living near the centers in hope that the effects of these selective demonstrations would spread to other farmers. Animation staff members were to facilitate the work of technical specialists in the CERs by seeking out those farmers who seemed sensitive to problems of development and willing to change their practices.[11]

Based on the 1961 IRAM report that gave some examples of Animation's success in cooperating with the Rural Expansion Centers, government leaders concluded that the mutual work of the two services was effective and should continue to be an important role of Animation in rural development. "When collaboration [between the centers and Animation] is genuine, two cogwheels are meshed; technical services and Animation units work together to multiply considerably the efficiency of their work."[12]

The cooperative movement had been introduced in Senegal even before independence. In the early 1960s the cooperative service was trying to educate cooperative officers and members in the management of their own marketing activities. Animation, being basically an educational service, could offer help to the cooperative movement. Likewise, the cooperative movement could be useful in the strategy of animation rurale by providing the nucleus of grass roots institutions in which peasants could put their new skills into practice. This collaboration between the Animation and cooperative services was foreseen in the First Development Plan, according to which cooperatives were to become the "cells of development"--the inter-village communes and the first layer of bottom-up institutions.

The Historical Development of Animation Rurale: 1960-1976

Animation rurale has moved considerably away from its original theory and its situation in Senegal's First Development Plan. The causes of this digression vary from national political crises to local and regional adjustments made to compensate for faulty planning and inadequate resources.

Four distinct time periods can be identified in the evolution of the program between 1960 and 1976. During the first period, between 1960 and 1962, the program was essentially one of consciousness-raising and institution-building. Animateurs were trained to instigate concern among their fellow villagers for the tasks that needed to be done in line with national development plans and to help them participate in the process of development. In the second period between 1963 and 1968 the consciousness-raising dimension of the program was subdued by national leaders, and the Animation staff was given responsibility for training and supporting animateurs in local community development projects. The intention of transforming "animated" villages into inter-village, subregional and regional institutions was no longer emphasized. The third period between 1968 and 1971 saw the Animation service move away from rural development training programs toward providing "civic and moral training" to urban dwellers and government administrators as well as rural traditional leaders. Finally, in the fourth period, 1973 to the present (1976), animation rurale became one of four programs of Promotion Humaine, a government agency commissioned to carry out technical training programs in both rural and urban areas.

1960-62: Consciousness-raising and institution-building. Animation rurale began as an experiment in late 1959. IRAM personnel assisted the Senegalese government in introducing two pilot programs, one in the Fleuve region and the other in the Casamance. These two regions were selected because they were both outside of the major peanut raising zone and therefore relatively untouched by the new market economy and by the Western culture which had come to Africa as part of the French colonial administration. An Animation training center (CAR) was set up in one département (cercle) of each region, and training sessions were held. The effects of these pilot programs were impressive enough for the government to decide to extend the program at the time of independence to other regions of the country.[13]

Senegal's First Development Plan anticipated the creation of twenty-three training centers (CARs) for men and 23 for women by the end of 1964, thus furnishing each département with one center. During this four-year period of the first plan, 7,500 animateurs and 3,800 animatrices were to be trained. Three criteria were used in selecting villages to be "animated":

1. Cooperatives should exist in the villages;
2. A fully-staffed regional expansion center (CER) should exist in the corresponding arrondissement;
3. Development programs in the corresponding regions should have progressed to a stage whereby villages with animateurs

could participate in regional development activities.[14]

In order to awaken the rural population to the value of technical progress, the Animation service began its work by introducing simple, short-term projects which could later become the point of departure for subsequent inter-village institutions. The objective of these initial projects was to improve the quality of life in some way that would be useful to villagers as well as attract their interest. Projects included new farming methods, strengthening communal farming and marketing activities, and building health centers, schools and animal shelters.

In agriculture, Animation helped villagers to improve their common fields and to invest the profits from those fields in more supplies and better equipment. Villagers usually worked both their own plots of land and common fields. Because the Animation strategy called for development activities to be directed toward communities rather than individuals, animateurs were advised to work with farmers on common fields rather than in their own plots. Previously the profits from common fields had been used for grand social occasions such as weddings and for gifts to the marabouts, who were leaders of Islamic brotherhoods and who were politically powerful in rural areas because they were believed to have spiritual power. They were given the products of common fields in turn for providing spiritual protection to the villages.[15]

Success in convincing villagers to use their profits from common fields for investment in development activities varied from region to region, often depending on the strength of traditional and religious leaders and on their attitudes toward Animation. Villagers in the peanut-raising regions of central Senegal were not always amenable to

Animation's instruction. In the *département* of M'Bour, for example, in which a relatively active *Animation* program was underway, only nineteen common fields were developed in an area of 91 villages.[16] Peanut-raising regions were more difficult to influence because farmers were deriving a good income from their individual plots and were not interested in collective farming. Moreover, the *marabouts* were strong and peasants were reluctant to reduce their contribution to their spiritual allies for the sake of improving their temporal conditions.[17] In some cases *marabouts*, fearing competition from *animateurs*, tightened the moral constraints on their followers and discouraged them from following the advice of *animateurs*; but in other cases they were supportive of *Animation*.

In the Fleuve region, *Animation* concentrated on starting cooperatives for marketing rice, which was becoming an increasingly important crop along the Senegal River. The services of *Animation* and *Cooperation* worked together in this region to increase the profit villagers received from rice production and to help villagers channel their profits into small community development projects such as digging common wells for both drinking water and irrigation.

In the Casamance, *animateurs* were relatively successful because farming conditions were favorable, peasants had not yet been touched by the new market economy, and, in an area where Animist religions predominated, the influence of *marabouts* was weak. *Animation* projects included reforestation and improvement of village coconut and palm plantations. *Animateurs* taught soil conservation and fire prevention practices as means of raising the rate of crop production. Many of these projects were planned and implemented in cooperation with the Service of Water and Forests. The main problem faced by *Animation* was a lack of perseverance on the part of villagers. In the *départements* of Bigogna and Oussouye, for example, two-thirds of a 70 hectare coconut plantation was lost due to careless maintenance.[18]

Health care and education projects were introduced in all regions served by *Animation*. *Animateurs* were trained to show villagers concrete steps to take in preventing diseases and caring for illness and injuries. Health centers were built, financed by the profits from common fields and cooperatives. Villagers installed protected wells with sterilizing filters, covered latrines and proper storage spaces for animal dung and carcasses. In order to combat infant mortality, mothers were taught the value of vaccinations and periodic health check-ups for children. Means to battle sickness and death was one of the most often expressed needs of the peasants. Although some resistance to new medical practices came from traditional medicine men and mid-wives, *Animation*'s community health care programs usually won popular support. In some instances, villagers began to mix traditional health practices with new techniques.

In addition to supporting this kind of short-term improvement project, *Animation* endeavored to encourage inter-village projects which would eventually lead to the first level of bottom-up institutions. The introduction of cooperatives for marketing peanuts, rice and other cash crops was viewed as the first step in creating inter-village institutions.

In training sessions for cooperative presidents and weighers (who were, in effect, secretaries) Animation staff members taught the mechanics of cooperatives and the skills needed to manage them. Since those serving as cooperative presidents and weighers were often prestigious members of their villages, the training sessions also served as the context of a dialogue between village leaders, animateurs and Animation staff members about the role of animateurs in the villages and about the representation of villages in inter-village institutions. Occasionally, animateurs themselves were selected to serve as cooperative officers, but this was not encouraged, since the animateur was supposed to help villagers oversee the work of cooperative officials. The system of checks and balances broke down when an animateur served in a position which he was also responsible for controlling.

During the first two years, the Animation service did not spread its efforts equally throughout all regions of the country. The Fleuve and the Casamance regions received concentrated attention by virtue of having had pilot projects. By 1963, twenty percent of the villages in those two regions had been touched, while no more than seven percent of those in the peanut-growing regions of Thiès, Diourbel and Sine-Saloum had been reached. Eastern Senegal was neglected completely until 1963 when the first training center was built. The region offered unexploited resources, but it was difficult to work in, being sparsely populated and lacking adequate transportation and communication infrastructure.

The Cap-Vert region constituted a special case with its large urban-industrial population in Dakar, Goree and Rufisque. People living there were accustomed to Western cultural patterns, and farmers in the two rural *arrondissements* of the region used modern techniques to raise peanuts and truck garden crops for marketing in the cities. *Animation* focused on increasing and improving food crops in Cap-Vert; the scope of activity was narrower than in other regions.

These, then, are the kinds of activities carried out by *animation rurale* in the various regions of Senegal during the first years of independence. By the end of the First Development Plan (1964) nearly 1,300 villages had been reached. This total did not reach the projected number of 1,500, but it accounted for over ten percent of the villages in the country.[19]

By early 1963, after over two years of operations, *animation rurale* had encountered certain setbacks which were to change significantly its goals and activities. The most dramatic event to have an effect on the program was an unanticipated shakeup in the national leadership and, subsequently, revisions of the national rural development policy. Other problems occurred at the local level resulting from planners' misjudgments about how villagers, *animateurs* and staff members would interact. We will look first at the kinds of difficulties that arose on the grass roots level and then at the central government crisis which directly influenced the course of *animation rurale*.

According to analytical reports of the evolution of the *Animation* service prior to 1963,[20] the program had four general problems: first, sometimes *animateurs* were badly selected; second, the program often met with strong resistance from farmers and local leaders; third, *Animation* staff members were inadequately trained to handle that resistance; and fourth, staff members sometimes did not behave appropriately in their work with other government officials.

Although the theoretical plan for selecting animateurs included rigorous selection criteria, the Animation staff learned only through trial and error that those criteria were not always adequate, because the social status in his village of the person selected as an animateur weighed heavily on his chances of influencing villagers. In the Fleuve region, where extended families usually constituted small villages, traditional chiefs often chose to send their slaves rather than members of the family to Animation training sessions. Since slaves did not own land and had very low social status, they could not command the respect of villagers. In the Casamance, where nuclear families were more autonomous than in the Fleuve region, young men had little voice in communal decisions and thus little influence as animateurs.

In the central regions of Thiès, Diourbel and Sine-Saloum, largely populated by Muslims, resistance to Animation occurred in spite of the good intentions of many local leaders. The traditional economic and social system was in a state of erosion due to the recent introduction of the peanut-marketing economy. A political clientele network had grown strong as a result of the new market, and Muslim marabouts had gained economic-political as well as spiritual power in their villages. Although some marabouts felt their private business interests threatened by Animation, others supported the program's goals and sent their young students, called talebes, to the training sessions. Unfortunately the religious leaders' endorsement of animateurs had a negative effect, because most villagers did not identify with the marabouts' clientele and thus did not see the relevance of the talebes' suggestions to their own lives and work.[21]

The problem of resistance to *Animation* projects appeared in various sectors of the population. The resistance of local administrators, village chiefs and other local elites to the initiatives of *animateurs* was based in part on their fear of losing their own power, since social reform programs such as *animation rurale* had been designed intentionally to alter existing power structures. Cissé has written that

> . . . as *Animation* works with people at the grass-roots level, it is clear that there will be resistance as much from the environment of the group as from the group itself; thus, a villager may set his face against an activity which the *animateur* wishes to promote; a political or government official will be jealous of the *animateur*'s action and seek to hinder it; or government-employed technicians will not consider collaboration with the rural communes in their own [personal or professional] interest.[22]

Resistance on the part of farmers was not usually due to an unwillingness to cooperate with *animateurs* but rather to a lack of perseverance, a natural reluctance to abandon existing life and work patterns, and a poor understanding of the reasons for changing these patterns. Although the planners of *animation* had conducted studies of rural areas and had made conscientious efforts to comprehend the problems at the village level so that the First Development Plan could incorporate measures to solve them, they had not explained to the peasants the relevance of the plan to village-level economy and society. One of *Animation*'s first tasks was to help peasants see the relevance of the Plan to their own lives, but staff members and *animateurs* rushed into development projects before enough people understood their purpose in terms of long-range development. Even when preliminary explanations were made about the relationship between peasants' expressed needs and the goals of national development, most did not see how community projects fit into national development plans.[23]

The third problem was an inadequate preparation of both *Animation* staff members and *animateurs* to overcome local resistance and to persuade other administrative and technical officials to cooperate in training programs. According to IRAM's evaluation report of 1961,[24] no precise tasks for *Animation* had been designated at either the national or regional levels. *Animateurs* had only a vague understanding of the Plan and could not integrate their activities into well-coordinated development projects. Consequently, most of them conformed with existing activities rather than providing a new and broader perspective on what needed to be done.

Members of the Rural Expansion Centers (CERs) on the *arrondissement* level and the *Animation* centers (CARs) on the *département* level lacked the capacity to coordinate the work of the various technical service agents in order to provide *animateurs* with the range of expertise they required. Consequently *animateurs* tended to become involved with the activities of technical experts on the basis of availability or friendship rather than need. IRAM stressed the need for more coordination among local administrative personnel

On the regional level, members of the regional development committees (CRDs) "lacked the will and the resources to act as genuine planning bodies" and to integrate development activities below the national level. Committee members attended meeting regularly but were unable to work together to implement regional development plans.

In an October 1963 speech to the Party, Senghor offered explanations of the reasons for the administrative weaknesses which were affecting the progress of new rural institutions and the work of Animation. Most chiefs of Regional Expansion Centers were displaced agents from the agricultural service who had had no training as planners, economists or administrators. The centers, in addition to being understaffed, functioned without a clearly defined program and in a vague relationship to the regional development committees (CRADs) and other branches of the government. Consequently, rural development workers, including animateurs, were geographically isolated, hierarchically unsupervised and without technical support. At all levels of the bureaucracy there was little sense of initiative and professional responsibility.

The fourth problem arose from the behavior of Animation staff members in their work with technical and administrative agents. Animation staff members tended to belittle the work and accomplishments of the technical specialists, many of whom were Frenchmen who had worked in Africa before independence. The Animation staff, constituted in part of young Frenchmen who were often new to both fieldwork and Africa, distrusted the motives of the older technical specialists, ignored the value of their experience, knowledge and achievements, and did not always establish good relations with them. Since agriculture, health and other technical agents were reluctant to cooperate with the Animation service, technical assistance was not always available to animateurs.[25]

In addition to creating bad relations with technical specialists, Animation staff members sometimes alienated local administrative and political officials by blaming them for rural development problems. They tended to "reduce political reality to antagonism between the political-administrative apparatus and the peasants."[26]

On some occasions *Animation* staff members appeared naive about village social dynamics. They were uninformed by villagers and unable to discern for themselves the circumstances preventing villagers from participating in community development projects. Sometimes in training sessions *animateurs* would frankly share their opinion of conditions and problems in their villages. Subsequently, doors were closed to *Animation* by village leaders and local officials who did not want newcomers meddling in their affairs.[27]

In sum, *Animation*'s chances of success were reduced by a series of local level problems, including badly selected *animateurs*, strong resistance from farmers and local leaders, inadequately prepared staff members and *animateurs* to meet the resistance, and a lack of appreciation on the part of staff members both of the technical and administrative services and of village conditions.

1962-67: A national crisis and reduction of institution-building. December 1962 saw the culmination of a national level political conflict in which *animation rurale* played a part and which altered the course of the program's evolution. The crisis was a struggle between President Senghor and Prime Minister Dia. Committed to the philosophy of African Socialism, the two leaders had been political allies long before the time of independence. When the new nation was born, they had managed to create an arrangement that avoided a struggle for the top seat in the government. Their spheres of interest and influence were complementary: Senghor was mainly concerned with public policy and foreign relations, while Dia dealt with economic planning and rural de-


1.0
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

velopment.

However, this amicable distribution of power was destroyed by a political contest in 1962 that resulted in Dia's banishment from the government. From all appearances the two leaders never did disagree seriously on matters of national goals, policy or planning. The accounts of what actually caused the struggle between them are not consistent. All agree, however, that animation rurale played a role in the general course of events.[28]

In 1960, when the Council of Ministers was introducing the scheme of building rural institutions from the grass roots level upward, Dia commissioned studies on the effectiveness of planned reforms and their possible outcomes. In essence, these reports recommended that the process of rural development be accelerated in order to insure timely effectiveness.[29]

Acting on the recommendations in the reports, Dia moved the Central Planning Commission into a more prominent position so that it had authority over other ministries and he reinforced the measures in the First Development Plan designed to transfer control of the economy from private interest groups to the government by way of the rural peasants. In a series of memoranda[30] Dia proposed legislation to decentralize planning, accelerate the implementation of animation rurale and cooperatives, and promote communal agricultural production projects and modern farming methods.[31] To stimulate the increased production of cash crops, he ordered cooperatives to market peanuts, to provide consumer goods such as rice, fuel, agricultural tools and supplies, and to distribute loans to farmers.[32]

> There was no doubt that many felt threatened [by Dia's actions]. The foreign traders were gradually being replaced by the OCA and the cooperatives; Senegalese businessmen saw their chance to . . . expand their affairs being reduced by the [government supported] cooperatives. Marabouts, who headed Muslim brotherhoods and who profited considerably from the peanut industry, saw their power basis being shaken by animation rurale and the cooperatives. Foreign commercial companies saw that their future was uncertain, and Senegalese officials who had recently come to occupy posts of leadership within the commercial system were particularly discontent. This led to a critical point of rupture: the economic development program had begun to demand a change in social structures. . . . A system in which the expansion of the rural milieu in the form of 'co-operativisation' as a fundamental objective [finds itself] in a dilemma as soon as the social organization of other sectors fails to move in the same direction.[33]

Dia's reform measures obviously signaled a decline in the influence of private investors and traders over economic matters; and mindful of their self-interests, these individuals began to pressure their representatives to stop Dia's programs and to curtail his power. In addition to antagonizing private investors, Dia had touched off opposition among the marabouts by suggesting that they confine their influence to that of their role of religious leadership and not meddle in economic affairs. Traditional leaders were annoyed at Dia's allies, including Ben Mady Cissé, the Director of Animation, who appeared to work without respect for the interests of Party officials. At the local level, technical service agents seemed to be jealous of the Animation cadres, who had strong political support from Dia and a relatively large share of government financial resources.

In the fall of 1962, anti-Dia forces began to emerge in behind-the-scenes political caucuses in the single party government.

> The working relationship of Senghor and Dia became strained as the mutual antagonism of their personal supporters intensified, and speculation mounted over Dia's apparent maneuvering among

> the President's political allies from the Muslim religious leadership.[34]

Nonetheless, Senghor never explicitly objected to Dia's actions, and it is probable that he was pulled into a political controversy which had no basis in issues of policy and planning.[35]

In mid-December, Dia's political opponents planned to introduce in the National Assembly a motion of censure against his government. Since all members of the National Assembly belonged to the UPS Party, the majority of whom supported Dia, he postponed the motion of censure long enough to allow for the Party to resolve its dissection in a political meeting before introducing it into the legal context of the Assembly. His opponents, however, refused to acknowledge his command to forestall the motion. On December 16 Dia ordered the arrest of four of the leaders of the group opposed to him. Senghor, acting as arbitrator of conflicts between government officials, sent paratroopers to disperse the police who had made the arrest on the floor of the Assembly. Later in the day, the Assembly voted to censure the Dia government, and the next day Senghor arrested Dia on the charge of an attempted coup d'etat.

Although Dia had been justified in his attempt to solve a political problem within the Party before introducing it to the legal process, he had acted illegally when he ordered the arrest of Assemblymen who had the official prerogative to bring a motion of censure before the Assembly with or without the concurrence of the Party members.

In March 1963 the Second Senegalese Republic replaced the first, and President Senghor became the chief executive. Although Senghor's own commitment to the tenets of African Socialism apparently did not falter,[36] his public espousal of them did. His commitment to rural development programs, including *animation rurale*, diminished after an initial period of support necessitated by popular sentiment in favor of *Animation*.[37]

In short, whereas *animation* did not lose the ideological support of those at the national level who had conceived it, pressures from various interest groups forced a conflict to be resolved on the national level which resulted in curtailment of the program. After 1962 the vigor of *animation rurale* began to dissipate.

With the removal of Prime Minister Dia, Senghor's control over rural development programs increased considerably. His actions reflected a new concern for economic development and technical expertise and less interest in political consciousness-raising and "soft" social welfare programs. He proclaimed that "even the most blind should be able to see that development is not connected to an ideology, but to methods and techniques which are indispensable to all nations no matter what their ideology."[38]

Although he could not afford politically to cancel the popular program of *Animation*, he took measures to reduce its consciousness-raising activities. In his address to the National Assembly in April 1963, he emphasized the economic and technical development responsibilities of *Animation*:

> The service of *Animation* has been conceived from the beginning as the original tool of our national development. . . . *Animation* has for its essential task the imparting to all echelons the mystique of development. . . . It is only through this meeting of the technical-administrative apparatus and the popular institutions . . . only through their concrete work that the objectives of the Plan of Development will be able to be realized.[39]

Senghor insisted that *Animation* could no longer implement government decisions in the "former boy scout style." "We have begun with the reorientation of the First Plan to make *Animation* pass from its psychological stage to its technical stage."[40]

While confirming his support of *Animation* by introducing *animation urbaine*, thereby extending the Division's scope of activities to the urban population and civil servants, he simultaneously reduced its threat to private investors and his own political supporters who for one reason or another had opposed the intentions and methods of *animation rurale*.

During the months following the ousting of Dia, Senghor worked to consolidate his government, to form a new constitution and to reform the lower administrative levels of the government and of rural development programs. The overall effect of his reforms was a generous increase in authority given to *Animation* on the national level and a restriction of latitude and power on the local level.

In accord with the reform measures of June 1963, the Directorate of *Animation* was moved from the Ministry of Development to a strong position in the Ministry of Planning. It became the Directorate of *Animation* and Expansion, and thus subsumed the Rural Expansion Centers (CERs), whose director became responsible to the Director of *Animation* and Expansion, Ben Mady Cissé. The regional centers were kept as the basic planning and development units, and were directed to strengthen coordinating mechanisms between technical services and educational programs, particularly *animation rurale*. On the national level a National Rural Expansion Center Commission was formed to coordinate rural development activities and to expand and adapt Animation programs for a widening audience of civil servants, village leaders and local influential community members.

This extension of Animation to government officials as well as to rural peasants was largely in response to the many cries for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the rural institutions, starting on the arrondissement level and moving up. It was hoped that those whose sympathies were not totally in line with the aims of socialism might become more conscientious in regard to national interest, and that administrators would acquire more of the skills they needed to fulfill their responsibilities.

In April 1954 a reform was put into effect to improve the communications circuit between the summit and the base, and to assign responsibilities within the complex network of agencies and administrative units between the President and the villages. The cercles were given the designation of départements, and their prefects became directly responsible to regional governors, whereas previously reporting had been to the Minister of Interior. Department Development Committees (CDDs) were created so that there would be some machinery for coordinating planning and development activities between the arrondissement and the regional centers. The overall result of these structural changes was to decentralize planning and development activities. Paradoxically, this effort at decentralization coincided with the strengthening of the Animation service at the central level.

The effects the December 1962 crisis had on rural development institutions were evident in the Second Development Plan. The new plan, covering the four years between 1965-69, was presented under the title of la nouvelle politique (the new policy). It emphasized increased production. Its general goals were to increase the production of peanuts as a cash crop, to develop truck garden production, and to accelerate the implementation of rural development institutions.

The specific responsibility assigned to Animation was to reinforce the "essential task of instilling in the population at all levels the mystique of development." This meant, in fact, that Animation was to spread its program to higher level officials in technical and administrative services. Animation was to organize training programs for future middle-level government-workers; the first institution created for this purpose was the Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée, charged with preparing personnel for such key development posts as the chiefs of arrondissement level rural development teams (CERs), the directors of departmental rural Animation centers (CARs), regional Animation inspectors, regional and departmental directors of the Cooperatives service and the CRADs, and economic advisors to departmental prefects.[41] The new Plan called for more rapid evolution of vertical (ascending) institutions and the horizontal (regional) network of the cooperative movement.

The second Plan was able to overcome some of the weaknesses of the first, for which there had been insufficient preparatory studies among all levels and sectors of the population, a lack of experience in setting reasonable objectives, and an absence of directive and integrative mechanisms.[42]

Taken together, the first and second Plans provided for an initial four-year period of institution building, to be followed by a second four years of rapid economic growth. However, the extent of institution-building envisioned by the first Plan was not fully realized during the first four years, which meant that the second Plan was projecting a considerable increase in agricultural production built upon still incomplete institutions.[43] This gap between what was presumed and what was actual led during the second four years to the government's need to choose between giving priority to pursuing the building of institutions, which were originally the crux of the socialist development scheme, and increasing agricultural production in order to begin immediately to accumulate surplus revenue. The original plans for increasing production had called for initial intensive preparation and technical training on the grass roots level. But due to inadequate resources and the unforeseen resistance of villagers and local and national leaders, this base had not been built.

As the goal of immediately increasing production and the goal of continuing to build institutions appeared more clearly as competing demands on limited resources and necessitating either/or choices, Senghor began to distinguish between "the Plan" and "programs." The Plan was to operate on the national and regional levels, orienting the nation toward a balanced economy, whereas programs were to operate on département and arrondissement levels, providing community development projects to villagers. With this distinction, the prescribed inseparability of ascending and descending institutions began to crumble, as both no longer spanned the levels between the summit and the base, and ascending structures were no longer so loudly hailed as the foundation of national policy. When the distinction between higher level and lower level responsibilities emerged, the scope of animation rurale's goals shrank from those of national economic development to those of community welfare service, similar to those of community development programs conceived by British and Americans.

In general, three trends developed in the activities of animation rurale after 1963. First, Animation was to spread its programs to urban areas and to higher echelon administrative services, thus diffusing the resources and energy previously concentrated in the rural milieu. Second, the "educational" character of Animation's activities was emphasized and economic development projects reduced. For example, journées de développement were held periodically to inform a wide range of people about the process of development and their own country's Plan and programs. These journées were organized mainly as series of lectures rather than as activities in which learners participated in on-going development programs. This change in goals and methods signaled an important departure from the original theory and strategy of animation rurale.

The third trend was the withdrawal of Animation's charge to arouse popular support for African Socialism on the village level. This change in Animation's role resulted from Senghor's increased caution in espousing Socialist policies and rushing the process of educating the rural people to take power in the government. He was not willing to accept the same fate as Dia had met by imposing too forcefully his vanguard programs.

By the end of 1967, 8,500 animateurs had been trained and were working in 2,600 villages. This was twice the number that had been reached by the end of 1964. At this time, however, Animation's programs stopped growing in number, as the service had become seriously contested by another rural development program.

1968-71: Diminution of human resource development goals. Shortly after the new government was installed in 1963, the seeds of animation rurale's destruction were being planted by the rising prestige of a new rural development strategy. The years between 1967 and 1971 witnessed the contest between two opposing theories of rural development and the eventual subdual of the theory which had supported animation.

During these years Senegal suffered serious economic problems. and some national leaders, including the new prime minister, attributed the resulting unrest among the population partly to the earlier consciousness-raising activities of animation rurale. Let us now look at these two sources of increasing opposition to the program.

In 1964, as part of the process of designing the Second Development Plan, the agricultural sector was carefully studied, and significant administrative reorganization was proposed. In that year, the regional development centers (CRADs) and the Cooperative Service were integrated on regional and local levels.

The most important event in the process of reforming agricultural services was the entrance on the scene of the Societé d'Aide Technique et de Coopération (SATEC). SATEC was a French development assistance firm which Senghor and Dia had called on for advice on administrative reform in agriculture in the early 1960s. SATEC's influence had grown, much to the displeasure of Animation leaders, because SATEC's theory and practices placed higher value on technical change than human resource development.

In the fall of 1964 "Operation SATEC" was launched with the grand goal of increasing production of peanuts and millet by 25 per cent during the next three years. The operation was financed by the French government and the European Economic Community as compensation for the effect on Senegal's economy of the community's new limit to subsidies given to former French colonies. The SATEC program was mainly one of agricultural extension.

In 1967, SATEC had failed to reach their production goal, partly because weather conditions had been extremely adverse, but also because in their intensified effort to increase cash crop production, they had employed poor agricultural techniques and had not used human and physical resources to their best advantage.[44] Nonetheless, in 1967 the government had to decide whether or not to invest in the continuation of SATEC's program, since most foreign funds would not be renewed.

The Animation service was directly affected by SATEC's plan for future rural economic development. The Animation staff was openly critical of the proposals put forward by SATEC, according to which technical plans would be made by national leaders and their foreign advisors and implemented in rural areas by extension agents. SATEC's goal was to increase production quickly, spending a minimum of time and effort on the education and social welfare of farmers and their families.

Those responsible for animation rurale reiterated their own recommendations for a rural economic development strategy, and they harshly criticized the previous work and proposed plans of SATEC. Anima-

tion spokesmen were particularly suspicious of the 'technocratic' approach to agricultural modernization which was heavily dependent on expatriate personnel working on a long-term basis. This strategy was viewed as hostile or at best indifferent to [illegible] genuine commitment to the cooperative movement, the *animation rurale* program, and the institutional development strategy at the core of Senegal's original socialist option.[45]

But it was also apparent that the methods of *Animation* had been less than perfect. Its work with the cooperative movement in training cooperative presidents and weighers to manage their organizations competently and honestly had not been entirely successful, and there was still widespread corruption and malpractice in local cooperatives. After seven years, the rural communes, "cells of development," had not progressed beyond the first stage, and were far from becoming the autonomous communal structures that had been envisaged. With Senghor's increased caution toward socialist schemes, it was unlikely that such communes would be allowed to evolve, since the communes were to be political instruments, and Senghor had clearly reprimanded the *Animation* staff for political activity, limiting their role to that of "teacher, not politician."[46]

Thus, with the balance of favor shifting away from the "socialist option" and toward increased production, the Senegalese government decided to build rural institutions along the order of those recommended by SATEC. In January 1968, the government of Senegal, SATEC, the Bank and the Cooperative Service were grouped together into the *Société de Développement et de Vulgarisation*

Agricole (SODEVA).

The role of Animation in rural development was to remain "unchanged," according to Senghor; this meant that it was to be confined to informing the people about government programs and encouraging village development projects, but without becoming involved in technical training programs or activities. Thus, the previous integration of institution-building activities and training programs for villagers was definitively split, and animation rurale was turned into a politically impotent civics education course.

Animation's political security was further threatened by the suspicion that it had contributed to anti-government activity in the rural areas. In 1968 an expression of discontent known as the "peasant malaise" ran through the countryside. The third consecutive year of severe drought (to be followed by several more) had passed, and many peasants were starving. Following the orders of their government, they had been limiting their crops mainly to peanuts, a cash crop, and had not been able to grow enough food even to feed themselves. Since government monopolies controlled the amount and kind of seeds and supplies available to them, they were not free to plant what they wanted. Thus in the late 1960s, peasants began protesting the government's rural policies and insisting that they be allowed to feed their own families before providing income to the government.

The voice of discontent was more apparent than it might have been otherwise due to the recent launching of a large project in Rural Educational Radio (Radio Educative Rurale).[47] In each village listening clubs had been formed, and through these groups, villagers were asked to write to the radio station their questions and opinions on the government's effect on their lives and work. The response was astounding.

> It was like opening the flood gates. More than 300 letters came in during January and February 1969. Letters of misery and complaints, or rage against being cheated and of enquiry about the rights of peasants.[48]

Although Radio Educative Rurale was not organizationally linked to Animation,[49] it was certainly a kind of "animation," and in this instance one which capitalized on the ten years of peasant's awareness built up by animation rurale. It was not difficult to draw conclusions about the extent to which the Animation service had been responsible for teaching the peasants to take an interest in their own welfare and provoking them to complain about government neglect.

Ironically, several of the peasants' specific complaints were directed toward policies and programs which Animation had been supporting. For example, the promotion of peanut cooperatives was often questioned; they were looked on as foreign institutions for which the peasants felt no responsibility. They did not like the joint liability sureties into which they were forced to enter as members of village cooperatives, they complained about the multiplicity, complexity and dishonesty of administrative institutions.[50] Since Animation was meant to promote rather than to criticize these new rural institutions, it appeared that either Animation itself was coming under attack by the peasants, or, as many government officials suspected, the cadres of animateurs had been critical of certain government activities and of politicizing the population in spite of orders not to do so.

As a result of the increased importance of SATEC and of *Animation*'s perceived connection to the peasant malaise, the responsibilities assigned *animation rurale* were reduced. But the Service of *Animation* was growing and expanding into other sectors. The Director of *Animation* and Expansion had become increasingly influential in the central government. Thus, on the records, *Animation* appeared to be making a growing contribution to national development goals.

In 1969, however, *Animation* and other economic development services came under severe attack from Italconsult, an Italian firm of management consultants employed by the government to once again revise its development programs.

The Italconsult team saw a need for

> . . . a much sharper distinction between the concepts of 'community development' and 'economic development' implicit in the government's basic strategy for rural socioeconomic change. . . . 'Ideological confusion' . . . [resulted from] the politically attractive idea that traditional community ties and social values would provide a propitious basis for the rapid and massive introduction of modern cooperative structures.[51]

The team advised that *Animation* restrain itself to activities in civic education and community consciousness-raising, and that responsibility for developing community economic institutions be transferred to those more capable of such a technical task, namely, the augmented Cooperation Service now called the *Office d'Invervention Technique pour l'Expansion Rurale* (OITER). Since *Animation* was now characterized as a "civic and ideological" training program, its position in the central government organization was to be transferred to the ministerial department concerned with adult education. These recommendations were part of the report that Italconsult presented to the government in mid-1970.[52]

Responding to the report, the government, in the person of Habib Thiam, Minister of Rural Development, proposed that all rural development services, including *Animation*, be incorporated into the Ministry of Rural Development, to which their personnel, vehicles and infrastructure would be reassigned. The Ministry of Rural Development would then reorganize these services to meet the demands of large-scale agricultural production projects.

Threatened with a devastating loss of power as well as destruction of their ideological foothold, the *Animation* staff prepared a set of counterproposals. They criticized the proposed merger of the services of Agriculture and *Animation*, arguing that the latter should be the conscience and judge of the former, vis-à-vis socialist goals, and hence the two should be administratively separated. Next, they insisted that top priority be given to "the task of educating, organizing and encouraging the rural masses to articulate their own needs and grievances." Rural cooperatives should continue to be treated as cells of development. In short, *Animation* pleaded for recommitment to the original "socialist option." They suggested an administrative arrangement whereby technical services and cooperative education and community development would be two separate but equal departments, both working for the Planning Ministry in local development projects as well as vast production schemes. The details of the proposed arrangement were thoroughly elaborated.[53]

But the proposals adopted in June 1970 were not those of Cissé and *Animation*. Instead, the Ministry of Rural Development was upgraded in authority and resources. The Ministry's struggle with *Animation* continued until September when Prime Minister Diouf bluntly halted the contest by issuing a policy statement calling for the dismantlement of the *Direction* of *Animation* and Expansion. "As the party's structures become stronger, this civic and moral training [previously carried out by *Animation*] must be left to the Party. *Animation* must now orient itself toward more precise actions, though not more technical ones."[54] Diouf announced that *Animation* would henceforth be responsible for the vocational training of rural and urban youth who could not attend secondary schools.[55]

In 1971, the remnant of the *Direction* of *Animation* and Expansion was transferred to the Ministry for Youth and Sports, and Ben Mady Cissé left Senegal to spend two years as a director of the Pan African Institute of Development in Douala. Cissé had not been satisfied with the transfer of *Animation* to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, because that ministry was void of political action, and the activities of *Animation* were to be essentially reduced to sporting and social activities for youth. Thus, with Senghor's concurrence, the man who had been the moving force behind ten years of *Animation* departed.

Since 1971 *animation rurale* has ceased to be regarded as part of a grass roots institution-building strategy. In effect, institution-building activities had been reduced in 1963, but they were not officially terminated until the transfer of the program to the Ministry of Youth and Sports.

Animation is now one of a collection of programs intended to provide specific groups of people with certain technical skills needed for the economic and administrative progress of the sector or region in which they work. We will examine later the events after 1971, the differences between *animation rurale* in 1960 and in 1976, and the reasons for those differences.

Upon transfer to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the *Direction* of *Animation* and Expansion became the Division of *Promotion Humaine*, whose mandate was primarily to help the youth in rural areas. There were two reasons given for this change in clientele from adults to youth. First, the problem of rural to urban migration of youth--a problem which was present in many parts of Africa--was becoming increasingly serious in Senegal. Young people were leaving their villages because they did not want to become adults in a traditional society which would offer them little power or status before they were very old. They were lured to the cities--Kaloack, Saint Louis, Dakar and even Paris--where they could earn money and find adventure. Since Senegal's cities could not absorb these large numbers of unskilled young men and women, the government wanted to take steps both to dissuade them from leaving their villages and to provide them with skills that they could use to improve village living conditions and to find for themselves economic and social security.

Second, the need to provide young people with more education and work opportunities had become even more critical after 1968, when university students in Dakar had demonstrated sympathy for the "peasant malaise," and, echoing the rebellion of their colleagues in Paris, had staged demonstrations to protest government policies in many domains. Thus, since *Animation* had been judged successful in channeling the energies of adults in rural areas into constructive development projects, it was asked to apply its methods to both rural and urban youth as a means of quieting their discontent and finding solutions to their economic and social problems.[56]

The 1971 relocation of Animation in the Ministry of Youth and Sports can be viewed both as a revision of government structures in order to meet changing needs, particularly those of youth, and as the defusing of a politically threatening movement. During Cissé's absence, Animation activities lay relatively dormant. Programs in villages and training centers were severely reduced. Any local actions which did occur resulted from community initiative, perhaps inspired by the previous work of animateurs. On the national level, a series of directors succeeded Cissé, including Ibrahim Sow and Cheikh Hamidou Kane, both of whom held important political posts before and after their service in Animation.

Cissé spent the two years between 1971 and 1973 working in the Cameroons and traveling in other African countries. His reputation for dynamic and intelligent leadership had spread beyond Senegal, and Senghor wanted him to return and take up once more the leadership of animation rurale and the larger organization which incorporated it, Promotion Humaine. Cissé returned to Senegal as the Director of Promotion Humaine, which was still in the Ministry of Youth and Sports. An administrative reform in 1975 raised the status of Promotion Humaine to that of a Secretariat, attached to the Ministry of National Education. Cissé, though not in fact responsible for a ministry, was given the title and status of minister and the authority to develop Promotion Humaine.

Promotion Humaine entered a period of revival which had gained full force by 1975.

> The Secretariat of *Promotion Humaine* has inherited the actions of *Animation* which played a large role in the raising of consciousness of the needs of development by the Senegalese following the time of independence.
>
> A structure of education for development, regrouping the entire series of activities and establishments of non-classical education, *Promotion Humaine* has seen considerable growth and increasing responsibility during the past years, notably with the implementation of the administrative reform, the new use of six national languages, and *Enseignement Moyen Practique*.[57]

Animation Rurale (1960-71) and *Promotion Humaine* (1971-) Compared

The goals of *Promotion Humaine* resemble closely the original goals of *animation rurale*, namely to promote the participation of citizens in the economic and political development of the nation. The two most notable differences are the change in clientele from one exclusively of adults in rural areas to a wider range that includes urban as well as rural citizens and youth as well as adults, and the change in emphasis from political consciousness-raising to technical training.

Cissé has characterized the current phase of *animation* and of *Promotion Humaine* as different from the 1960s phase in that it is primarily aimed at promoting the economic autonomy of Senegal, now that political autonomy has been achieved.[58] In the first decade of *animation rurale* the rural population had to be made aware of their national identity and of their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the government. As subjects of the French colonial administration, peasants had felt no allegiance to any government beyond the traditional rule of their own families and ethnic groups. They had often feared the leadership of French officials and resented any interference in their own affairs.

But by the 1970s, national political institutions were strong, and it appeared to government officials that most of the people were aware of their existence, even though tribal chiefs and Muslim *marabouts* were as powerful locally as government officials. Nonetheless, it was time to move beyond programs which primarily sensitized peasants to rights and to the role of the government in their lives, to programs through which they could help Senegal achieve economic security and independence from foreign nations.

Moreover, by the 1970s, the goals and purposes of *Promotion Humaine* had become less directly integrated with the goals and development Plan of the nation. After the extensive effort during the first two years (1960-62) to create a socialist state, the national leadership had become much more supportive of private enterprise as a means of supplying badly needed capital. The production and exportation of peanuts was given higher priority than the production of food crops for local consumption. Villagers were no longer treated as the most important resource in national development.

Promotion Humaine under Cissé's direction is primarily concerned with serving the people, urban as well as rural, and youth as well as adults. Its objectives and methods sometimes conflict with the central government's economic development policies and practices.[illegible] For example, the peanut industry has become virtually nationalized. Peanut oil is produced by the state from the peanuts which ONCAD, the government marketing agency, purchases from cooperatives and other markets.

In order to protect the national peanut oil industry, individual farmers are not allowed to process peanuts or to sell peanut oil. Consequently the central government retains the profits from peanut oil sales rather than returning them to village cooperatives. Another example of government monopolies is the production of farming implements and other tools. Local artisans have the skills to fashion tools, but they lack the necessary capital and materials. To protect its own tool-making industry, the government does not supply peasants with the loans and supplies they need to invest in tool-making on a large scale.

These and similar instances indicate that Senegal's original development strategy, inspired by Perroux and Lebret, by which national wealth would grow out of investment in grass roots level development projects, shifted during the first decade to a development of capital in the productive and commercial sectors of the economy. Accordingly, Promotion Humaine is not central to the government's development goals, and is sometimes caught between serving the national objectives for economic growth and the peasants' needs for survival skills and improvement in the quality of their lives. After one-and-a-half decades of trying various development strategies, Senghor's policies reflect his conclusion that investment in rural human resources must not outweigh investments in the productive and commercial sectors of the economy. Moreover, in order to keep Senegal from following many new African nations into internal dissension and constant turmoil, Senghor has had to keep a tight hold on political affairs by refusing to tolerate the threat of potentially rebellious movements.

Cognizant of Senghor's concern for economic growth and political security, the Director of Promotion Humaine has compromised his position and attuned programs to prevailing economic and political goals and to the pressures put on Senghor by other national leaders and politicians. In order to maintain a secure position in the myriad of political forces, Promotion Humaine has taken on new strategies and new characteristics since its revival in 1975. First, following the policy established in 1971 when Animation was moved to the Ministry of Youth and Sports and given a new title, Promotion Humaine encompasses a diversity of programs. Whereas in the 1970s, Animation was intended to have goals and methods that were uniform throughout the country, Promotion Humaine consists of four programs, each with different, although sometimes overlapping, objectives and activities. These four Directions are Animation Rurale et Urbaine, Literacy (which is a program designed to transcribe six national languages), Enseignement Moyen Practique, designed to curb the exodus of rural youth to the cities, and Formation Professionelle Rurale, which offers a variety of technical skills training programs to rural citizens and incorporates the semi-autonomous program of Maisons Familiales.[60]

Promotion Humaine is that part of the Ministry of National Education responsible for programs located outside of the formal school system. Promotion Humaine is not, however, the only government agency sponsoring out-of-school education programs. Senegal has several regional development projects designed to increase and diversify agricultural and industrial production in certain regions of the country. For instance, in the region of Eastern Senegal, a project is underway to increase livestock production. The project includes a training component for farmers in new livestock-raising techniques. *Promotion Humaine* has been called upon to help plan and implement training activities. In the Fleuve region, near the border of Mauritania, a regional development project sponsored by the *Societé d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation du Delta du Fleuve de Sénégal* (SAED) aims to increase rice and tomato production, to improve the infrastructure of roads and river transportation in order to promote marketing possibilities, and to ameliorate the pathetically poor living conditions of peasants in the region. In contrast to the project in Eastern Senegal, SAED is a government regional operation, which manages its own training program and has no ties with *Promotion Humaine*.

Based on the belief that technical development is effective only when it includes human resources development, the cadres of *Promotion Humaine* aim to influence as many of the government's development projects as they can. But circumstances make it difficult for them to extend this influence both to regional development projects and to other ministries whose development programs have a training component. Because the agents responsible for development projects consider themselves technically competent, they want to be responsible for delivering technical skills training, even though they are relatively ignorant of the pedagogical and psychological aspects of such training. Furthermore, even in cases where the technical agents recognize the need for pedagogical expertise in training programs, they often hesitate to call upon *Promotion Humaine*, as they still regard its personnel as amateur political zealots completely lacking in technical skills.[61]

In spite of this image of *Promotion Humaine*, which confuses the present-day organization with animation rurale of the past, there is ample evidence that Promotion Humaine has reoriented its focus from ideology to technicity. In its central office, staff members with technical expertise are given preference in recruitment. In its relationship with other ministries, specific agreements called Protocols d'Accord, are outlined to delineate the technical and training responsibilities of Promotion Humaine from those of other ministries in the sectors of agriculture, health, education and rural development. Finally, structural changes have been made within the organization which reflect the increased value placed on technical competence. Animateurs are no longer village volunteers but government employed personnel who work on the département level--two administrative levels higher than the former inter-village communes.

In the early days, training was directed toward selected representatives from villages, who were taught to work in their own villages, not as government employees, but as community members capable of arousing interest in local development projects and of improving relationships between the villagers and the government which was meant to represent them. With the advent of Promotion Humaine, employees of each of the Secretariat's four divisions, including Animation, are salaried by the government and work on the département level. The rationale for this organizational change is that current programs require some technical expertise, and this can be provided more readily from a few cadres who circulate among villages than from representatives from every village to whom the minimum of training can be afforded. Assigning animateurs to départements is also explained by the need for those employed in the services of development to acquire a loyalty which extends beyond their own village. It appears also that the government is strategically holding *animateurs* more directly responsible to the government administration rather than to their own people in order to reduce the likelihood that *animateurs* incite peasants to oppose government policies.[62]

Consequently, *Animation* has been reorganized within Senegal's development to place the locus of initiative on government officials rather than villagers. On the regional level are the Inspectors of *Promotion Humaine*, who are responsible for all activities in their region. On the *département* level are the *chefs d'equips* (team leaders) who coordinate personnel and activities. There are no personnel assigned directly to the *arrondissement* level. Instead, rural expansion committees (CERs) request from *département* development committees (CDDs) the services of *Promotion Humaine* for specific tasks. Thus, an *animateur* is assigned by his boss, the *chef d'equipe* of the *département* to work in a village of an *arrondissement*, where the CER has requested his or her services.

Such a request and the resulting training programs follow a procedure that also varies from the original scheme. The *Promotion Humaine* team from the *département* spends three full days in the village which has requested assistance. The team members collect data on the needs of the village from three sources: the villagers themselves, who express "felt needs," the technical service representatives who work with the *arrondissement* encompassing the village, and finally, their own perceptions of the situation based on their three-day exposure. Thus, village projects are no longer solely in response to villagers' felt needs, but also to the technical expertise of government officials.[63]

One further cause of the change from *animation rurale* as a nationwide rural institution manifesting the same goals in every locale to *Promotion Humaine* as a diverse collection of technical training programs for economic development is the increased need for foreign assistance in implementing the program. *Animation rurale* was a high priority government development program. *Promotion Humaine* is less critical in the national development plan, and thus receives a relatively small chunk of the national budget. With an annual budget of no more than about one hundred twenty thousand dollars (thirty million CFA), it depends heavily on foreign funds in order to maintain a significant number of programs.

Promotion humaine is in a good position to receive foreign aid, because the development strategy on which it is based is receiving more attention throughout the world. During the 1960s foreign funds were usually given to programs with the limited intentions of either economic growth, political orientation or humanitarian care. Most of Senegal's support came from the French for economic growth purposes. During recent years, however, the concept of development has evolved from a simple one of economic growth to a more complex one that involves human resources development and social and economic equity. This new concept has always been central in the ideology of *animation rurale* and continues to influence *Promotion Humaine*. Although most foreign funding agencies have specific areas of concern such as rural development, women's education, urban youth welfare or vocational skills training, Promotion Humaine can attract these funds as long as programs are tailored to the specific interests of the supporting agencies as well as to the general needs of the population.

Promotion Humaine now includes over thirty specific projects, focusing on various regions, sub-regions and villages. Many are financed largely by outside sources of funding such as the French, American and German governments and United Nations organizations. One prominent program is the Maisons Familiales, which is sponsored by a private French organization and which operates with a large degree of autonomy. Another is Enseignement Moyen Practique, the training program for rural youth which was initially sponsored by IRAM in 1970, but which now receives support for expansion throughout the country from the World Bank. Small-scale projects include a mother and child health care component of a regional development program financed by Unicef in Diorbel, Thiès, Sine-Saloum and Louga, YMCA technical training programs for urban youth, and others. Promotion Humaine, with its varied approach to education and rural development, has been able to incorporate all of these with little disruption.

The balance of foreign assistance has shifted from that given by the French government to that given by other government and non-government organizations. The support of IRFED and IRAM has been reduced to a small team of technical assistants in Enseignement Moyen Practique, a full time advisor to the Minister, and a series of short term consultants. In contrast USAID, an agency interested in technical development and the kind of human resources training programs found within Promotion Humaine, has become an increasingly important source of funding and expertise. International organizations, such as the World Bank, UNICEF and the United Nations Development Fund contribute funds wherever particular program goals match their own areas of concern.

The original concept of animation rurale has not been abandoned nor has its influence ceased to exist. Animation and animateurs are known all over Senegal. Nearly every village can point to its animateur, even though many of them never carried out the tasks for which they were trained, and some have long since abandoned the effort or have died. The idea of local development projects is no longer strange to Senegalese peasants, and villages are accustomed to receiving the cadres of Promotion Humaine who support the villagers' economic advancement. Individuals who were formally trained as animateurs, or who showed enough understanding and initiative to take upon themselves an unofficial role of animateur in their village, continue to start projects which attract government funding.[64]

The rural communes envisaged in the First Development Plan are now coming into existence. In four of Senegal's seven regions--Sine-Saloum, Thiès, Diourbel and Louga, where an administrative reform has been carried out, rural communes exist officially. The reform is planned for the other regions within the next few years. In these communes taxes paid by the villagers are collected and budgeted within the commune, thus eliminating the flow of a large part of a villager's revenue to the national and regional levels of government.

Although the rural communes appear not to have been created out of the initiative of villagers themselves, but instead have been directed from the national level, their functional capacity depends on the ability of villagers to unite and control their own economic and social affairs. Villagers must know what their needs and resources are, and be able to negotiate with the central government on particular policies and practices concerning their own affairs. *Promotion Humaine* is partly responsible for training rural commune officials in the administrative reform. Its personnel are finding that the leaders of the rural population do not readily accept the imposition of new government institutions and that they are conscious of their needs and capacity to participate in development activities. This awareness can be attributed to the decade of training provided by *animation rurale*.[65]

Animation has taken on as one of its two main goals the organization and training required to install and maintain rural communes. *Promotion Humaine* cadres go from village to village explaining the significance of the administrative reform--a task not unlike their original one of informing the villagers about the nature and purpose of their government--and helping to train government officials at every level in the skills and knowledge they need to support the communes.

The other major goal of *Animation* is the development of rural and urban women as producers in the economic sector. This goal is being reached by giving women an awareness of their importance as a social group, of their right to economic independence vis-à-vis their extended family, of the skills they might acquire and the projects they might undertake in order to achieve that independence. Since the training of women has become an active endeavor of *animation* only within the past year (1976), it is far too early to assess the viability of this program. Animation feminine was part of the original conception of the whole animation program, but in 1960 it was needed because in most Senegalese villages, according to cultural practices whereby men and women do not mix socially, the only way to work with the female half of the population was through programs designed exclusively for them. The notion of women as direct contributors to economic advancement is new.

In conclusion, Promotion Humaine still faces a number of difficulties in working towards its goals. Some of these are the same as those faced by Animation in the 1960s; others are new. Of the latter, the most prominent is the area of conflict between the interests of the rural people, and those in line with national development goals. Whereas in 1960 Animation was an integral part of Senegal's socialist option, the socialist strategy has been considerably altered, and Promotion Humaine, in order to survive amidst other vested interests, must acknowledge them and confine its activities to those which do not interfere in higher priority schemes. Cissé is the sole negotiator of Promotion Humaine vis-à-vis other ministries and private concerns. He must maintain a loyal staff on every level and keep the political support of the government and the Party in order to stretch the domain of his Secretariat's activities. He must cooperate with the ministries involved in rural technical assistance, the Ministry of the Interior, which controls administrative matters in the countryside, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which supervises the budget.

The problems which have continued since the day of Animation's inception are numerous. Many officials on every level still hold their self-interest over that of the nation or even the local area, and thus their activities, ranging from simple inactivity to corruption, block the effectiveness of intended programs. The Senegalese bureaucracy is still so intricate and cumbersome that it is nearly impossible to request and receive the funds and supplies needed to implement projects. In Promotion Humaine, only the Minister can sign checks and approve expenses. Opposition to Promotion Humaine's desire to participate in technical projects is encountered by animateurs trying to work on the local level with département or arrondissement development teams of technical service agents. Finally, the ancient elites, tribal chiefs and Muslim marabouts are still strong in rural areas and cannot be overpowered by local government officials from any service.

The most important changes between animation rurale in 1960 and Promotion Humaine in 1976 are that: (1) it is no longer a crucial component of the government's national development plan; (2) its primary objective is technical training for economic progress rather than consciousness-raising and institution-building for political and economic unity; and (3) the locus of initiative in rural development is no longer with the villagers and their animateurs but with government officials working in rural expansion centers in the arrondissements.

What may be more important than all of these changes within the Animation program, however, is the recent change in the national administration which has resulted in significant decentralization on the regional level and the inception of inter-village communes. This shift in the locus of power may allow the latent effects of animation rurale to bear fruit over the next decade.

ENDNOTES

[1] E.J. Schumacher, *Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Senegal* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), p. 64.

[2] Ibid., pp. 85-86.

[3] J. Serreau, *Le Développement à la Base au Dahomey et au Sénégal* (Paris: Librarie du Droit et de la Jurisprudence, 1966), p. 84.

[4] Schumacher, p. 91.

[5] Ibid., p. 95.

[6] Ibid., p. 92.

[7] M. Dia, "Doctrine et Problèmes de l'Evolution du Mouvement Coopératif au Sénégal" (Dakar, 21 May 1962).

[8] B.M. Cissé, "L'Animation des Masses, Condition d'un Socialisme Authentique," in *Sénégal, An 2, par lui-même* (Paris: IRFED, 1962), p. 39.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Serreau, pp. 109-10.

[11] Ibid., p. 145.

[12] Y. Goussault, *Rapport 1960 de l'IRAM sur le Sénégal*, vol. 4(3).

[13] Ibid., p. 130.

[14] H. DeDecker, *Nations et Développement Communautaire en Guinée et au Sénégal* (Paris: Mouton, 1967).

[15] A good study of the role of the *marabout* brotherhoods in Senegal's development has been made by Cheikh Tydiane Sy in *Traditionalisme Mouride et Modernisation Rurale au Sénégal* (Paris: Thèse de Doctorat, 3è cycle, University of Paris, 1965).

[16] DeDecker, p. 269.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 270.

[19] Ibid., p. 264.

[20] IRAM, *Rapports 1960 et 1961 sur l'Animation au Sénégal*.

[21] C.T. Sy, personal interview (July 1976).

[22] Cissé, "L'Animation des Masses, Condition d'un Socialisme Authentique."

[23] DeDecker, p. 300.

[24] Schumacher, pp. 102-12. See also, J. Brochier, *La Diffusion du Progrès Technique en Milieu Rural Sénégalais* (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, IEDES, 1968), pp. 271-77.

[25] A. Magnen, UNESCO, personal interview (August 1976).

[26] Brochier, p. 273.

[27] Magnen, personal interview (August 1976).

[28] There are two sides to the story of the Senghor-Dia conflict. For an account favorable to Senghor, see E. Milicent, *Au Carrefour des Options Africaines: le Sénégal* (Paris: Editions du Centurion, 1965), pp. 74-98. For an account favorable to Dia, see P. Thibaud, "Dia, Senghor et le Socialisme Africain," *Esprit* (September 1963). The events are also well detailed in S. Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal" (New York: Columbia University, Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, 1967).

[29] Reports by Lebret's task force and IRAM.

[30] Dia, "Doctrine et Problèmes de l'Evolution du Mouvement Coopératif au Sénégal" (Dakar, 21 May 1962).

[31] Schumacher, p. 104.

[32] Gellar, p. 334.

[33] A. Fofana, writing as Minister of Commerce, in *Esprit* (September 1963).

[34] Schumacher, p. 66.

[35] Thibaud; and Schumacher, p. 66.

[36] H. Cassirer, personal interview (July 1976).

[37] Sy, personal interview (July 1976).

[38] *Dakar Matin* (2 November 1964).

[39] L.S. Senghor, "Discours à l'Assemblée Nationale" (19 April 1963).

[40] L.S. Senghor, "Les Objectifs Essentiels du Deuxième Plan Quadriennal du Sénégal," *Sénégal d'Aujourd'hui* 21 (July 1965), p. 18.

[41] Schumacher, p. 127.

[42] DeDecker, p. 330.

[43] Serreau, p. 220.

[44] R. Dumont, *Paysanneries aux abois* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972), pp. 195-97.

[45] Schumacher, p. 119.

[46] Sy, personal interview (July 1976).

[47] For a good account of Rural Educational Radio as sponsored by UNESCO, see H. Cassirer, *Mass Media in an African Context* (Paris: UNESCO, 1973).

[48] Ibid., p. 35.

[49] According to Cassirer (personal interview, July 1976), Cissé deliberately excluded the Project from *animation rurale*.

[50] Cassirer, *Mass Media in an African Context*, pp. 37-38.

[51] Schumacher, p. 207.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., pp. 214-15. See also the documents of the *Direction de l'Animation et de l'Expansion* (20 May 1970; 5 June 1970; and 24 March 1971) in which the goals, methods and results of *Animation* are closely traced, in an apparent attempt to prolong its existence.

[54] A. Diouf, *Circulaire 37* (Dakar: Dimeo, March 1971).

[55] This mandate led to the creation of *Enseignement Moyen Practique* which evidenced a regeneration of the principles of *animation rurale* in a program designed to curb the exodus of rural primary school leavers.

[56] *Propositions pour le IVe Plan, 1973-1977* (Dakar: RS/MJS/PH).

[57] *Note d'Information* (Dakar: Secretariat d'Etat à la Promotion Humaine, June 1976), p. 1.

[58] B.M. Cissé, personal interview (November 1976).

[59] J. Barbier, Conseiller Technique, Promotion Humaine, personal interview (November 1976).

[60] For a description and analysis of the Maisons Familiales, see L'Association des Paysans Moyens de Formation et d'Animation dans les Villages Africains (Paris: l'Institut d'Etudes du Développement Economique et Social de l'Université de Paris I, 1976).

[61] F. Casey and E. Lerner, personal interviews (November 1976).

[62] This was the speculation of some Peace Corps Voluntoers working in Promotion Humaine in 1976.

[63] O. Samb, personal interview (November 1976).

[64] A striking case in point is Lamine Sonko Kebba, the Regional Inspector of the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Casamance, who has made his own village of Koubanao into a "development dream" and whose influence is spreading to neighboring villages.

[65] Cissé, personal interview (November 1976).

CHAPTER V

ANIMATION RURALE IN NIGER

The *animation rurale* program in Niger is important to study in several respects. First, upon independence the Nigerien government chose to decentralize its administrative and technical services. Consequently, the kinds of problems faced by *Animation* arose more as a result of local level conflicts than national level politics. Second, Niger did not formulate policy, goals and strategy in either African Socialism or any other ideology. Thus the political consciousness-raising dimension of the program had a different and less noticeable tone. Third, the program became closely aligned with the cooperative movement and was strongly affected by the movement's goals and activities. Finally, local incidents, problems and issues have been well-documented from various points of view.

The case of Niger complements that of Senegal with its descriptions of local events. At the same time, it provides comparative data which help to limit the risk of drawing general conclusions from a unique situation.

The chapter has three main sections: one on the political and planning context in which the *Animation* program was formulated; one on the historical development of the program from its inception in 1962 to its abrupt curtailment in 1974; and one that summarizes the characteristics of the Niger program in contrast to the Senegal program and explains the differences between the two. Whereas in the case study of Senegal most of the analytical material appeared at the end of the chapter in a comparison of the first and the present phases of the program, in Niger the effective absence of a program today does not permit such a comparative analysis. Furthermore, the problems and issues which arose in Niger were closely related to specific time periods. Therefore, analytical material is presented within the historical development section of the chapter.

The Political and Planning Context[1]

Except for the common government of the French colonial administration during the hundred years prior to 1960, the political events in Niger followed quite a different course than did those in Senegal. The most notable difference is that Niger was not one of the new nations embracing African Socialism. Consequently, there was not the close alignment between the goals and methods of animation and the national development plan in Niger as there was in Senegal.

As a colonial territory, Niger was relatively neglected by the French administration, since it was economically very poor and thus had little potential for providing income to the metropole; indeed, the colonists had to be satisfied to derive from the peasants enough income to cover the expenses of governing them. Moreover, severe desert climate made the territory an uncomfortable place for the French to live, and finally, tribal groups were numerous, their chiefs were strong, and to interfere with their established systems of rule seemed to be only courting trouble. Thus, a policy of "indirect rule" prevailed in Niger more than in other French territories, and, at the time of independence, the political-administrative system was skeletal, especially when compared to that of Senegal, where the administration of the entire French West African territory was located.

As in the other territories, Nigeriens began to get actively involved in territorial politics in 1946 when they sent to Paris two deputies to the National Assembly, two senators to the Council of the Republic, and two representatives to the Assembly of the French Union. Of these six representatives, two became Nigerien politicians prominent in the government of the territory and later the nation: Diori Hamani, from the Djerma tribe and Djibo Bakary, from the Hausa tribe. Both were Muslims, graduates of the Ponty school in Dakar, and founders of the Parti Progressiste Nigerien (PPN), which was the territorial branch of the interterritorial Rassemblement Democratique Africain, the radical party headed by Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast.

Diori and Djibo worked in close political alliance and in support of the RDA's activities during its radical period, but in 1950, when Houphouët-Boigny suddenly changed his position to cooperate with France rather than fight for independence, Djibo broke away. An ardent Marxist and leader of Niger's Communist-oriented trade unions, he formed his own party, the Union Democratique Nigerienne, which later changed its name to Sawaba and became affiliated with the African Socialist party headed by Lamine Gueye of Senegal. With this group of Socialists, Djibo continued to work for the movement for an independent African federation. In 1956, he was elected mayor of Niamey, but his political support did not really last much longer than 1958, when his effort to have Niger vote against DeGaulle's referendum on territorial affiliation with the French Union failed. Djibo's loss of political power meant his defeat in the elections in the same year in which, on the basis of his party's success at the polls, Diori became Premier of Niger.

One of Diori's first political acts was to bring Niger into the Council of the Entente, the economic alliance of the Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Upper Volta, none of which had joined the forces of African Socialist nations such as Senegal, Ghana and Guinea. Diori also undertook a series of steps to remove Sawaba from political contention. In July 1960, threatened by his political enemies, Djibo fled the country, and thus the struggle between a moderately capitalistic option headed by Diori and perhaps Africa's most adamant Marxist movement led by Djibo was over. With Diori securely in charge, Niger became independent on 3 August 1960.

Djibo was not heard of again for several years, except for occasional rumblings of rebellion from outside the country, but in October 1964, his forces were held responsible for an attempted coup d'etat. By then, Diori had mobilized his own supporters and appeased opposition groups enough to prevent internal rallying around the once-popular call to Socialism.

In 1961, the economic situation in Niger was assessed by a mission sent from IRAM in Paris. Their study showed that, because of a scarcity of resources, Niger presented a much less favorable situation than did Senegal for any kind of rural development program such as animation rurale. Because of neglect during the colonial era, Niger, at the time of its independence, had one of the weakest political systems in West Africa.[2] The most urgent problem for the new national leadership was to fill the posts left vacant by the French colonists who had departed without preparing Nigeriens to replace them. The entire colony had been administered by commandants de cercle, Frenchmen who had maintained a loose alliance with the traditional chiefs, allowing them to rule their own people as long as they maintained order and complied with colonial regulations. Thus, with independence, the government was left without an administrative infrastructure to insure order and regulate activities.

In addition to lacking administrative capability, the new nation was critically short on economic expertise. The initial study of the situation emphasized the lack of Nigerien-trained technical cadres:

> Two observations illuminate the problem of technical staffing in Niger, first: the availability of technical agents is extremely reduced. The only existing school, in Kolo, graduates only fifteen agents a year, about one third of which continue their studies or pursue careers in other domains. If the resulting number of 10 agents is compared with the need foreseen in the first three-year plan and by the agricultural services, which call for 58 agents in the first three years, a considerable disproportion between possibilities and needs is evident.[3]

The second observation was that although the country was theoretically divided into five administrative zones for the purpose of economic development, in fact, except in two small areas, there was not even a cooperative or credit organization. The only encouraging observation was that, according to ethnographic studies made by the Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire in Niamey, the social dynamism of the indigenous communities would make them receptive to development programs that could capitalize on their indigenous cultural patterns, which tended toward a socialist kind of political economy.

The national leadership was in the dilemma of having too few administrative and technical personnel to carry out a nationwide development program on the grass roots level, yet at the same time unable to afford the luxury of costly and intensive local programs. Under these circumstances, the advice of IRAM was followed in undertaking certain administrative, technical, and economic reforms which would train local people to develop human resources in selected rural areas.[4]

The report concluded that a program of animation rurale should be instituted nationwide, but introduced initially in no more than four arrondissements considered favorable to agricultural production: Kantche-Matamey, Maggia, Diffa and Say. At the same time, certain reforms should be introduced in the central government to provide national level support for the local level rural development movement.

In other words, as in Senegal, the French rural development specialists of IRAM advised the national leadership to institute a program which put the locus of initiative in development programs on the grass roots level while simultaneously providing the means for control to the central government. This strategy aligned the national government with the rural peasants, encouraging the peasants to take economic and political power from the Nigerien and foreign entrepreneurs, merchants and others who were gaining a foothold in the rising group of economic elites.

> Both the top Nigerien leadership and the French experts who advised on this strategy recognized that it would involve political conflict. They theorized that, if the villagers

> could be persuaded to participate, they would not only modernize but would become political actors in local affairs. . . .[5]

Animation rurale was thus considered both as a program intended to educate peasants in their rights and in the skills they needed to improve their condition, and as a strategy for changing the balance of power in the nation to favor the masses. The contention of *Animation* was that through this sort of adult education, political democratization and economic modernization would take place.

In 1961 the *Banque de Développement de la Republique du Niger* (BDRN) was created to finance planned investment programs, to facilitate new village level economic societies and to provide short term credit in the commercial sector. The *Société Nigerienne de Commercialisation de l'Arachide* (SONARA) was created in 1962 to nationalize and regulate all marketing and trade of peanuts, the country's main cash crop, and the *Société Nationale de Commerce et le Production du Niger* (COPRONIGER) was installed to regulate all other commercial crops. Finally, the *Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation* (UNCC) was established as a semi-private organization to support lending services and cooperatives and to insure the diffusion of new seeds, fertilizer and other materials for farming. The UNCC was eventually to become the main institution to coordinate the services of *animation rurale*.

It is apparent that with the creation of a bank to promote rural development and agricultural marketing organizations, and with the decision to educate the villagers through a program of *animation rurale*, Niger was following an economic development scheme similar to that of Senegal. There were, however, some notable differences. First, Nigerien leaders did not profess African Socialism, nor did they depend on expressions of any other ideological position for their proposed activities. Second, the political party was to play a bigger role in rural programs, and finally, due largely to the extreme dearth of resources, economic and development programs were orchestrated much more loosely than in Senegal. These last two points require further elaboration.

Diori's political party, the *Parti Progressiste Nigerien* (PPN), had a very precarious base in the rural areas, particularly in the Hausa regions which comprised two-thirds of the country. Thus, it was decided to help the Party profit from development activities by sharing responsibility for their implementation. Involvement of party members influenced the selection process of responsible cadres, with the result that many *animateurs* and *Animation* staff members were more interested in their own future than in the service.[6]

The other significant difference between the initial situation in Senegal and Niger was the relationship between the *animation* program and the national development plan. In Senegal, the two were tightly linked. In Niger, with independence, the President was far more preoccupied with surveying the resources of the country and devising an investment strategy for rapid economic growth than with rural development schemes. Thus, *animation rurale* began on an independent footing, not coherently linked to a well-articulated plan, but supported explicitly by Diori and top government officials. On the national level, *Animation* was situated in the Rural Development service of the Ministry of Rural Economy. This relatively low position resulted in more autonomy of local programs than in Senegal, where *Animation* was more prominent in the national government and subject to more central control.

The Historical Development of *Animation Rurale*: 1962-1974

The evolution of *animation rurale* in Niger can be viewed in four distinct time periods: between 1962 and 1966, when the service was operating independently to lay the groundwork for building rural institutions; between 1966 and 1968, when *Animation* was part of *Promotion Humaine* and the New System of integrated rural development; between 1969 and 1974, when it played a secondary role in the adult literacy campaign of the cooperative movement; and after 1974 when Diori's entire rural development program was blocked by a *coup d'etat*.

1962-65: Village level projects and inter-village centers. The process of starting an *animation rurale* program in the selected *arrondissements* was slow. The year of 1962 was spent laying the groundwork. French consultants were sent to each of the four *arrondissements* to make a careful survey of technical and social conditions, existing technical services and possibilities of collaborating with them. Following the programming methodology of IRAM,[7] this initial phase entailed explaining to local leaders the goals and methods of *animation rurale*, building training centers from available materials, and organizing initial training sessions. By October 1962 funds had been obtained from the French government for the installation of four training centers, and three Nigerien government employees had been sent to Senegal for two months to become familiar with the program there.

By January 1963, the *Bureau Central de l'Animation* (BCA) had been established on the national level and three of the four training centers were functioning in Matameye, Say and Magaria under the direction of Nigerien directors and the help of French advisors. Difficulty in finding capable staff members forced the center directors to work without Nigerien assistants, and to delay the opening of the fourth center in Diffa.

In the process of setting up the training centers and sensitizing local level workers to animation, several phenomena became clear. Peasants did not think of themselves as Nigerien citizens; for fear of being repressed, they avoided taking responsibility for their economic and social behavior, and indeed, their attitude was reinforced by the exploitive control over them by traditional chiefs and other leaders. The administrative services were not apprised of the role they were supposed to play in support of rural development institutions and the technical services hardly knew the peasants' needs, let alone how to help them. Sanitation facilities on the village level were poor or non-existent; the commercial structure allowed for widespread exploitation of village farmers by local merchants, who made villagers' investment opportunities negligible.[8] It was the task of the Animation program in each zone to overcome these difficulties.

The Animation staff in the arrondissement consisted of a chief of the Animation service, his assistants, and service personnel. The chief, a middle-level government employee in rural development, was charged with organizing, directing and coordinating activities in the sectors of Animation for men, for women, and for youth (the program in Niger differed from that in Senegal in its inclusion of activities for youth as well as adults). The chief worked directly with the sous-

prefet of the *arrondissement* advising him on matters of organizing and training the rural population. He reported to the *Animation* staff on the *département* level (equivalent to that of the region in Senegal). He controlled the *Animation* budget, and was administratively responsible for training sessions. The assistants worked directly with the village population in their initial surveys of conditions and needs, the training of *animateurs*, and the continued assistance to village projects.

In implementing the *Animation* program the staff followed the same methodology used in Senegal and elsewhere:

1. Determination of the specific zones (within the selected regions) from which to recruit *animateurs*;
2. Installation of the centers of *Animation*;
3. Recruitment and training of *animateurs*;
4. Training of the core staff of *animateurs* (cadres, who could take more responsibility at the supra-village level;
5. Development of coordinated activities of the various technical services; and
6. Support of *Animation* projects in the villages for men, women and youth.

The activities of *animation rurale* in Niger were closely aligned to those of the agricultural calendar. The planting season begins in the middle of May, with the first rainfalls, and work culminates in October, with the harvest and marketing of products. *Animation* began its annual program in early October and ended it in mid-May. Activities were designed to promote peasant participation in selling and buying agricultural products and materials, training sessions took place during three weeks of each month at the Animation center, and specific projects were implemented with an eye toward the coming cultivation and marketing seasons. Although the Animation teams of each zone had intended to offer four initial training courses each year, lack of staff forced the limitation of this number to two. Each training session was for forty animateurs, who, in turn, were responsible for a population of about 7,000.

According to the theory of animation rurale, economic institution-building begins on the national level. Immediately thereafter economic development activities commence on the village level, evolve gradually into organizations incorporating several villages, then into regional organizations, and finally into a revision of national organizations responsive to the expressed needs and proposals of the rural population for national development planning.

In contrast to the case in Senegal, where institutions at both the summit and on the base were established in detail in the First Development Plan, in Niger, where policy provided for a mixed rather than socialist economy, there was less coordination between goals and activities at the summit and those at the base. Hence, grass roots level institutions were allowed to evolve in a more spontaneous fashion, especially since they were installed only in selected regions, in which they had relative autonomy. In theory, as village animation programs evolved, animateurs and villagers would begin to recognize that some of what had to be done to improve conditions would require cooperation with others outside of their village. For example, they would see the advantage of building better roads to nearby towns, of digging wells for irrigation, of controlling soil erosion, and of building shelter for travellers. Animateurs would then welcome the cooperation of Animation and other technical and administrative cadres in the arrondissement in helping them to organize the technical and economic apparatus for intervillage programs.

Finally, when intervillage programs were operating smoothly, representatives from neighboring programs would want to build rural institutions on the arrondissement level, from which they could negotiate contractual agreements with government services on the departmental level.

In Niger the intervillage programs were called Regroupements de Villages Animés (RVAs). Generally three to five villages grouped together to form an RVA (which was equivalent to the rural commune in Senegal). Each village, through consultation among the village chief and administrative officials, animateurs and others who were concerned, selected a representative to the RVA; he served for a half-year term, during either the dry season or the farming season.

In its internal structure, each RVA had a person responsible for acquiring and distributing agricultural materials (fertilizers, fungicides, seeds and seedlings), someone especially trained in new planting techniques, a first-aid worker who also received special training and shared his knowledge with someone in each village, and a directive team for the cooperative, consisting of a weigher (who had managerial responsibilities), a president and a secretary. These people coordinated the various agricultural and marketing activities of their villages with the services and the cooperative union.

The RVAs grew at an uneven pace throughout the country. Attesting to the effective establishment of RVAs in the selected areas. Belloncle reported that all the technicians who worked in Animation projects confirmed the peasants' interest in the RVAs. The RVA network was frequently used by the technical services to diffuse information, to collect requests for help and supplies and to deliver them.[10]

Whether or not "animated" villages were successfully grouped into RVAs, able to contest the power of local elites and give the peasants control over their own affairs has been opened to question. After careful study of the RVAs in Matameye, one observer concluded that they were not effective grass roots institutions.

> The Animation program of organizing politically awakened villagers into RVA structures not only failed to produce an effective agency for funneling peasant political interest and demands upward, it also failed to prepare villagers for effective management of the economic aspects of their new units. Animation could neither provide the training nor the support for villager political expression. What the RVA structures did do . . . was to create significant new opportunities for local level patronage and influence at an extra-village level. New leader roles merely reflected syncretic responses. In addition, the mass of villagers did become much more involved in the symbolic aspects of an extra-village power struggle than had been the case before. It was not, however, the democratic opening to villagers which had been anticipated and desired by Nigerien development planners.[11]

The Animation program, nonetheless, continued to gain viability as a part of the national rural development program in the early 1960s. In 1964, reforms on the national level strengthened the position of animation rurale. At the time of independence the central office of Animation, the Bureau Central d'Animation, had been situated rather low in the central government organization, as part of a service which itself was part of a ministry. This low position made it difficult for the local Animation cadres to coordinate their activities with other services such as literacy, in the Ministry of Education, radio clubs, in the Ministry of Information, the cooperative union, in the Ministry of Rural Development, and the Party, because local agents took their orders directly from the ministries and had no incentive to cooperate with officials to whom they were not linked in a chain of command.

In 1964 a national level inter-ministerial *Comité*, named *Promotion Humaine*, was created. Presided over by the President, this committee reorganized members of government services and members of the Party, and set forth as its task the coordination at all administrative levels of the various services involved in rural development. Within the committee, *Animation* constituted an important component. A few months after the committee had been formed it became a Commissariat, even more directly responsible to the President, and in December 1965 the *Promotion Humaine* Commissariat and the Planning Commissariat were united on the ministerial level. The status of *Animation* staff members at the *département* and *arrondissement* levels was raised accordingly.

Although it served the same national level coordinating function as did *Promotion Humaine* in Senegal, the Niger organization was less effective than its Senegalese counterpart, largely because there was less activity on the national level in Niger, and partly because it lacked a powerful leader like Cissé in Senegal.

The ultimate goal of *Promotion Humaine* was to pave the way for a real participation of the entire population in its own development and in planned programs of economic, social and cultural dimensions. To meet this goal, three stages of activities had been envisaged: (1) the establishment of a "dialogue" between peasants and cadres; (2) the extension of RVAs into a network of cooperatives and lending services; and (3) increasing collaboration between government technical services and villagers in development projects. Theoretically, these stages would help the rural population arrive at a point where village cooperatives could be transformed into rural communes--administrative as well as economic entities in which village groups took responsibility for their own affairs and through which they were linked to successively higher government levels--the *canton*, the *arrondissement*, and the *département*.[12]

The government report describing the rationale for the creation of a bureau such as *Promotion Humaine* read as follows:

> There can be no development without the establishment of a permanent dialogue between the administration and the people. Unfortunately, for many reasons which are too numerous to analyse here [historical, cultural, economic] this dialogue is not created spontaneously. On the contrary, at first there is an extremely large gap between the cadres and the peasants. This situation has been referred to many times, notably by President Diori in his speech on the major options of the ten-year plan, in which he called for a modification in the attitude and behavior of civil servants who have too quickly gotten into the habit of mistrusting the peasant or treating him in an authoritative manner and hoped that 'the masses of peasants would consider the civil servant, from the most humble to the most important, as being at their service.'[13]

Belloncle, the author of the report, interpreted *Animation* in a historical context: its initial purpose had been to create a confident working relationship between government workers and the peasants. *Animation* sessions had aimed at allowing the peasants to get acquainted with *animateurs* (who are government workers) and to gain confidence in them in order to establish this "dialogue" between the government and the people. Because there had been such a general--and justifiable--mistrust of government officials during the colonial era, *animateurs* had been given the mandate to interact with the peasants in such a way as to gain their trust and to demonstrate that there could be a channel of communication between the government and the peasants, through which the latter could express their needs and voice their opinion about how they were (and would like to be) governed. To this extent, Animation had succeeded. Even visitors to Animation sessions had noted the freedom of expression in those meetings.[14]

Animation had not yet succeeded, however, in creating a similar relationship of confidence between the peasants and other government workers, namely those in the technical and administrative services. The latter considered the Animation service as something separate from themselves, and had not tried to profit from its services. The next objective of Animation, then, was to create a relationship of confidence between these other services and the people. To meet that objective, Animation would work closely with the office of adult education within Promotion Humaine.

Promotion Humaine directors also predicted that these working groups would produce new forms of social cohesion and thereby ameliorate certain problems within some of the tribes (Talakas, Saraouta, Birni and Gari) caused by the deterioration of the traditional family structure. Youth were disoriented and unable to find their niche in village life, people were becoming greedy for material things, and undesirable competition was developing among individuals. Animation was to help create better relations among the various tribes and among the age groups.

Moving from a description of what Animation's role had been to a description of what it should become, Belloncle emphasized that *Animation* could not operate in isolation from the other services. Once it had brought the government workers into contact with the peasants, *animateurs* were useless unless they involved themselves directly in the projects of the services of health, agriculture, education, forestry, water, and primarily cooperatives.

1966-68: The New System and the cooperative movement. In 1966 the Nigerien government instituted a major reform in rural development. The primary effect of this reform was to augment the cooperative movement and to turn cooperatives into the inter-village economic institutions, the principal building blocks of the ascending institutions. *Animation rurale* was directed to collaborate with the Cooperative Union (the *Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation* or UNCC). Between 1966 and 1969 selected *arrondissements* became "zones of integrated action," in which the services of *Promotion Humaine* coordinated their efforts on the local level.

This reform was called the "New System" (*la nouvelle systeme*). Because the New System was centered in the cooperative movement, we will begin the description of its evolution by reviewing the earlier history of the cooperative movement in Niger.

In September 1962, when the new administrative and economic structures were being established, the Cooperative Union (UNCC)[15] was created as a financially autonomous unit charged with the promotion of cooperatives throughout the country. During the first few years of independence the Union formed four cooperatives in the Matameye area, involving a small part of the peanut market and of the rice market. UNCC officials were to help the farmers create these cooperatives and eventually to manage them, thus eliminating further need for government control. Membership in the cooperatives was strictly voluntary, and they competed with private commercial merchants for clients. They were inspired by the principles of the European cooperative expert, Rochdale, and they adhered strictly to his principles.

The first three years of the cooperative movement demonstrated that the structure and operations of European cooperatives were not adaptable to the situation in Niger. Although it had been predicted that cooperatives would grow rapidly as more and more members began to participate, to understand the operations, to profit economically, and to take increasing responsibility for their control, it became clear that the peasant population lacked the basic knowledge and skills to initiate such activities. Moreover, many of the regulations of the Rochdale system were very ill-suited to Niger; for example, one regulation stated that a member wishing to withdraw from a cooperative must do so in a letter, yet most peasants could not write, and lived a day's trip away from any post office. Another impediment to success was the membership fee, which was a considerable expense to most peasants. Because the cooperatives failed for the most part to provide profits, this fee was not even reimbursed to the peasants, and was thus a bad investment.

So prior to 1966, the cooperative movement had not been able to point to success. Animation rurale, on the other hand, could show numerous instances of success in promoting small development projects, setting up RVAs, and bringing administrative and technical services closer to village people.

In February 1966 the UNCC called upon L. Schmandt, one of the directors of the French *Caisse Central de Coopération Economique*, for help in reorganizing the cooperative services. Schmandt's proposed solution to the problems of the cooperative movement was to merge the activities of *animation rurale* with those of UNCC, in applying the organizational skills of *animateurs* to the building of cooperatives:

> The self-management and self-financing of the rural world would thus seem possible; . . . the UNCC and *Animation Rurale* should merge their efforts so that the development of RVAs and of cooperatives is a single common enterprise, administered by *animateurs* and supported by agents of the UNCC.[16]

Working together to reform the cooperatives, both *Animation* and the UNCC would advance their own causes. The UNCC would profit from the help of *animateurs* in winning the confidence of the peasants, and *Animation* would be able to merge the RVAs with an economic structure allowing more peasant participation and control over their own affairs than did the simple distribution mechanisms for small-scale production to which they had been limited to date.

In his report, Schmandt also recommended that the cooperatives be enlarged to market more agricultural products and that they incorporate the function of providing credit to farmers, so that crediting and marketing would be organizationally linked. Farmers would then be able to borrow money for seeds and supplies at the beginning of the planting season, and to repay their debts to the same organization after marketing their produce.

Schmandt's recommendations were accepted, and the New System was put into effect. Some officials of the UNCC and SONARA, the peanut-marketing agency, resisted modification of the existing marketing system. Nonetheless, the plan was proposed by *Promotion Humaine* to the peasants in the RVAs, and most of the year of 1966 was spent working collaboratively with the RVAs, the UNCC and SONARA to reach a compromise acceptable to all concerned. Eventually a program was developed which allowed peasants to take over their own cooperatives under the continued direction of the UNCC. The semi-private commercial operation was not to be dissolved by fiat, but by gradual decrease in outside control as peasants became increasingly able to manage their own commercial affairs. In 1967, the banking and credit activities were transferred from the UNCC to the *Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole*.

Thus the framework and statutes of the cooperative movement were revised. Each village became a basic membership unit, in which individuals shared credit receipts and profits; village units were grouped together into cooperative sections, which administered marketing and credit activities, and the sections were regulated by a centralized cooperative market. If a village chose to join a section all village members would automatically receive free membership in the cooperative. Each village would elect its own officers--weighers, secretaries, presidents and advisory councils--and would combine its produce for sale in the section's market. All the sections (from 5 to 10) together would form a central market, controlled by UNCC administrators.

Animation turned its full attention to training peasants in the skills required to run cooperatives. First, marketing procedures were taught, then crediting and ordering, stocking and selling certain foods and supplies on which the government would have a monopoly. In the process of teaching these techniques of economic cooperation, the *Animation* staff expected to impart to the villagers a psychological disposition which would prepare them to cooperate in social political endeavors as well, thus enabling them eventually to govern themselves at the level of the RVAs and to eliminate the need for local administrators appointed at the central level.

Accounts differ as to whether or not *animation rurale*, working within *Promotion Humaine*, achieved the goal of establishing viable grass roots economic institutions in the selected zones of Zinder, Maradi, Desso and Tahoua. Some government workers reported that *Promotion Humaine*, if not quite able to bring these zones to the stage where they were economically and administratively autonomous communes, led them to the verge of that stage, having strengthened villagers' leadership of cooperatives and mutuals and having completed many local development projects in which villagers and technical services worked hand in hand.[17]

In July 1966, a Bureau of Studies was formed in *Promotion Humaine* to document and evaluate the inter-ministerial body's activities. These studies furnish evidence of achievements in cooperative building, agricultural production, improvement in health conditions, and the establishment of programs undertaken in the social sectors of women, children, nomads and government personnel.[18]

D. Gentil, a French advisor working in the *département* of Matameye-Magaria, made a thorough study of what happened during the 1960s. Because his description is detailed and based on a number of years of work in the cooperative movement it exemplifies the government's assessment of the New System.[19]

Gentil concluded that the evolution of cooperatives from simple peasant-controlled peanut-marketing mechanisms to autonomous rural communes is technically possible if methods permitting peasant participation are continually employed. However, the political feasibility of such communes was questionable. To the extent that the cooperative movement attacked the economic interest of foreigners and the newly emerging African commercialists, and to the extent that it considerably modified the nature of social relations between the peasant masses and the traditional elites, the party, the administration and the technical services, strong opposition to this movement would persist. Paradoxically if *animation rurale* and the cooperatives succeeded in providing peasants with the tools to increase their own control over economic and political affairs, they would agitate the status quo to resist the subsequent shift in the balance of power.

It was often difficult to distinguish between what seemed like technical limitationn--the inability of peasants to manage their own economic affairs--and political impediments to the success of the New System. But a close look at the events that occurred in the various *Animation* programs and cooperatives in the *arrondissements* of Matameye and Magaria sheds light on the critical effect of political resistance on the implementation of the New System.

In the fall of 1966, the villagers of Matameye and Magaria were given the opportunity to take over the management of their cooperatives from UNCC officials. This option was part of the course of the

New System, and it was offered at the time when *animateurs* and *Animation* cadres believed that villagers were ready to assume such responsibilities. In the three cooperatives of Matameye, the transition occurred smoothly. As expected, there was some initial protestation from the UNCC officials who gained an economic foothold locally, and feared that their previous unfair treatment of the peasants would hamper their chances for retaining their posts in the cooperatives when a general election was held. But the agents of *Promotion Humaine* had worked well with local administrators and peasants, and the latter were well enough informed not to be inhibited by the UNCC officials' propaganda against the New System. As a result, the three cooperatives of Matameye voted to take over the management of their own markets and to elect representative officials.

In Magaria, on the other hand, the three cooperatives had a range of reactions to the introduction of the New System. In Koya the New System was accepted without difficulty; in Bande it was firmly rejected; and in Sassoumbouroum, it caused a controversy which ended in a stalemate, the outcome of which affected the whole *arrondissement*.

When it was announced that the Magaria cooperatives would be allowed to adopt the New System, *arrondissement* officials, including the *sous-prefet*, the president of the Party, certain local chiefs and other members of the elite, visited the three villages, where *Animation* training sessions were underway. With the weight of their authority they tried to convince the peasants that the New System would only hurt them, as they were not capable of performing the tasks involved in the management of cooperatives. The reaction to this warning varied from village to village. In Koya, the cooperative members replied that the visitors were misinformed. The villagers calmly explained the New System and proposed to demonstrate their ability to manage their cooperative. The Animation program went on, and the mission from the arrondissement increased the peasants' support of their autonomous management.

In Bande, the traditional chief was very powerful, dominating the village and families scattered for miles around. The positions of president and secretary of the party were held by brothers of the chief, and all the cooperative officials were members of the local elite. The animateurs in the village were powerless, and had no influence on the chiefs and elites. When the New System was proposed, the elites were firmly opposed to it, and they convinced the peasants that they should not be so foolish as to accept responsibility for their economic future.

In Sassoumbouroum, where the economic and political situation was more complex, the presentation of the New System lit a spark that spread throughout the arrondissement. The peanut market was dominated by two merchants who had a large network of buyers beyond the area served by the cooperative. These merchants had no interference from the ruling Hausa chiefs, who lived some distance away, and they had political support from local chiefs of the Peuhl tribe and locally influential Hausas. At the same time, the animateurs were strongly backed by the peasants, had some support of local elites, and were themselves very forceful and influential. Thus, the balance of power between the representatives of the peasants and the elites was nearly even, and the interrelationships among supporting factions of the various groups was very complex. Consequently, the new system created an issue in the struggle for power which resulted in a standoff and could not be resolved in the village itself. The arrondissement officials decided to appeal to higher authorities.

Eventually the conflict extended so far that the issue had to be resolved by President Diori himself. Those who opposed the New System insisted to him that the peasants were not capable of learning the skills necessary to organize and run cooperatives. Diori called in G. Belloncle, then an advisor to UNCC, and asked him exactly what the peasants would have to learn. Convinced by Belloncle's presentation that a reasonable program could be designed to educate people in cooperative management skills, Diori declared that the cooperative movement should progress in the direction of state and peasant control, and that the New System should continue.[20]

The decision had fortunate effects for the New System in Magaria as well as in other regions where local programs were meeting resistance from established interest groups. In Magaria, a mission was sent from the central government to ascertain whether the villagers understood their options in relation to the New System. Koya and Sassoumbouroum elected to accept the New System, and although Bande remained a UNCC market for another year, in the fall of 1967, having seen the satisfactory progress of their neighboring cooperatives, that village too began to insist upon running their own marketing. By this time the local elites were willing to endorse the New System, and elections were held. Although four brothers of a local chief were elected, the other five officers were peasants, and thus power struggles began to be modified.

Although the immediate issue of these events was the control of the peanut cooperative, its larger significance was the change in the power balance in the village and the recognition of the peasants' right to some political and economic control. Animation had both trained the peasants to be able to handle such power, and demonstrated their support from the national level.

The reactions of the cooperatives in Matameye and Magaria to the New System exemplify the variety of reactions which took place in the four arrondissements of Niger where it was introduced. In some villages there was even more resistance than in Bande; Gentil's general conclusion is that the success of the New System varied from place to place, depending upon the local power structures' acceptance of or resistance to it. The capability of the peasants to manage the cooperative and their openness to working with government cadres were not the main questions.[21]

A very different assessment of the general success of the New System in helping peasants take responsibility for management of their own economic and political affairs was written by R. Charlick. As an independent researcher, he made an empirical study of the "induced participation" scheme of the government of Niger as it was exemplified in the arrondissement of Matameye. Charlick concluded that "despite the extremely positive reports, Animation did not function as an effective instrument for radical structural change in Matameye."[22] Charlick presented an analysis of events during the years 1962-68 which contradicts the conclusions of many government reports and of IRAM advisors to the government.

Charlick points out that while it was the overall goal of Animation to help establish new political and economic structures which would allow the peasants to run their own affairs on an inter-village (RVA) level, these structures never evolved, and

> Animation limited its activities to attempts to prepare the rural population for cooperative organization, and . . . to motivate the other bureaucratic services to cooperate in planning and meeting villager needs in the framework of an integrated government service team.[23]

Charlick argues that, from the beginning, Animation was resisted by the local elites, and that because animateurs received only minimal support from the national level, they had to come to terms with the power and wishes of party and traditional leaders. The incident in Sassambouroum cited by Gentil was one of the only two occasions in which Diori intervened to protect the Animation program.[24] Consequently, Animation's intended role as instigator for radical institutional change on the local level became confined to that of technical support of the other development services. One Animation director, upon tendering his resignation, despaired that Animation had become no more than "a trailer for the other services, carrying their pedagogic tools for them."[25] (This negative cast on Animation's role might be challenged, however, if one sees the submersion of Animation by the other services as the desired integration of services in Promotion Humaine.)

According to Charlick, the failure of Animation to modify the power relations between the peasants and the elites limited the work of the cooperatives and the agricultural services to short-term and sporadic achievements. The cooperative movement leaders were indeed justified in their high praise of the movement during the 1966-68 period.

Even by 1966, the number of cooperative members had grown from several hundred associates in UNCC pre-cooperative mutuals to 15,000 active members.[26] Moreover, Schmandt, on his mission from France, had been so favorably impressed as to recommend the continuation of a substantial subsidy first given to Niger by France in 1964. The agricultural services could point to effective projects, since they had eleven full-time agents in this single arrondissement at a time when the service's resources were very limited in other zones; these agents went from village to village, demonstrating modern methods of farming and introducing new seeds, fertilizers, fungicides and even ox-drawn plowing equipment which were, in effect, never adopted by the farmers. But despite the substantial resources and personnel of the agriculture service the agents reached only a small number of farmers, who adopted only a few of the innovations introduced.[27] Moreover, these services were rarely supplied to community organizations, but rather to individual farmers, and sometimes "highly coercive methods . . . [were used] to assure the sale of equipment once selected farmers had benefited from 'free' demonstrations."[28]

Charlick concluded that "even at the country level the structural implications of Animation were severely curtailed by the inability of the regime to support its fledgling services against the residual elites and against their bureaucratic allies,"[29] and that Animation was no more than a series of technical support activities to other development services.

His assessment is reconfirmed by Gentil's study done in 1970, indicating that, for several reasons, Promotion Humaine had failed to transform cooperatives into viable rural economic institutions. First, ideally, cooperative membership should have been voluntary rather than obligatory. But since membership was on a village rather than individual basis, all villagers were obliged to belong to their village cooperative. Such an obligation was not consistent with the theory propounded by *Promotion Humaine* that villagers would participate voluntarily in the cooperative system. In fact, the system would not work unless they were legally required to do so. Second, although the goals of *Animation* had been global and based on the integrated work of all the development services, by the late 1960s *animateurs* still had to work within one or another service, since these services had created very few horizontal links with each other on the local level. Third, the various services, especially the agricultural service, were very weak in technical expertise and could not offer viable alternatives to traditional practices. In contrast to Senegal, Niger, at the time of independence, had received very little attention from French agronomists. Thus it took Niger a long time to compensate for this lack. Whereas in Senegal, *Animation* erred in ignoring available resources of agricultural expertise, in Niger, such resources did not even exist.[30] Finally, there was still effective opposition to peasant controlled cooperatives from the local chiefs and religious leaders as well as the merchant class in some areas.

By the late 1960s the strategy of *Promotion Humaine* had been revised to reduce the obstacles being encountered. In their initial intervention in village affairs, *animateurs* worked more closely with the local elites to select and organize a development team consisting of government service representatives and traditional leaders on the arrondissement level. The theory was that, having acquired an understanding of the proposed Animation program and a vested interest in its outcome, the elderly leaders would then usually leave the animateurs and the team to carry out the specific projects under their approval.

1968-74: The adult literacy campaign in the cooperative movement. The success of the cooperative movement continued into the late 1960s, at least as a loose network of local marketing mechanisms, if not a strong economic and political institution. As the cooperatives gained prestige in selected arrondissements, other technical services were drawn over to support it. In particular, the Adult Literacy service joined forces with the Cooperative Union to conduct a literacy campaign as part of the movement. The increased importance of the Adult Literacy service as an educational agency resulted in a reduction of Animation's role in rural development. After 1968 the program was confined to certain tasks in the assistance of a literacy campaign which was implemented first in Maradi and later in other départements of the country. Although the campaign was, in principle, the coordinated effort of all rural development services, it was in fact largely the product of collaboration between the Cooperative Union and the Adult Literacy service.

In May 1968, two and a half years after the introduction of the New System, the cooperative movement could count among its successes six cooperatives in the département of Zinder, one in Maradi, ten in Tahoua and eighteen in Niamey. All thirty-five cooperatives were managed entirely by the peasants and their elected officers. Other cooperatives were evolving from a stage of self-management with UNCC assistance to one of full self-management.

As the number of self-managed cooperatives increased, Promotion Humaine officials began to see more clearly what skills were required by the peasants to run their cooperatives. The greatest task appeared to be the development of literacy skills.[31] The Nigerien Director of the Cooperative Union stated that "the organization of peasants into cooperatives and mutuals . . . requires the felt need of peasants to read and write so that they can perform their new duties adequately."[32]

To demonstrate and meet these needs, a campaign was launched by the UNCC and the Adult Literacy service to provide functional literacy training to cooperative officers in the zones of integrated action, beginning with the département of Maradi. The purpose of the campaign could be seen from two perspectives--that of the Cooperative Union and that of the Literacy service. The latter wanted the campaign to increase the functional aspect of literacy training, since during this era educators around the world[33] were preaching that the most effective kind of literacy training was functional literacy training, whereby people were taught to read and write so that they could perform specific functions in their social and economic milieu. Thus the Nigerien Adult Literacy service was searching for a specific "function" to support. The Cooperative Union was just such a function, as it needed help in making its officers and members better able to perform their tasks. Thus, "the project was explicitly focused on rural farm cooperatives as the one local institutional structure which met the criteria of economic potential, political viability and cultural relevance to serve as a framework" for functional literacy training.[34]

The campaign began in 1968 as an experiment with methods of training cooperative members in literacy in the _départements_ of Zinder and Maradi. In 1969, between February and May, the dry season during which farmers were not occupied in their fields, a pilot project was implemented in the Cooperative of Chadakori, just north of the capitol of the _département_ of Maradi. Based on the success of that pilot project, the _département_ directors of the literacy and cooperative service decided to launch projects throughout the _département_.

Collaboration between rural services at the _département_ level was a new endeavor; previously such collaboration had taken place on the _arrondissement_ level.[35] The months between the conclusion of the pilot project and the opening of the _département_-wide project were thus spent in building a structure at the _département_ level in which all the rural services could work toward the objectives of the functional literacy campaign. In particular, the group directing the campaign wanted to incorporate the services of _Animation_ and Agriculture into the already existing relationship between the Literacy service and the Cooperative Union.

Animation's inclusion seemed important both structurally and functionally. Structurally, it was already related to the Adult Literacy service through its inter-ministerial connection with the Adult Education service (of which literacy training was the major effort) in _Promotion Humaine_. Functionally, the civic education activities which had always been in the domain of _Animation_ were considered essential in the campaign, since it required "as much an effort to inform the rural population and to discuss the alternatives with them as it did a program to train selected local people in given technical tasks."[36]

However, since 1966, with the rise of the cooperative service and the subsequent submersion of Animation to the cooperative movement, relations between the two services had become increasingly strained. Animation, at least in the département of Maradi, had hesitated to "integrate itself fully into the cooperative movement because it did not clearly discern an independent role for itself and because it was not yet decided that cooperatives constituted the best practical means for local development."[37] In fact, it had allowed its role vis-à-vis the cooperatives to be reduced to that of supervising annual elections of cooperative officers, and even this task had been frustrated by the resistance of local leaders such as those in the villages of Magaria.

During the 1969-70 planning and preparation period of the campaign in Maradi, the Animation service, though invited to participate in the campaign, chose to restrict its activities to those generated around the campaign. The Animation cadres' reluctance to become involved in the campaign was due in a large part to their own internal dissension during this period.[38]

By October 1970, however, when the département was ready to begin the campaign, Animation was ready to become involved in it. The month of October was devoted to a workshop in the preparation of educational brochures, planning documents and visual aids needed to teach the rural peasants. In the workshop, staff members of Animation introduced the use of felt cloth figurines as a means of explaining to the peasants the purpose and need for cooperatives in their economic development. Thus, Animation was able to define a clear role for their services and an effective way to play that role. Easton reported that

> . . . the sort of civic education and information to which we devoted considerable periods of the months of October seemed then . . . to constitute a very natural part of the project. The two services [Adult Literacy and Animation] continued working out in practice the reciprocal relation between the work of Animation and that of literacy training throughout the rest of the year, with the result that the Animation staff made a much more active contribution to programming the project and to the entire campaign in 1971 than they had the previous year.[39]

Animation had four specific tasks. First, in the following spring (1971), its cadres went from village to village, preceding the literacy instructors and laying the groundwork with village authorities for the organization of functional literacy centers and the courses. Second, as their contribution to the subject matter and materials for use in making the literacy training "functional" they prepared, in the Hausa language, a model constitution for credit and lending agencies and a simple description of how an arrondissement was organized. Third, animateurs selected from each village several cooperative officers and village delegates to receive prior instruction in the constitution and administration so that they could assist the literacy instructors in teaching cooperative members. Finally, animateurs helped the Adult Literacy agency assess the degree to which information imparted in the session held at the level of the cooperative were transmitted by those attending the course to their fellow villagers back home.[40]

As the campaign continued, all the service agencies were given an opportunity to become a part of it. In addition to lessons in simple math and written Hausa, instruction in agricultural production, including the use of fertilizer and insecticide, forestry, civics and cooperative management was offered. For their part in the training, Animation staff members prepared the Hausa edition of the constitution and the description of administrative organization at the arrondissement level. They were not very successful in creating an equity between the literacy instructors and the village leaders and delegates, since the latter had more prestige and were prone to dominate instruction centering on politics. Thus, the instructors had to make sure the lessons stayed in the realm of literacy, rather than political pontification.[41]

By the end of 1973, the functional literacy campaign had reached 3,271 peasants. Starting with the pilot project in six village cooperatives in 1969, by 1972 the campaign had covered 13 more villages, and by 1973 another 34 villages had been included for a total of 53 villages.[42] Between 1971 and 1974, literacy campaigns like the one in Maradi had been introduced in Zinder, Dosso and the Badeguicheri.

Belloncle and Easton judged the campaign a success insofar as many cooperative leaders were able to take more responsibility for the management of the cooperative as a result of it.[43] Many materials had been produced in Hausa and were being used by cooperative officers; a newspaper was being published in Hausa; the attitude of peasants toward their cooperatives appeared to have become more favorable; and the actual management system had changed to facilitate the peasants' taking charge of it.

Belloncle and Easton also called attention to problems they had faced during the campaign and which continued to linger into even 1973.

These were: (1) "lack of coordination and joint planning among member agencies of the Maradi development team," e.g., a lack of horizontal coordination; (2) "a lack of coordination between national and regional [départemental] levels of government," e.g., a lack of vertical coordination; and (3) resistance by local leaders to the self-management of cooperatives in their locale.

Easton elaborated on this final problem:

> . . . it is questionable how much more headway this enterprise can make if the base principles of cooperative development are not reaffirmed by the government and ways found to mobilize the cadres in the difficult work of delegating and decentralizing their tasks--the more so as there is quite evidently opposition to the growth of cooperatives among the commercial strata of the country and in some national ministries. The potential stalemate is geographically illustrated by the fact that in 1972 the project will have reached all of the cooperatives of the Maradi Department . . . which have been approved for self-management by the regional and arrondissement authorities. A new decision to generalize the local autonomy movement in accordance with the objectives announced six years ago must be made for the project to continue its extension.[44]

Belloncle adds that the greatest problem facing the self-managed cooperative leaders, and those who had learned literacy as a function of other development tasks such as in agriculture, was the lack of positions open to them, jobs available in their village in which they could take increasing responsibility as their skills and knowledge grew.[45]

The existence of this problem reflects on the route followed by Animation in Maradi between 1963 and 1973. Animation's role moved farther and farther away from that of having responsibility for insuring communications between the government and the peasants, and of responsibility for guiding the peasants into active participation in their own economic development through participation in economic and political structures. As Animation's exercise of its mandate diminished, it became a part of an integrated effort in rural development, but only a minor part, as subject to the Literacy service, and the cooperative movement.

1974: A coup d'etat. In 1973 the Diori government was frequently accused of corruption and inefficiency in handling the economy. In April 1974, there was a coup d'etat resulting in the establishment of a military regime that still holds Diori in prison. Concerning the months following, little information on the fate of Diori's development programs has been available. But it is fairly certain that even by the time of Diori's overthrow, the Maradi project had diminished to a state of near inactivity and had not been successfully replicated in other regions of the country.

The reason for this was primarily deterioration of government support of the project.[46] Rural development was taking second priority to the building of capital and foreign markets for peanuts and cotton. Due to the disastrous droughts of 1968, 1970, and 1972, the nation's capital resources were not improving.[47] The central government, preoccupied with holding the country together economically, could not risk the political opposition of middle level commercialists and their government representatives, and Diori policy and regulations in regard to rural development programs became weak and vague. When clarification and support was needed to settle disputes among cooperative members and sometimes non-members the concern demonstrated earlier by the President was absent. The rural population sensed this lack of support, and gradually lost interest in the movement.[48]

Moreover, the intense effort made in Maradi to integrate the services of the UNCC, Animation, Adult Education and the technical agencies was never echoed at the central level of the ministries. Agents of each ministry were responsible in a vertical line to their directors in Niamey, and they had no incentive to cooperate horizontally in the departments where they were introduced. Finally, one could speculate that the passive resistance of government officials to extend the Maradi project to other regions was due not only to lack of interest, but also to the suspicion that as the cooperative movement spread to more established private commercial areas, the economic interest of their clientele would be threatened.[49] Thus, middle-level politicians gained strength while Diori's back was turned, and the peasants, without strong support from the top, could not hold their own in the constant struggle with local level elites and their patrons in Niamey.

When the new military government was established under the leadership of Seyni Kountché, the Counseil Militaire Supreme became the ruling body, and development plans were directed by the Counseil National du Développement (CND). Although in theory the CND was responsible only for screening developmental programs to be implemented by the Supreme Council, in actuality it took on responsibility for their execution as well. In 1975, Promotion Humaine was merged into the Ministre du Développement.

By early 1975, Promotion Humaine could claim that Animation had reached nearly one quarter of Niger's population (about one million people); most of these were in Maradi, Zinder and the other southern areas in which the program had begun. In Maradi, the UNCC had organized 400 cooperatives in 40 sections, which had been renamed *Associations Locale de Cooperatives* (ALCs). To serve these cooperatives, 155 functional literacy centers had been built. Other rural services, however, including those of agriculture and credit, had become insignificant. Moreover, after five years of severe drought, the region had failed to build up the capital needed for further development, and was still turning to international funding agencies for loans and assistance.

The Programs in Niger and Senegal Compared

On the whole the *animation rurale* program in Niger appears to have been much less significant in the evolution of rural development institutions than was the program in Senegal. It was confined to local projects in scattered areas of the country, and, during much of its history, to assisting other local technical services as "a trailer carrying pedagogical tools." *Animation's* failure to raise the level of political consciousness on the part of peasants and to prepare the way for rural economic and political institutions seems to have resulted from three circumstances that were different from those in Senegal.

First, the nation's dire lack of resources, especially trained personnel, and the early decision to decentralize administrative and technical services prevented the linkage of grass roots level programs to the central government. This resulted in competition rather than collaboration among services on the local level, since there was no higher level body to integrate their work and to help them negotiate in areas of conflict. Arrondissement level staff members owed allegiance to their hierarchical superiors, not to their colleagues working on a horizontal level in other services. The creation of Promotion Humaine appears not to have improved the situation because, being on a central level in a decentralized administration, it was too remote to affect activities directly. After four years of relative success in its autonomous work with villagers, Animation lost ground to the Cooperative Union and then to the Adult Literacy service, and became second to them.

Second, animation rurale was not linked to any national ideology in Niger in the same way it was linked to African Socialism in Senegal. In this respect it was less vital to the national interest, and the President and top leadership were less obligated to support the program at times when it conflicted with the interests of other individuals or groups. Diori chose to support Animation and the cooperative movement in certain instances, but he was not a consistent backer, having more freedom for pragmatic decisions than he would have if the program had been part of a comprehensive ideology.

Finally, the French advisors to the government on matters of rural development and education appear to have had much more control over the direction of rural projects and institution-building than they did in Senegal, where Senghor and Dia maintained firm control over policy and planning decisions. In addition to inspiring less commitment from the Nigeriens than their own people might have, the French advisors to animation rurale and the cooperative movement seem to have suffered from insufficient familiarity with rural people and their cultural patterns. For example, they mistook a mild interest and willingness to cooperate on the part of peasants for a commitment to participate in economic and political affairs and to abandon traditional ways of living for the sake of modernization.

In sum, the Animation program in Niger experienced many of the same setbacks on the local level as did the program in Senegal. It did not suffer, as did the Senegalese, from an abrupt change in policy on the national level early in its history. Yet it missed the force of central planning and control in strengthening its effects nationwide and making it a viable political force, even one that at times opposed the national leadership that enforced it.

ENDNOTES

[1] The summary of historical events is based on V. Thompson's "Niger," in G. Carter, *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

[2] R. Charlick, "Power and Participation in the Modernization of Rural Hausa Communities" (Los Angeles: University of California at Los Angeles, Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, 1974), p. 64.

[3] IRAM, *Les Animateurs des Villages dans les Zones Aménagées de la République du Niger; Etude et Propositions* (Niamey: Secrétariat d'Etat aux Relations avec les Etats de la Communauté, February 1961).

[4] Y. Goussault, *Interventions Educatives et Animation dans les Développements Agraires* (Paris: Presses Universitaires du France, 1970), p. 109.

[5] Charlick, p. 87.

[6] Goussault, *Interventions Educatives et Animation dans les Développements Agraires*, p. 111.

[7] Cf. Chapter II.

[8] Y. Goussault, *l'Animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Francophone* (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1970).

[9] Cf. Chapter III.

[10] G. Belloncle, "La Promotion Humaine au Niger," *Formation des Hommes* (Bamako, mimeograph, 1976), p. 42.

[11] Charlick, pp. 301-02. For details of the incidents leading to these conclusions, see pp. 293-301.

[12] Belloncle, "La Promotion Humaine au Niger," pp. 38-54.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] The summary of the cooperative movement in Niger is based on D. Gentil, "Les Coopératives Nigeriennes: Traditions Villageoises et Modernisation Coopérative" (Paris, IRAM, doctoral thesis submitted to l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1971).

[16] Republique du Niger, L. Schmandt, *Mission Niger, Octobre 1964* (Niamey: UNCC, February 1965), p. 13.

[17] See G. Belloncle, *Coopératives et Développement en Afrique Noire*, Vol. III (Bamaka: mimeo, 1976); R. Colin, *l'Animation du Développement dans la République du Niger* (Paris: IRAM, February 1967); G. Nicholas, *Circulation des Richesses et Participation Sociale dans une Société Hausa du Niger (Canton de Kantche)* (Bordeaux: Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 1965); and V. Gentil, *Rapport Provisoire-Etude Sociologique de Quatre Villages Animés* (Niamey: Promotion Humaine, Service de l'Animation du Développement, Sous-Prefecture de Magaria, August 1966).

[18] Belloncle, *Coopératives et Développement en Afrique Noire*.

[19] V. Gentil, pp. 246-49.

[20] P. Easton, personal interview (January 1976).

[21] V. Gentil, p. 249.

[22] Charlick, p. 94.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 95.

[26] Ibid.

[27] G. Nicholas, *Problèmes posés par l'Introduction des Techniques Agricoles Modernes au Sein d'une Société Africaine (Vallée de Maradi)* (Bordeaux: Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 1969).

[28] Charlick, p. 98.

[29] Ibid., p. 101.

[30] This observation is confirmed by A. Magnen (personal interview, August 1976).

[31] A detailed discussion of the need for and a proposed method of such literacy training is in Belloncle, "Projet d'Alphabétisation Fonctionnelle dans le cadre des Coopératives," in *Coopératives et Développement en Afrique Noire*, vol. III, pp. 84-97.

[32] Ibid.

[33] UNESCO, *The Experimental World Literacy Program: A Critical Analysis* (Paris: UNESCO, 1976).

[34] P. Easton, *Functional Literacy and Cooperative Education: Growth of the Project, 1969* (Paris: IRAM, mimeo, 1970).

[35] The foregoing description of *Animation*'s activities relates to those in the *arrondissements* of Matameye and Magaria, which are two *arrondissements* within the Département de Zinder.

[36] Easton, *Functional Literacy and Cooperative Education: Growth of the Project, 1969*, p. 25.

[37] Ibid., p. 26.

[38] Ibid., p. 27.

[39] Ibid., p. 34.

[40] Ibid., p. 35.

[41] Ibid., p. 47.

[42] Belloncle, *Coopératives et Développement en Afrique Noire*, vol. III, p. 215.

[43] Easton, *Functional Literacy and Cooperative Education: Growth of the Project, 1969*, p. 61; and ibid., p. 217.

[44] Easton, ibid., p. 48.

[45] Belloncle, *Coopératives et Développement en Afrique Noire*, vol. III, pp. 217-18.

[46] P. Easton, personal interview (January 1976).

[47] According to the Government of Niger, the Gross Domestic Product had fallen from 108 billion CFA in 1972 to an estimated 92.5 billion CFA in 1974, a loss of 15.4%.

[48] P. Easton and J.F. Barres, personal interviews (January 1976).

[49] Easton, personal interview (January 1976).

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS

We have now described the theory of animation rurale (Chapter II) and the historical trends fundamental to its inception (Chapter III). We have traced the evolution of the animation rurale programs in Senegal (Chapter IV) and in Niger (Chapter V). This chapter brings the discussion of theory into contrast with the account of the applications of that theory.

The contrast is sharpened through a series of steps. After a recapitulation of the development strategy into which animation rurale was integrated, and a review of the assumptions upon which it was based, the results of the programs in Senegal and Niger are summarized and assessed in terms of the stated goals of the planners. These results are looked at within four conceptual frameworks which have been offered by four different scholars of rural development.

Finally, the list of assumptions is examined once more in order to draw general conclusions from this particular study of the role of nonformal education in rural development. The discussion of the assumptions covers the lessons learned from the study about the problems and issues that planners can anticipate in designing programs similar to animation rurale and about the validity of the assumptions tested by the programs in Senegal and Niger.

Animation Rurale as a Development Strategy

The *animation rurale* program, as it developed in Senegal and Niger, was a critical educational dimension of the new nations' development strategies. A very significant element of those strategies was to invest primarily in *human* resources. The teams of Senegalese and Nigeriens and their European advisors who designed the first national development plans chose to depend for their capital accumulation on the productivity of their citizens rather than on foreign investment or the accumulated wealth of the national elite. They intended that within the first few years of independence, modern economic structures would replace the traditional and colonial ones. The bulk of the population would be educated to participate in these modern institutions, thereby increasing their profits from agricultural production and reinvesting them in their own rural communities, which would eventually become the basis for regional and then national economically self-sufficient and politically self-reliant organizations.

In Senegal this strategy was clothed in the ideology of African Socialism; in Niger there was no such prevalent ideology, but there did exist the principle, especially among the proponents of *animation rurale*, including the President, that most of the wealth should be nationalized and fed back to the rural communal structures in order to promote development from the grass roots. Thus, on the spectrum of what have been characterized as the capitalist and socialist modes of development strategy,[1] the schemes of Senegal and Niger fall much closer to the latter, when compared, for example, with the direction taken by the Ivory

Coast. In the capitalist mode, surplus wealth is given to the elites rather than to the masses, on the assumption that they have the incentive and discretion to reinvest it in such a way as to achieve the maximum national economic growth. (It is generally agreed that the accumulation of wealth by foreigners for their own national interests is not desired by anyone in the developing world.) In the socialist mode, wealth is believed to come from the labor of the masses, usually in rural areas, and it is that group (or class) which should receive the surplus to reinvest in ways that will make their labor even more productive.

This dichotomy is oversimplified here in order to point out the critical role played by an educational program such as animation rurale in the socialist mode of development strategy. If human resources are to be the main source of surplus wealth, they must be developed, and this entails education and training. Modern agricultural production skills and modern economic attitudes must be instilled in the rural masses so that they can participate in the modern economic institutions, such as cooperatives, credit schemes and other marketing devices installed by the state.

In order to provide this education, the inventors of animation rurale chose rural villages and groups of villages--as their target populations. In choosing to work with villages as communities, they took a firm stand on the issue of whether individuals or communities can be most effectively trained to accomplish productive tasks.

Finally, as part of their strategy, those responsible for the development schemes and animation rurale chose not only to educate the rural masses in modern methods and attitudes, but also to transform them into a new power base to replace the European colonial rulers and to prevent the growth of any national elite groups. Thus, simultaneously, power was being handed over to a large group of citizens, very few of whom had previously held power even on a local level, and education was being offered to this same large group in order that they become able to use their power intelligently.

From logical, practical and pedagogical points of view, the simultaneous creation of this new power base and introduction of mass education resulted in a program of "learning by doing." The peasants were to learn how to be economically more productive and politically more directive by actually being given responsibility for doing so. The ideological roots of this new development strategy[2] depended heavily on an equally new concept of education.[3]

The essential characteristics of this kind of education were: first, its different clientele of the underprivileged masses rather than the elite, who previously had been selectively filtered through social structures to receive schooling; second, its more limited resource base, including time, personnel, facilities and materials; and third, its general aim of providing practical rather than academic training.

This, then, is the development strategy into which animation rurale was intended to fit. Animation rurale has been regarded in this study as a type of nonformal education, and as such, a concrete case of the new approach to education which is rapidly gaining popularity in the development strategies of many African as well as other Third World nations. Animation rurale has tested some assumptions about development and the role of education in development which have bearing on nonformal education in general. These assumptions, which are implicit in the theory of *animation rurale*, will be listed here, so that they can serve as a framework for the appraisal of the program's outcomes and the analyses of its relative success and failure.

Three of the assumptions directly concern the role of nonformal education in development. The other three, although not directly focused on education, are critically related to the educational dimension of any development scheme.

1. Nationwide development programs on the grass roots level can be ordained and directed from the highest level of the central government. This assumption is related to the conflicts which occur in development programs managed from both the bottom-up and the top-down.

2. Traditional societies are amenable to an evolution toward modern economic and political institutions. Modernization can take place without a brutal disruption of traditional cultural patterns. This assumption is a rejection of the notion that economic development and modernization cannot take place without painful conflict and the destruction of traditional forces.

3. The socialist mode is more efficient than the capitalist mode of economic development. Concomitantly, development programs should be designed for communities rather than individuals so that all people, not just an emergent group of elites, be allowed to share and invest surplus wealth.

4. Education of the masses and socioeconomic structures which provide for the equal distribution of national resources are comple-

mentary. Both are necessary in a development strategy that aims at both economic equity and growth. This assumption is stated in such a way as to resolve the "chicken or egg" debate about the priority of training people for modernity and institutionalizing modern structures.

5. Participation in modern economic and political structures, such as cooperative marketing organizations and democratic election of government leaders, can be the very basis for training people to operate within these structures. In other words, people can be given economic and political power at the same time they are being taught to use it.

6. Educational programs are most effective when they are integrated into other development programs such as agricultural production, marketing, forestry, health and sanitation. This is taking one step further a fundamental tenet of nonformal education, namely, that education suffers from being isolated within schools, and that out-of-school educational programs should be designed so as not to separate the learner's education from his social and economic activities.

Nature of the Results

The results of *animation rurale*, seen from the vantage point of today, can be summarized in three statements. The scheme of creating bottom-up institutions, that evolve from village level development projects into national organizations which allow the peasant population economic and political self-direction, has not worked out as planned. On the other hand, sixteen years of *animation rurale* in Senegal and twelve in Niger have created in the countryside numbers of local development projects and pockets of increased awareness among the peasants of their relationship to their government. Finally, the concept and strategy of *animation rurale* has changed significantly from what it was originally indicating an impracticality of the original plans.

It cannot be demonstrated conclusively that *animation rurale* has either "succeeded" or "failed." Quantitative data is not very instructive, since an account of the numbers of villages affected and of *animateurs* trained, gives no indication of the effects of the training or the *animateurs*' achievements. Although such statistics are available and have been cited in this study as relevant, they are misleading if not accompanied by an account of the qualitative results of the training and village development programs. Unfortunately, there has been a great lack of this kind of evaluative information--a lack which has continually made it difficult to systematically adjust the program on the basis of formative evaluation information.

Furthermore, one canaot determine from the massive literature produced by IRAM what the actual results of *animation rurale* have been at various stages. Written assessments of the programs, such as the 1966 document cited in Chapter V on the progress of *Animation* and the cooperatives and the announcement of the New System, tend to be theoretical and with an apparent apologist orientation. Therefore, the most reliable information comes from studies made by individuals who worked outside of either IRAM or the governments themselves, and from recent direct observations. Also, one can deduce from the current economic and social situation in the countries a degree of the lack of success of the *animation rurale* strategy, since it has not produced the intended results, regardless of other variables which have entered into the national development processes.

The following account of the results of animation rurale in Senegal has been compiled from the studies of DeDecker, Serreau and Brochier, made between 1964 and 1967, and from my own observations and interviews made in 1976. The former serve as historical documents since it was prior to 1964 that the significant events which were to influence the outcome of the program occurred. The summation of what happened in Niger comes mainly from Charlick's study, from a 1975 World Bank report on the economic situation in the region of Maradi, and from interviews with Barres and Easton, who have both worked in Niger recently.

Senegal. Since the inception of animation rurale in Senegal in 1959, there have been three critical episodes affecting the current status of the program, the modifications of the development strategy and the results of the program and strategy. The first of these was in 1962, when Mamadou Dia was removed from the government as a consequence of cumulative opposition from many factions to Senegal's radical socialist development strategy. From that time on, much of the socialist ideology, including the granting of power to the peasnat masses, remained rhetoric only, and animation rurale became one of several, often competing, means to economic growth.[4] The second major event was Ben Mady Cissé's departure from Senegal in early 1971. This, too, was the end of a long period of Cissé's and others' dissatisfaction with the government's firm hand on what had once been a very active development program. And the third occurrence was Cissé's return to Senegal and reaking of the leadership of *animation rurale* (within *Promotion Humaine*) in 1973. The evolution of Cissé's philosophy and the change of circumstances in Senegal have led to a decisive change in the nature of *animation rurale* from what it was in the 1960s.

Most notably, whereas *animation rurale* was a systematic, homogeneous nationwide program designed to achieve economic development by increasing the productivity and improving the welfare of the rural population, *Promotion Humaine* is a collection of a wide variety of development projects, some national, some regional and others very local, which are not clearly linked, except in the rhetoric of the program and of the government, to the nation's overall development strategy. The political aspect of *Promotion Humaine* is much less distinct; the various programs aim more at improving economic and social conditions in given areas than at encouraging people to participate in government institutions. (One exception are those *Animation* programs whose purpose is to train villagers and government cadres on all levels to adjust to the administrative reform which is designed to give rural communes more economic autonomy.) The Secretariat of *Promotion Humaine* searches for employees who have technical skills, background and interest in human development training.[5] Because *Promotion Humaine* is occupied with technical economic development activities rather than with political instigation, personnel are hired by the government to work on a departmental level rather than recruited from villages to work without pay.

These changes reveal that the strategy to build bottom-up institutions was perceived as a failure. None of the "animated" rural communities ever progressed beyond the first stage of local development or village improvement projects or incipient cooperatives.[6] Within the past two years rural communes (which bear resemblance to those foreseen in Senegal's original Plan) have been implemented in four of the seven regions; but these have not evolved from the spontaneous formation of cooperating village organizations; instead they have been directed from the national level. Whether or not these communes will function effectively as intervillage economic units remains to be seen, and their evolution will demonstrate even better in the future whether the training provided by Animation has taken effect. In any case, because of the abrupt redirection of the national strategy in 1963 and because of the inability of local peanut marketing cooperatives to hold their own in the face of traditional opposition, the anticipated expansion of small cooperatives into self-sufficient economic and political units has not come about.[7]

Most villages have their animateur, but his or her influence, if it ever did exist, has long since ceased. The role of animateur is generally considered to be something of the past and no longer vital.[8] Although the political climate varies from region to region, the traditional elites--the marabouts and local tribal leaders--hold more power than animateurs, and if the latter have been influential, it is usually due in part to the support given to them by the former. Peace Corps Volunteers working with Promotion Humaine in the Fleuve and Casamance regions, in discussing their own activities and difficulties, depict the aims of animation rurale as brand new to their locales, not as something which has been institutionalized for sixteen years. These Volunteers are still trying to instigate small-scale projects such as well-digging, vegetable growing, cooperative marketing, and so on. More often than not, they work independently, with little support from either village *animateurs* or the government bureaucracy. These conditions show that neither the apparatus nor the attitudes of modern economic structures are present.

Progress in development, however, must always be measured in relative terms, and one could argue that *Animation* has had an impact, the results of which have not yet been fully manifested. There are, for instance, certain regions, such as Thiès and the Casamance, in which numerous village development projects are underway; some of these are remarkable in the initiative taken by the villagers to improve their standard of living and to enter into the modern economy. As might be expected, the results of *Animation* have varied from village to village, depending on the skill and charisma of the *animateurs*, regardless of the training or support they were given.

In addition to sporadic evidence of success throughout the country, there have been major changes resulting in part from the efforts of *Animation*. In the current administrative reform, the government officials of many ministries, including *Promotion Humaine*, are finding that the villagers do not passively accept the dicta sent down from central planners. The villagers and their traditional and administrative leaders have a sense of what the structural changes would demand in terms of their own life patterns, and whereas they are not opposed to the new design, they insist on negotiating with government officials instances in which the reform is being pushed too abruptly.[9] This kind of active response indicates a sophistication in villagers' perspectives on social change which could only be expected of individuals who had had prior experience with reorganization schemes imposed on their lives.

Another important phenomenon to which Animation was believed to have contributed was the "peasant malaise" of 1968-69. During those years of drought, when the peasants refused to limit their crop production to peanuts for export in order that they could grow food crops for their own survival, the lessons taught by Animation about the obligations of the government to the rural peasants was viewed by Cissé and other Senegalese leaders as a cause of their willingness to voice discontent and to demand revision of government policy.

Surprisingly strong expressions of discontent were also heard through the Rural Educational Radio program (Radio Educatif Rural), which went on during the late 1960s.[10] This program on agricultural policies and practices, which solicited questions in writing from the listening groups on that subject, received an overwhelming response in the form of criticisms, complaints and demand for explanations. Again, such an awareness and lack of docility among peasant groups has been attributed by Cissé to the consciousness-raising element of Animation. But there is no empirical proof of this relationship between the two programs.

Perhaps the most significant influence on the vitality of animation rurale is the continued presence of its original director, Ben Mady Cissé. It appears that after the turbulence and gradual emasculation of the program in the 1960s, it is once again an active institution. In spite of the tenuous connection between Promotion Humaine and the national development strategy, the two seem to be no longer in conflict, and Cissé appears to be aware of the limits of the program's political influence. Promotion Humaine has become more of a traditional educational endeavor, in that it is preparing communities for a future in which modern institutions are foreseen rather than inciting them to take responsibility in their own hands for changing those institutions. On the spectrum of socialist and capitalist modes of development strategy, in other words, Senegal's strategy has become much more capitalist, but it still has room for the socialist direction of Promotion Humaine.

It can be argued that the Animation program has been successful because it has lasted so long. However, since its original strategy has been revised so notably, one can also insist that the original concept of animation rurale failed and that the present program of Promotion Humaine represents a whole new strategy.

Niger. In Niger, where animation rurale was dominated from the beginning more by its French advisors than by Nigeriens themselves, its existence has been much less visible than in Senegal under Ben Mady Cissé. The program in Niger was not part of a national ideology, and it was implemented primarily on a regional and local level, even though it was considered to be a national institution.

The best account of the results of animation rurale in Niger is in Charlick's study of induced participation in the Hausa communities of Southern Niger. His empirical research on development efforts in Matameye county show that Animation's results, as assessed in 1970-74, are similar to those of the program in Senegal. His perspective, however, reveals many more details than do the reports on Senegal, and his study substantiates the more piecemeal studies made in Senegal.

Charlick concludes that the *Animation* program in Niger was relatively ineffectual from the beginning. First, in recruiting *animateurs* from the villages, the government and its French advisors were not able to overcome the suspicion of villagers that their men were being taken to war against neighboring enemies or to carry out some equally onerous duty.[11] Then, even those who did attend the *Animation* training sessions reportedly viewed them as no more than a series of lectures on what government agencies were supposed to do for the villagers. The "learner involved" activities described by RAM were apparently not reinforced enough to make an impression on those who participated in the training programs, since *animateurs* did not recount them to their fellow villagers, but instead reiterated the list of services offered by government agencies.[12] Consequently, *animateurs* had nothing unique to offer to their villages, and either used the opportunity of their training session to acquire the role of an additional advisor to the village chief and traditional leaders, or proceeded to fade altogether from a leadership role in their village.

Since the *Animation* program did not have the anticipated effects even at the village level, the inter-village program--*Rural Villages Animés* (RVAs)--was ineffectual from the beginning. Viewed by local religious, tribal and political authorities as a threat to their own power, the RVAs were prevented from becoming anything more than means of passing on information about government plans and activities to the villagers. The RVAs also served as terminal points for extention training programs, such as those in agriculture and literacy. The only note-worthy effect of this new institution was to create one more opportunity for some individuals to establish themselves as patrons who could cultivate a clientele ready to obey their commands in exchange for favors such as a portion of the limited agricultural supplies and government credit funds.

Charlick cites an example of certain Kera villagers, in Matameye, who responded eagerly to the *Animation* program's RVAs as an opportunity to play out a power struggle between Hausa and Fulani delegates in the area. Instead of seeing the new inter-village organization as a means toward cooperation and shared economic profits, these villagers used it as an occasion to decide which social group should predominate in the area. The result was that the Fulani villages eventually seceded from the RVA, "complaining that they were denied even a modicum of the rewards and titles."

> Clearly the political participation created by RVA structures represented an interesting syncretistic [i.e., compromising, accommodating] pattern for the new influentials. They were able to assimilate the new positions and resources into a traditional political game and to gain influence where they had previously been powerless beyond the confines of their own villages. This response pattern had nothing whatsoever to do with the notion of mass-based political organization and of greater equality of village influence. In fact, the Hausa delegate resorted to some political tactics which were totally antithetical to *animation* principles. One of the resources which he used to gain the patronage of the *sous-prefet* was informing on villagers in various towns in his area who had been hidden from the tax rolls by their chiefs. When the Departmental *Animation* director heard about this, he insisted that it cease, as villagers might turn on the *Animation* service as a mere adjunct of the administration. However, the tactic paid off richly for the delegate.[13]

Charlick concludes that the participation of villagers in the new political and economic structures such as the RVAs and the cooperatives was symbolic rather than real. That is, villagers were told that they should participate in discussions about how these organizations were to be established and run, and that they should have a voice in the election of individuals who were to run them, but in fact, the villagers, accustomed to honoring the traditional tribal and religious power systems, always supported the wishes and candidacies of the already-established elites in their locale. Thus, whereas officially there was a new political institution, the increased number of participants in that institution did nothing to alter the influence of those who were already in a position to make decisions.

As a reflection of the lack of institutional and practical change on the village and inter-village (RVA) levels, the effect of *Animation* and the cooperative movement on the county level was also slight. Again, the new organizations offered an opportunity to the politically ambitious ones to increase their influence and their clientele by being in a position to offer material as well as political favors. Although in theory, the New System was to permit the villagers themselves to run the cooperatives and to take responsibility for decisions as to how they would be governed, in fact, the Cooperative Union advisors and government officials, still uncertain as to the most efficacious regulations and most equitable principles, were reluctant to give up control over decisions such as how individuals should be incorporated into village cooperatives, how credit should be awarded, and how profits should be invested. Their continued intimate involvement in such decisions left the villagers with the feeling that they themselves had no real authority in these institutions, and, as it had always been, the government left them no options as to how to invest their resources and secure their means to survival.[14]

The situation has been summed up as follows:

> . . . the *Animation* program of organizing politically awakened villagers into RVA structures not only failed to produce an effective agency for funneling peasant political interest and demands upward, it also failed to prepare villagers for effective management of the economic aspects of their new units. *Animation* could neither provide the training nor the support for villager political expression. What the RVA structures did do . . . was to create significant new opportunities for local level patronage and influence at an extra-village level. . . . In addition, the mass of villagers did become much more involved in the symbolic aspects of an extra-village power struggle than had been the case before. It was not, however, the democratic opening to the villagers which had been anticipated and desired by Nigerien development planners.[15]

The new institutions--the RVAs, the cooperatives and the credit mutuals--failed to include the bulk of the villagers in the decision-making and management processes. Decisions were made either by the Cooperative Union and *Animation* officials or, when officials stepped back, by traditional village notables who were usually selected as presidents and weighers of the cooperatives. The New System did not actually provide villagers who had not previously held power with any new resources to challenge those who had held it traditionally.

The resulting situation, according to Charlick, is that some enterprising individuals used the new structures to increase or gain a new clientele with the authority and material benefits supplied by the government marketing mechanisms; traditional authorities immersed themselves in the new structures, truncating any potential means of diminishing their own power. Most villagers, having had no successful experience in challenging the traditional authorities, did not change their attitudes toward the local or national government.[16]

In short, the bottom-up institutions in Niger did not develop any further than those in Senegal. They were halted at the first stage of local development projects, particularly peanut marketing cooperatives. As in Senegal, some of these local projects, including some inter-village cooperatives, were successful in their own right, especially since they provided practical training to some villagers in the literacy, numeracy and administrative skills useful in managing a cooperative.

Charlick's findings were confirmed in a 1975 World Bank appraisal of the need and feasibility of an investment in rural development projects in the Maradi region. This report implies that modern economic structures exist only in rudimentary form, and have had hardly any influence on villagers' attitudes and behavior in agricultural production, marketing and investment in their local economic growth.

In the next section, some explanations for this relative failure will be reviewed. These explanations have been offered in theoretical and empirical assessments of animation rurale.

Critiques of the Program

This section will cover four major written critiques on animation rurale in Senegal and Niger and will remark on other critiques as they pertain to these four. Since the results of the program in Niger studied by Charlick have just been reviewed, we will start with his analysis, which is made in the framework of "induced participation" theory as a basis for a rural development strategy. The second analysis to be examined is that of Easton, who has looked at the cooperative movement functional literacy project (the latest phase of Niger's rural development strategy of which Animation was a part) as an example of the organic growth process of a project. Then follow the conclusions of DeDecker, a Belgian who examined animation rurale as a socialization scheme. Finally, we will examine the criticisms made by Albert Meister, who has written about community development as an inadequate strategy of economic development. Often, these authors have pointed to the same factors as weaknesses in the animation rurale program. Following the synopsis of each critique, these points will be synthesized in a reexamination of the issues and assumptions considered in this study. This section, however, is intended primarily to present the relevant points of each critique.

The scheme of creating new economic and political institutions in rural areas and of training peasants to take responsibility for them and thus to increase their power and authority in the government at regional and national as well as local levels has been called by Charlick a theory of "induced participation." This theory has its roots and parallels in political and economic science and in humanistic and industrial psychology.

In Niger, the new government leaders and their advisors tried induced participation as a strategy of rural economic development. Why did they not succeed? Charlick offers six main explanations.

1. This strategy assumes that a rural community--a village--is a homogeneous group of individuals, with the common circumstance of poverty. Traditionally, these rural communities have had a "socialist"

approach to government, in that they share among themselves any surplus wealth accumulated, and have been "democratic," in that decisions affecting the community are made in a "palaver" or discussion which leads to a consensual agreement on decisions.

Charlick's close study of four Hausa villages, however, reveals that the communities are not homogeneous, and that within each group there are distinct gradations of wealth.

> Development planners . . . have viewed the village society as an economic monolith, either out of ignorance, or for simplifying ideological reasons. . . .
>
> Villagers do not share a common objective standard of living and quality of well-being. Some villagers appear to be perpetually on the edge of destruction. . . . Other villagers wear beautiful gowns, own one or more handsome horses, and live in well-kept compounds often encircled by mud masonry walls.[17]

Consequently, economic inequalities work against the effects of socialist communal investments, since those who are already more wealthy will be reluctant to share what they have. And as long as decisions are made by these same wealthy and powerful individuals--which is the case in spite of the appearance of consensual agreements--they will not choose to support a system that forces them to distribute wealth more equitably. Hence comes the resistance of the local elites, who see no personal gain from the new structures.

2. Capital growth depends upon saving and investing surplus wealth. The designers of animation rurale assumed that villagers would be more than happy to invest such surplus into their own communities if they could only be taught to acquire it and to invest it wisely. Charlick finds, that, on the contrary, surplus wealth is acquired from time to time, but it is consciously given not to the community at large, but

to those with social and political power.[18] The powerful are the heads of "work groups," which are organizations of village families sharing land and labor in agricultural production.

> In reality it is difficult to imagine how a work group surplus could be jointly invested . . . any surpluses actually produced and undistributed to group members become the assets of the work group head. . . . Effectively the work group forms no capital, and therefore lacks any collective 'capacity to invest.' If work group production has any relevance to investment, then it must be in its relationship to individual well-being, both of work group heads, and of their dependents.[19]

So not only do the villagers not possess attitudes favoring investment of surplus wealth into the growth of their communities, but they are accustomed to definite social pressures not to invest such surplus. Again, Animation unknowingly tried to upset the status quo, believing attitudes of equity and entrepreneurship to exist where, in fact, they did not.

3. Animation tried to convince the rural peasants that the government and the Party were useful services. The peasants, however, had feared and distrusted the central government and its local agents as long as they had known it. In an attempt to demonstrate their advocacy for the government, Animation staff members made the initial mistake of identifying themselves with that government and its officials. As a result, villagers could not easily distinguish between this new service, which had been created to start a dialogue between them and their government, and the government agents against whom they were already prejudiced.

> In 1966, for example, when Animation agents conducted studies of the new system in a number of villages, they routinely included party officials and agents of the civil administration in order to convince villagers that they were 'serious.' As a

> result, village *palavers* with *Animation* agents were simply viewed as the 'giving of orders' and villagers were only slightly more willing to discuss village problems with *Animation* personnel than they were with other bureaucrats.[20]

In Senegal Cissé also acknowledged the problem *Animation* had in keeping its identity distinct from that of the Party and its politicians. *Animation* "necessarily has a political dimension, since it accelerates and improves the political awareness of the masses. It can, however, become difficult to distinguish it from the purely political . . . parties."[21]

4. Because many of the new agents of *Animation* had been simply transferred from other government services, they continued to have the paternalistic and authoritarian manner of government agents--the very manner which the *Animation* theorists recognized as harmful and which they preached against. The non-directive and sophisticated pedagogical tactics which *Animation* staff members were supposed to adopt were not easy to learn, and in the face of resistance or frustration, many of them fell back into customary behavior of forceful direction. Again, this prevented villagers from seeing much difference between *Animation* and other government services.

5. *Animateurs* and *Animation* staff members working on the local level lost the support of the central government which they needed to assist villagers in challenging the authority of the traditionally established local elites. Although *Animation* and the cooperative movement were launched initially with the blessing of the President, as the years went by his attention was concentrated on other matters, and neither he nor his national level cadres had the time or interest in intervening

in local level politics each time these new services were frustrated in their plans. Moreover, Diori, like Senghor, had to pay heed to the vested interests of his political supporters, many of whom were patronizing local elites, and they saw no advantage for themselves in contramanding their local clientele for the sake of a new ideology and newborn rural institutions. Thus, *animateurs* were left on their own to create a new power basis, starting from scratch in pockets of rural peasantry with a long tradition of powerlessness.

Easton's analysis is in the form of a report on the first year of the cooperative movement functional literacy program in Niger in which he played a significant part between 1968 and 1971. His analysis is relevant here because it examines the project in the light of a model of the natural growth of any such rural development strategy, and like Charlick's, it focuses on the weakness of central government support of *Animation* and other rural services as a major factor in their lack of success.

The process of a rural development project can be characterized by five steps: (1) the identification of a problem and a proposed solution to it; (2) the implementation of a pilot project to carry out the solution; (3) adjustment to the impact of the project in the social, cultural and economic aspects of the rural population's lives; (4) administrative and political adjustments required to institutionalize the project; and (5) the expansion of the project to other areas and the creation of centralized institutional support.[22]

This maturation process of a project, says Easton,

> . . . is inherent, but not inevitable; and the process can be changed, deformed or simply stilted in a number of ways. The

> project activity generally obligates people who had isolated themselves from the growth possibilities of the community to face up to these hazards and to accept new alignments of resource distribution, influence and value. To the degree that it is successful, therefore, the project inevitably runs into resistance at various points along the way--resistance to the mutations in community life which are necessary in order to carry out the new activity on a permanent basis.[23]

All this coincides with the basic theory of *animation rurale*, namely, that bottom-up institutions of rural economic and political autonomy must be instituted in step with the training given to rural peasants so that the traditional patterns are allowed to ease gradually into modern ones at the rate at which peasants are able to operate within them.

Easton focuses on the two final steps, at which administrative and political adjustments, i.e., bottom-up institutions, must be implemented. Such adjustment is necessary because the problem to which the project is initially proposed as a solution is generally not an immediate irritant, but a structural limitation, and as such, requires significant restructuring above and beyond the local level. Recalling that Easton wrote his report in 1972, ten years after *Animation* was first introduced, we see that the program had still not progressed beyond the stage of local development projects because sufficient support from the top level had not yet materialized.

> The national government demonstrated support for the strategy of cooperative development in the mid-'sixties, but has not often taken an active stand since, preferring perhaps to see what the results of early initiatives and projects such as ours would be and to wait until the cooperative movement generated enough momentum to pose the question in concrete terms.
>
> But it is questionable how much more headway this enterprise can make if the basic principles of cooperative development are not reaffirmed by the government and ways found to

> mobilize the cadres in the difficult work of delegating and decentralizing their tasks--the more so as there is quite evidently opposition to the growth of cooperatives among the commercial strata of the country and in some national ministries. . . . A new decision to generalize the local autonomy movement in accordance with the objectives announced six years ago must be made for the project to continue its existence.[24]

According to this analysis, the theory of *animation rurale* which prescribed a simultaneous movement from the bottom-up and from the top-down remains viable. The problem in Niger--and in Senegal as well--was the absence of support from the top at the stage in various local development projects when it was needed.

This criticism is seconded by Serreau in his study of *animation rurale*'s role in the development of Senegal. Serreau, however, puts the onus on *Animation*, and says that the personnel of that program must take responsibility for insuring the continuation of bottom-up institutions, rather than complaining that these can only be directed from the top government level.

> If *animation rurale* cannot rely on adequate institutions [beyond those on the village level], it will be no more than a bad alibi for the government responsible for developing the country. For *Animation* to be a real pedagogy of development, it is not enough to rely on these small programs; it must make them evolve and entail the creation of institutions which are still lacking.
>
> At present, *animation rurale* is only a *syndicat* representing the rural population. Other institutions must be developed to support these programs.[25]

DeDecker, in his study of Senegal, also concludes that *animation rurale* has produced technical changes but not institutional changes.[26] The reasons he gives for the incompletion of Senegal's rural development strategy are close to--and often identical with--those already surveyed. DeDecker, however, employs a different analytical framework. He views *animation rurale* as a program designed to *socialize* the Senegalese rural peasants into the ways and values of a modern, independent nation based on an ideology of socialism.

Referring to a definition of community development offered by an American authority, J.D. Mezirow, DeDecker describes *animation rurale* as a planned socialization process, the success of which can be measured by the degree to which the traditional peasant population learns to participate in the new social institutions. *Animation rurale*, as a community development effort, entailed a clear ideology, that of African Socialism, the values of which it hoped to instill in the peasants, new economic and political institutions, training programs to assist the peasants in adapting to these institutions, and new communication channels between the peasants and the planners and implementers of the new ideology.[27]

In adopting this strategy, the creators of *animation rurale* took the position that socialization results from creating a new milieu and indoctrinating the population to accept it rather than from training individuals to practice new behaviors which will then lead them into convergence with a new milieu.[28] In other words, they believed that *attitudes* must be changed before *behavior* will change, not vice versa. The two channels devised to create this new milieu were, first, training programs used to indoctrinate *animateurs* in the new ideology and second, training by these *animateurs* of their fellow villagers in the new ideology.[29]

This strategy failed, however, because the educational process involved in creating a new milieu based on a new ideology was greatly oversimplified, underestimating the strength of attitudes which had to be changed, and inadequately preparing both the trainers and the *animateurs* to effectively change their attitudes.[30] This shortsightedness resulted in an early breakdown of communication between the peasants on the bottom level and their new leadership on the top level, and the ideology of socialism was never translated into institutions and practices meaningful to the peasants.

What were the peasant attitudes that Ani[illegible]ied to change? These have been generally noted already in reference to Charlick, Cissé and others. First, the peasant cultures had evolved over long periods of time, had assimilated new movements such as the Islamic religion and, more recently, the colonial administration; the status quo provided security, if not wealth and equity for most members of the society. The cultural and religious mores of their ancestors were accepted without question; for example, they firmly believed that their future life depended in part upon their cooperation and subservience to the Muslim *marabouts*. They had no desire for economic growth and change, no concept of working to earn profit, to save and reinvest, and to use time as a resource in development. Their traditional leaders met their modest needs, and their ambitions did not go further. Like most human beings, they were willing to try new ways, as long as these did not threaten the structures which had been providing them with security. Thus, they were willing to listen to the message of *animation rurale*, to take on some tasks of local development projects, to join cooperatives and so on, but not to contradict the wishes of their leaders or to rearrange the balance of power in their communities.[31]

The attitudes of those selected as Animation staff members and as animateurs were also not amenable to the strategy of animation rurale; yet not enough attention was given to the task of changing the attitudes of these individuals who were to be the principal channels of spreading the new ideology. Because the entire strategy had been presented to them in an oversimple fashion, they had a very meager understanding of village dynamics; although they knew what to expect from the total experience of their lives in the village, they could not view these analytically, which is the first step toward intervening and changing them. Thus, they quickly grew impatient when changes did not occur according to schedule, and frustrated when they met up with unanticipated resistance. Many of those selected and trained as staff members were over-zealous, belittling the technical skill and the understanding of social dynamics required in the socialization process. They were not adequately trained in the new pedagogy--the dialogue style of teaching--and before long resorted to authoritarian techniques in order to carry out their training duties. Some trainers and animateurs, who found themselves with a new source of power, abused it by developing or increasing their own clientele instead of promoting democratic means of distributing power and wealth. Often it was members of the elite who became animateurs or cooperative leaders, and they tended to co-opt the new institutions in order to maintain their own position.[32]

Finally, the Animation staff lacked any systematic feedback mechanisms and means of evaluating their progress in order to make effective adjustments.[33] Thus, the various local programs tended to advance according to the discretion and theory of their directors, rathe than on the basis of real progress and steps needed to be taken. Impatient with the slow pace of acceptance, communities were often perceived as "trained," when in fact there had been no significant attitudinal changes.

Therefore, DeDecker concludes, animation rurale never got beyond the first stage of local development projects, the new ideology never became meaningful to the peasants, and as a socialization effort, the program did not succeed in getting the peasants to participate in new social institutions.[34]

Albert Meister, who because of his prestige as a scholar of rural development and education probably has been taken the most seriously by the theoreticians of animation rurale, has presented his criticisms in the context of rural economic development strategies in general, including the dimensions of economic, political and social change as well as pedagogy. Although his analysis is primarily based on generalizations from community development programs in a number of African countries, many of his points have been substantiated by the critiques already presented.

Meister's arguments can be grouped into four main categories: (1) the nature of development problems; (2) the political limits to the feasibility of animation rurale; (3) the false assumptions of animation rurale theorists about peasant values and communities; and (4) operational weaknesses of the strategy.

1. In his opinion, the most important problem of development is not on the local level in the reorientation of peasants to modern in-

stitutions, but on the top and middle government levels, where there is a crucial lack of competent leaders and administrators, and where the overwhelming predominance of the patron-client system hinders the progress of democratic and equitable institutions. With the onset of independence and the retreat of French colonists, the young African elites in positions to gain power failed to have their selfish ambitions curbed, and were not sufficiently educated to avoid neo-colonialist practices. Animation rurale, in becoming a national institution, evolved into just another patron-client system; this tendency should have been checked at the higher and middle echelons of government, rather than turned over to the powerless peasantry. But these new government leaders had a natural orientation to urban problems, since that had usually been their environment, and programs implemented in the rural areas were relatively ignored by them, since they were not adequately retrained to be conscious of the importance of the rural milieu.[35]

2. As a community development and educational program, animation rurale has some limits to its political feasibility. Even the president of the country, who ordains the program, is bound to the status quo and the elites who support him, and he cannot blatantly deny them their established self interests.[36] (This point was borne out dramatically in Senegal.) A shrewd president may use Animation as a device neither costly nor dangerous for giving an appearance of concern for rural development without upsetting the existing balance of power. Such a program can do no more than inform the population about their new nationhood, it is the central government which must provide the resources to the rural population for their economic and political

development.[37] In other words, Meister scoffs at the idea of relying on investment in human resources in rural areas for national economic growth. *Animation* can be no more than a new type of education or extension program with limited capacity to ameliorate poor conditions.[38] The national leadership which does not acknowledge this is either deceived or dishonest about its intentions.

3. The strategy of *animation rurale* rests on some misconceptions about peasants. Peasants are not interested in economic growth and development. On the contrary, they are most concerned with getting food, shelter and security from year to year and continuity of their social group.[39] Moreover peasants, who are accustomed to being governed authoritatively, are very unlikely to initiate a change in their own life patterns even if they are prodded ever so slightly to do so.[40] Therefore, the more a development strategy relies on grass roots initiative, and the less it relies on centrally planned change, the smaller will be its chances of success.[41] The belief that peasants have acute "felt needs" which they are seeking to fulfill is not true. When the peasants do express needs, they usually ask for increased consumption rather than a change in their working and living patterns as a means of entering the modern world.[42]

Peasant communities have been misunderstood. The traditional communal production and consumption groups have been confused with modern cooperative structures. Whereas the latter are built by groups of people desiring to gain more wealth and distribute it more equally, members of traditional communes do not expect to share equal responsibility or benefits from their mutually acquired wealth. Instead, they expect the elites to take the largest share in return for protecting the rest of them in the patron-client manner. The rural community is not a homogeneous group that makes decisions in a democratic manner. With a change in the economic system from one of subsistence crops to one of cash crops, the difference in wealth between the elites and the others will increase, the appearance of "equality in poverty" will disappear, and the lack of democratic processes will become more obvious. In short, the concepts of equality and cooperation as conceived of by Westerners do not exist in rural African villages.[43]

4. In its operation strategy, animation rurale has made some mistakes. First, because the ambitious Africans, who are expected to be the backbone of the program, will have more to gain by rising in the hierarchy of Animation or whatever government service they are in, it is naive to believe that they will place more importance on cooperation between services on any level--local, regional or national--than on loyalty to their superiors in whatever ministry or service employs them.[44]

Next, the program designers have miscalculated their ability to select, train and mobilize animateurs. The selection criteria for animateurs[45] have been well instilled in the cadres. But in reality, it is rare to find individuals in rural areas who meet all these criteria, and yet are willing to remain in the villages as unpaid workers. And those who are selected, with or without the desired characteristics, do not receive adequate training in the short time and from the amateur staff provided to them. The resulting animateurs [illegible] return to their villages are far from the ideal portrayed in the theoretical plan, but the program progresses without compensating for the discrepancy. In addition, Meister finds that altruistic motivation and social activism are not characteristic traits among Africans, any more than they are among other cultural groups, and it is naive to assume their existence. The selection criteria for animateurs favor individuals who conform well to their society, not those who are restless, discontent and more likely to desire change. Finally, because animateurs are sent back to their own villages, they are given hardly any opportunity to see a different milieu, to gain exposure to other, perhaps more modern ways of life. An exposure to different environments has long been considered a major motivational force in modernization.[46]

To summarize, Meister finds animation rurale an ineffective development strategy because it is "too soft and slow," it leads easily to increased social stratification, and because it chooses poor methods of promoting a spirit of entrepreneurship, which is essential in any development strategy.[47]

Examination of the Assumptions

We now have some bases for drawing conclusions about the relative success and failure of animation rurale as an educational program within a certain strategy of rural development. These bases are the theoretical and historical background of the program, its manifestations in Senegal and Niger, and analyses of it which have been made in the frameworks of participation theory, project development theory, socialization theory, community and economic development theory. In light of this information, each of the six assumptions listed earlier in the chapter will be restated and assessed.

1. *Nationwide development programs on the grass roots level can be ordained and directed from the highest level of the central government*. Pertinent to this assumption is the theme of bottom-up top-down leadership conflict. Diori and Senghor, as presidents of their newly-independent nations, had several immediate pressing problems which could not all be resolved with a single coherent strategy. First, they had to mold from a collection of diverse tribal groups with no previous mutual identification a single nation, whose citizens would give allegiance to the national government before their own extended families. Political and social power had to be realigned so that these groups would eventually participate in national institutions and respect national doctrines. Second, the leaders had to increase the wealth of their very poor nations so that they could begin to accumulate capital and move toward economic as well as political independence. Given the history of almost total support by the French economy prior to independence, this was no easy task. The Senegalese, in particular, with their proclaimed African Socialism, were eager to create wealth within their own boundaries and to cut off foreign capitalist investments and foreign assistance. Nigeriens, although not so vociferous in their desire to do away with foreign enterprise, had far fewer resources to begin with, and the achievement of economic self-sufficiency was an enormous undertaking, with or without aid. In addition to the goals of developing national identity and moving toward economic self-sufficiency, Diori and Senghor had to face the problem of mass poverty in the rural areas and the majority of a population completely without the means or skills

to survive in a modern world where the growing international market and interdependence would only make them poorer. And for humanitarian reasons, those responsible for the new nations needed to improve the living conditions of their own people.

In order to achieve national unity, new African leaders could not afford to alienate those groups, identified by their tribal background, economic interests or religion, who might, in their opposition, form a coalition strong enough to overthrow the government. They had to keep tight control of political and social activities, to appease or subdue dissident factions. As the first few years of Senegal's history demonstrated, the national leadership could not afford to deny the interests of one group for the sake of another--in this case, the interests of the small group of commercialists and merchants for the rural masses.

In order to increase their nations' wealth they had to call upon a variety of resources, both from within and without the country. In Niger, reliance upon the Entente with the Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Upper Volta as well as continued reliance upon the French and other foreign investors was much more advisable than the expectation that their own meager resources could suffice in the near future. In Senegal, in spite of the initial efforts to ban foreign investment and to discourage internal capitalist ventures, the government had to pay serious attention to increasing production of its export crops, especially peanuts, and to negotiating with the European marketers for its own economic existence. In both countries, the struggle for economic survival was intensified in the late 1960s by the severe famine and by the European

Economic Community's decision to reduce its subsidies to former colonies.

The management of progress toward nationalism and economic self-sufficiency in many ways competed with the effort to reduce poverty and increase the political and economic power base in the rural areas. The attempt to develop human resources in rural areas seems to be the most significant source of conflict between the bottom-up grass roots movement, and top-down central control, leadership directions in the development of Senegal and Niger. The vested interest of various groups, who saw that the advancement of rural people would occur at their own expense, had too much influence on the national leadership to be ignored. This conflict between the interests of traditional elites, the new merchant class, foreign participants in the economy and their patrons in the government, and the interests of the rural villagers, which Dia was vigorously supporting through such programs as *animation rurale*, came to a head in the Senghor-Dia battle of December 1962, and was resolved, effectively, in the interests of the established and rising elites, not the rural villagers. Although Senghor apparently continued to be sincerely concerned with the rural problem, he did not actively support grass roots movements, including *animation rurale*, when they interfered with his strategies to strengthen the nation on other fronts.

This study has also discussed numerous instances of conflict between the Senegalese and Nigerien *Animation* services and the local elites in those countries. The resistance of the Muslim *marabouts* was, and still is, widespread, since they collect some of the surplus wealth when it is produced in rural areas, and resist government pressure on them to give it up. Commercialists who had been controlling the peanut trade in their own locales did what they could to prevent the nationalized cooperative system from reducing their own profits. In these cases, the conflict between elites and peasants was not acted out on any higher a level than the local one, but in fact it extended to the most central government officials who, in their passive attitude toward local struggles, implied support of the more powerful elites and refusal to approve the actions taken for the peasants.

In addition to the conflict of interests between the rural peasantry and other social and economic groups, and the conflicting priorities faced by national leaders, there was an inherent conflict in the development strategy which intended for a national development plan, carefully detailed every four years, to embrace a nationwide collection of more or less spontaneous community development processes. The more a national development plan is centralized, detailed and comprehensive, the less it can allow for aberrations, diversity and spontaneity of grass roots participation.

> Personal and group growth processes do not lend themselves to centralized timetables, national and regional bureaucratic systems, and vertical lines of authority. The setting of targets, timetables, and other administrative procedures may not mesh well with the unpredictable progress of village groups.[48]

Therefore, whereas we cannot conclusively say that grass roots development programs are incompatible with centralized national control of them, the history of animation rurale has revealed the likelihood of conflict between these two leadership directions--conflict in various group economic and political interests, conflict in priorities for national development, and conflict in the manner in which the two levels of programming must be managed.

2. Traditional societies are amenable to an evolution toward modern economic and political institutions. This assumption was questioned by critics of animation rurale, and indeed, it has been a point of widespread debate among many social scientists, including educators, concerned with the development process. In this study, we must limit our opinion on the validity of the assumption to conclusions from the results of animation rurale.

The issue is grounded in the age-old debate as to whether social change is a process of evolution or of conflict. Social scientists have tried to prove definitively that it is one or the other. The creators of animation rurale[49] have insisted that the traditional African social groups embody the values and mores which allow them to enter into modern social and economic institutions without painful disruption of their cultural patterns. The effects of colonial administration and foreign domination have distorted these patterns, so that interventions of the new national governments are necessary to provoke their participation in modern institutions, but essentially these interventions will not produce painful conflict between the old ways and the new.[50]

Critics of this theory have objected to it on two grounds. First, they give evidence that traditional societies, such as the Hausa, the Wolof and the Serer, in which animation rurale was active, do not hold the Western values of equality and democracy, which the program was trying to solicit.[51] Peasants do not want to change their life style for the sake of economic growth and better conditions, as envisioned by central planners and politicians. They first ask for sufficient food and shelter from year to year and security in their environment. When they do not get this (which has often been the case in recent years), they do not seek for solutions in better investments of their wealth, but in religious or other magical blessings. The second basis for disagreeing with the assumption of evolutionary social change is that, at least in the case of *animation rurale*, it did not occur within the time expected. The people constituting the nations of Senegal and Niger did not have common interests and homogeneous values, and on many levels and in many instances, the profit of one group was the loss of another. As Charlick has shown very clearly, even within a single village, the new economic institutions advocated by *animation rurale* were not successful because they were not in the interests of some of those who held power. Moreover, even some of those who were powerless appeared to prefer their security to a disruption in their social milieux.[52]

Therefore, the contention that *animation rurale* did not force peasants against their will to abandon their cultural patterns only raises the question of whether or not a disruption in their life patterns would have occurred, had the program progressed beyond the initial stage of local projects into building viable new institutions.

3. *The socialist mode is more efficient than the capitalist mode of economic development.* Concomitantly, development programs should be designed for communities rather than individuals in order that all people, not just an emergent group of elites, be allowed to share and invest surplus wealth.

Like the assumption just discussed, this one is an unresolved issue for social scientists, and in the cases of Senegal and Niger cannot be validated or invalidated. In fact, the history of animation rurale does not contribute much to either side of the debate, because of the large gap between the socialist theory on which the program was predicated and the actual events which often failed to manifest that theory. For example, in entrusting surplus wealth to the peasant masses, the planners of animation rurale intended that this investment would be carefully founded on a thorough knowledge of the conditions in which rural people lived and worked, of precise selection and effective training of those who would assist them, of viable economic and political institutions which would regulate the outcomes of their growth and development, and finally, of unfailing support from the highest levels of government. But none of these intentions were fully realized, and both qualitative and quantitative measures of the extent to which they were achieved are lacking. Therefore, we can only conclude that the socialist mode of development, in spite of abundant rhetoric, particularly in Senegal, was not tested in the animation rurale programs of Senegal and Niger.

Note should be taken, however, of what appears to have been some conceptual confusion between "socialism" and "capitalism" in the strategy. The socialist mode of development has been characterized in this study as the distribution of surplus wealth equally among the population, with the expectation that their own labor will be the most effective way of making it grow. This strategy also places high value on social justice and economic equity, and the maintenance of a stable society in which the security of all members is insured. The capitalist mode has been characterized as the cultivation of an elite group, which because of their skill, entrepreneurial spirit and motivation are expected to invest surplus wealth more prudently than the whole population would. This strategy is willing to sacrifice some equity for more rapid economic growth and more resources to draw upon in providing security to all members of society.

Animation rurale, although it proclaimed the values and promoted the strategy of the socialist mode, also endeavored to create an entrepreneurial spirit among villagers--a spirit which would lead them to see the value in cooperation with higher government levels, investment and growth. In this sense, the planners wanted to change the nation from one which was stable in its poverty to one which was motivated to grow. But in denouncing the inequities of capitalism, they failed to acknowledge their need for entrepreneurship (generally associated with capitalism), and as Meister has noted, had no effective means of training the peasants to save and invest the wealth accumulated from their production, regardless of whether that wealth would be acquired by individuals or communities.

For the same reasons that the question of the superiority of the socialist or the capitalist modes of development cannot be answered here, the question of the preferability of communities to indivudals as targets of development remains unanswered. However, as we have pointed out, critics of animation rurale have presented persuasive evidence that the program's failure to reach its final goals resulted in part from its misconception of the nature of the African communities in which it operated. The assumptions made by the planners that Hausa, Wolof and other ethnic groups were homogeneous in their needs and interests, that democracy, equity and cooperation were traditional African values, and that rural villagers desired progress and growth, and lacked only the power to obtain it, were not valid. Perhaps if those directing *animation rurale* had carried out their initial social surveys as rigorously as they claimed to have done, these erroneous assumptions would not have been made, and a more accurate view of the communities in which they worked would have resulted in effective development programs focusing on communities rather than individuals.

The present program of *animation rurale* in Senegal, as it is incorporated into *Promotion Humaine*, might overcome this misjudgment of the nature of rural communities, because now the program is more directly under the control of Senegalese, many of whom have spent their adult years during the era of independence, and have a more direct knowledge of deep interest in feasible means of solving problems in rural areas.

4. *Education of the masses and socioeconomic institutions which provide for the equal distribution of national resources are complementary. Both are necessary in a development strategy which aims toward economic equity as well as growth.* The events of *animation rurale* have borne out this assumption. The program was at its strongest point in the first two years in Senegal, when it was vitally integrated with the whole movement toward politicizing the rural areas and providing villagers with skills to improve their situation. It has been faulted, even during those years, for the failure of its cadres to work respectfully with the technical experts of the other services, and after 1963, as its scope of activity was continually cut back from active

instigation of nationalism and economic independence to simple provision of courses in moral and civic instruction, the applicability of its lessons diminished. As the nation's strategy moved further away from building bottom-up institutions in which peasants could use their newly acquired skills, the futility of *Animation's* training programs became more and more obvious, until finally, in 1970, the programs were dropped.

In Niger, *animation rurale* seems to have been most effective in 1966, when it was working with the cooperative movement, preparing peasants to do specific tasks and to take their place in established cooperatives. Again, it had a period of strength in 1970-71, when it worked closely with the cooperative movement and the functional literacy service in an integrated campaign to make the rural economic institutions more viable. At other times, when support for these institutions was waning, and when the *Animation* agents were hesitating to collaborate with the other rural services, its effectiveness was less noticeable. In this respect, the pedagogical theory used in *animation rurale*--the assumption that learning is meaningful only if the learner can apply it to serve his own interests[53]--seems to have been accurate. Again, the difficulty in testing the theory lay in the gap between it and what was actually allowed to happen.

5. *Participation in modern economic and political structures, such as cooperative marketing organizations and democratic election of government leaders, can be the very basis for training people to operate within these structures.* This assumption, although closely related to the previous one, differs critically from it. The first posits that rural education programs depend for their effectiveness on institutions

in which peasants can employ the skills and attitudes they have learned, and by the same token, that these institutions cannot continue to exist without a population which has been trained to work within them. The second says that these institutions can be used as training programs, and that the peasants, while still in the training stage, can take responsibility for their viability.

This assumption has not been borne out through animation rurale. The designers of the strategy which encompassed the program did not take into account the amount and strength of pressures resisting a considerable increase in the power of the peasants, and since the groups which put on this pressure already had well-established bases for wielding their own power, the emergent group of peasants was no match for them. This problem originated in the earliest conception of the strategy, which did not sufficiently acknowledge the interests of local elites, foreign and incipient national commercial interests and religious tradition. It was too much to expect that, while still learning a new role in a new social configuration, the rural population would possess the skills, desire and resources to accumulate political power and then to maintain it.

Their frustration--or more accurately, the frustration of the Animation staff members and others who were struggling to support them--was aggravated by the withdrawal of support from the national level. The strategy of both Senghor and Diori seems to have been to find the surplus wealth needed for increased capital investments not exclusively from peasant labor and rural production, but also from foreign investment, trade and export crops. Thus, the peasant population had to compete for resources from the government, and in the first decade of independence, they were not equipped to do so.

We can conclude that the reduction of mass poverty in rural areas and the accumulation and investment of surplus wealth can exist as simultaneous goals, but the latter cannot rest on the former. At least in the first stages of national development, the government must find capital from wherever it can, and insofar as it is genuinely interested in improving rural living conditions, it can invest in rural areas. But this investment should not be expected to have immediate returns in national economic growth. The process of developing resources--both human and material--in rural areas is long and slow. As the critics of animation rurale have pointed out, equity and democracy in a nation results from the top leadership's decision to create and defend the institutions which provide for them, whether this decision be the result of internal or external pressure or of their own volition and strength. Mamadou Dia, perhaps, came the closest to instituting these values, but he did not have enough time to rely on the support of the peasant population or the training programs of animation rurale.

6. Educational programs are most effective when they are integrated into other development programs such as agricultural production, marketing, forestry, health and sanitation. This is one of the basic assumptions behind the movement toward nonformal education as an effective alternative to the formal school systems in developing nations. Because this study of animation rurale has not included any means of direct comparison between the relative effects on national development of

formal and nonformal programs, the assumption cannot be verified here. However, the issue has a dimension which is critical to this case. Nonformal education programs, such as animation rurale, simply by virtue of being outside of the formal school system, and by their efforts to serve the populations which have either no access to or use for the school system, are not free from the danger of becoming isolated and irrelevant to the needs of those whom they are designed to help. We have pointed out already that Animation was most effective at the times when it worked most closely with other development services and related most directly to the newly instituted economic and political structures, and that it was most impotent at times when, for one reason or another, it became an isolated educational endeavor. In his analysis, Easton has emphasized the need for integration on national, as well as local and regional levels of all programs aiming to promote rural development.[54]

For those who plan and implement nonformal education programs, an essential lesson to be learned from the case of animation rurale is the necessity of tying educational programs into the goals and activities of other technical services and of giving priority to instruction that has applicability for the learners. Otherwise, even though it may be classified as nonformal and practical, the educational endeavor runs the risk of becoming irrelevant and one more hierarchical organization more interested in its self-preservation than its effects.

Hypotheses about Pre-Conditions

To conclude this study we will formulate some hypotheses about the pre-conditions that apparently must exist if a comprehensive and grass roots education program such as _animation rurale_ is to have a chance for success. These conditions apply to the area to be served by the program, whether that be an entire nation or a region within a nation.

First hypothesis. A comprehensive education program for national development must extend beyond a local or regional level to the national level by being an integral part of the national development policy and plan. The program must be strategically linked and accounted for in the budget of national development goals. This condition was made explicit by the planners of _animation rurale_, and it was being met as long as the program's goals and methods were consistent with the governments' adherence to the plans. But history has shown that the program could not survive without a firm foothold in national development goals and strategy.

Second hypothesis. The administration of the national government must be decentralized to an extent that allows local education programs to have sufficient control over their own objectives and means to meet them. Planners and programmers must have autonomy to decide about how to budget resources and to revise plans when desirable. The greater extent to which the government is decentralized, the better chance an educational program has to follow a natural and appropriate course. The less a national development plan is centralized, detailed and comprehensive, the more it can allow for aberrations, diversity and spontaneity.

Third hypothesis. The government must have sufficient financial resources to invest in long-term programs of human resource development. Education, even outside of the formal school system, is not a quick process, and the government cannot expect immediate returns on its investment in the training of people in attitudes, knowledge and skills which do not fit into their customary way of life. As we have pointed out, the reduction of mass poverty and the accumulation of surplus wealth can exist simultaneously as national development goals, but the latter cannot rest on the former.

Fourth hypothesis. The national government must be secure enough politically and stable enough in its ideological commitments to afford the alienation of those people who oppose grass roots economic and political development. The education of rural people for development, in spite of its humanitarian appeal, is not always a politically popular objective. The history of events in Senegal has shown how a national leader was forced to choose between commitment to rural development and his own political security.

Fifth hypothesis. An infrastructure of communication and transportation that links villages to rural communes, and communes to subregional and regional institutions must be present. In Senegal and Niger, animation rurale was limited to those areas in which a sufficient infrastructure did exist; in other parts of those countries, and in mountainous regions or in nations with many islands, the absence of communication and transportation facilities would make a grass roots initiated network of economic institutions nearly impossible.

Sixth hypothesis. Village level workers must be given the incentives necessary to stay in their village and to act as liaison between traditional patterns and modern practices. Animateurs were not given any incentives to pursue their work in the face of strong resistance from their own social groups, not even the probability of advancing to a higher post in Animation if they were successful in their village work. Convincing men and women in rural areas that their situation could improve if they stay appears to be difficult, since they have never seen change occur, and have no concept of what they might gain by instigating change.

Other prerequisites for the success of a program like *animation rurale* have already been defined by the theoreticians and planners of that program. They include the pre-implementation study of village conditions and needs, the appropriate selection of village level workers in terms of their social role as well as their talents, the adequate training and support of village level workers, the existence of institutions that complement training, and the commitment to the program's goals by staff members at every level of the organization. A major source of problems in *animation rurale* was the failure to meet these preconditions that had been so carefully set down in the theory.

One of the lessons to be learned from the history of *animation rurale* is the difficulty of applying in practice what we know in theory. Even the most elabroate theory of education for development cannot be realized if the necessity of preconditions is slighted, progress overestimated and original assumptions left unchallenged when they are contradicted by reality. In this study, the implementation of a sophisticated theory has been analyzed. The weaknesses in the theory have been indicated, and the instances in which sound theoretical plans have been distorted in their implementation have been delineated.

At this time when integrated rural development programs and theories of participatory planning and programming in development and education are becoming increasingly popular, the history of *animation rurale* has much to teach us.

ENDNOTES

[1] I. Wallerstein, "The State and Social Transformation: Will and Possibility," in Underdevelopment and Development, ed. H. Bernstein (Middlesex: Penguin, 1976).

[2] Cf. Chapter II.

[3] During the 1960s similar strategies were flowering in other developing countries, notably in Tanzania where Nyerere was becoming well-known for his concept of adult education and his institution of Ujamaa community development. Also the movement was gaining popularity among the revolutionary strategists from the work and writing of Paulo Freire, who was advocating the use of education among the masses as a revolutionary tool to awaken them to their rights and to take over more power in their own government. Also in Guinea, Guinea Bissau and fledgling nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, education of the masses as a means to increasing their economic and political power was gaining acceptance as a development strategy.

[4] Senghor's role during this time is discussed in I.L. Markovitz, Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude (New York: Atheneum, 1969).

[5] E. Lerner, Conseiller Technique, Promotion Humaine, personal interview (November 1976).

[6] H. DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire en Guinee et au Sénégal (Paris: Mouton, 1967), p. 408.

[7] As described by Goussault, Belloncle, etc.

[8] A. Magnen, UNESCO, personal interview (July 1976).

[9] B.M. Cissé, personal interview (November 1976).

[10] H. Cassirer, Mass Media in an African Context: An Evalution of Senegal's Pilot Project (Paris: Unesco, 1973).

[11] Charlick, p. 288.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., pp. 296-97.

[14] Ibid., p. 301.

[15] Ibid., pp. 301-02.

[16] Ibid., pp. 213-14.

[17] Ibid., p. 226.

[18] Cf. Unesco, *Experimental World Literacy Program: A Critical Analysis* (Paris: UNESCO, 1976), p. 153.

[19] Charlick, p. 226.

[20] Ibid., p. 292.

[21] B.M. Cissé, "Senegal," in *Adult Education and Nation Building*, ed. J. Lowe (Edinburgh: University Press, 1970).

[22] Easton, *Functional Literacy and Cooperative Education: Growth of the Project, 1969*, p. 5.

[23] Ibid., p. 10.

[24] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[25] J. Serreau, *Le Développement à la Base au Dahomey et au Sénégal* (Paris: Librarie du Droit et du Jurisprudence, 1966), pp. 133-34.

[26] DeDecker, p. 409.

[27] Ibid., pp. 389-92.

[28] Ibid., p. 398.

[29] Ibid., p. 401.

[30] Ibid., pp. 408-09.

[31] Ibid., pp. 369-74.

[32] Ibid., pp. 374-78.

[33] Ibid., p. 413.

[34] Ibid., pp. 369-413.

[35] A. Meister, "Développement Communautaire et l'Animation Rurale en Afrique," *L'Homme et la Société* 18-20 (October-December 1970), p. 128.

[36] Ibid., p. 126.

[37] Ibid., p. 133.

[38] Ibid., p. 223.

[39] Ibid., p. 218.

[40] Ibid., p. 127.

[41] Ibid., p. 126.

[42] Ibid., p. 219.

[43] Ibid., pp. 133-38.

[44] Ibid., p. 129.

[45] Cf. Chapter II.

[46] Meister, "Développement Communautaire et l'Animation Rurale en Afrique," pp. 211-16.

[47] Ibid., pp. 220-22.

[48] D. Evans, "Responsive Educational Planning: Myth or Reality?" (Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning, unpublished manuscript, 1976).

[49] In particular, see R. Colin, "L'Animation, Clé de Voute du Développement," *Développement et Civilisations* 21 (March 1965).

[50] See P. Easton, "Rural Adult Education in a Dependent African Economy" (Stanford: Stanford University, School of Education, unpublished paper, 1973).

[51] See the works cited by Meister and Charlick and G. Gosselin, *Développement et Tradition dans les Sociétés Rurale Africaines* (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1970), pp. 221-42.

[52] Charlick, p. 301.

[53] Y. Goussault, *L'Animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Francophone* (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1970).

[54] Easton, "Rural Adult Education in a Dependent African Economy."

APPENDIX A

TIME LINE OF EVENTS

Sénégal		*Niger*
	1959	
Animation rurale introduced in 7 regions	1960	
	1961	
Mamdou Dia ousted	1962	*Animation rurale* instituted in 4 regions
Second Senegalese Republic installed	1963	
	1964	*Promotion Humaine* installed
	1965	
	1966	The New System introduced
	1967	
Peasant Malaise occurs	1968	
	1969	Literacy campaign introduced
Animation rurale moved to *Promotion Humaine*	1970	
	1971	
	1972	
B.M. Cissé returns to Senegal	1973	
	1974	Diori ousted; *Animation rurale* curtailed
	1975	
	1976	

APPENDIX B

MAP OF SENEGAL


St. Louis
(FLEUVE)
MAURITANIA
OCEAN
Louga
Thiès
Bakel
Dakar
Diourbel
ATLANTIC
(SINE-SALOUM)
Kaolack
MALI
GAMBIA
Tambacounda
(CASAMANCE)
(SENEGAL ORIENTAL)
Ziguinchor
GUINEA
BISSAU
GUINEA

APPENDIX C

MAP OF NIGER



ALGERIA
LIBYA
MALI
Agadez
CHAD
Tahoua
Niamey
Zinder
Maradi
Diffa
Say
Dosso
Magaria
UPPER VOLTA
NIGERIA
BENIN

APPENDIX D

ORGANIZATION OF ANIMATION RURALE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY: COMPARISON OF SENEGAL AND NIGER (1967)

Senegal			Niger	
Rural Development Agency	Administrative Structures	Level	Administrative Structures	Rural Development Agency
Centre regional d'assistance au développement (CRAD)	Region (400-700,000)	Regional	Département (300-500,000 pop)	Chef du département
Centre d'Animation rurale (CAR) Centre de développement départemental (CDD)	Département (50-150,000)	Sub-regional	Arrondissement (50-150,000)	Centre d'Animation (CAR)
Centre d'expansion rurale (CER)	Arrondissement (20-80,000)	Communal	Canton (18-15,000)	Centres annexes zone d'animation (3-4 RVA's)
Cellules d'animation (AIR) Coopérative (1,500-3,000)		Intervillage		Regroupements de villages animés (RVA) Coop. sections (1,500-4,000)
Animateurs		Village		Animateurs

APPENDIX E

SENEGAL: ORGANIZATION OF ANIMATION RURALE COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1975


Level
1960
1975
National Ministry
Region
Departement (cercle)
Arrondissement
(Inter-village)
Village
Rural Economy
Development
Directory of Animation
Centers of Rural Development Assistance (CRAD)
Inspectorate
Centers of Animation Rurale (CAR)
Centers of Rural Expansion (CER)
Cooperatives
Cells of Animation (AIR)
Animateurs
Rural Development
National Education
Secretariat of Promotion Humaine
Centers of Rural Development Assistance (CRAD)
Inspectorate
Centers of Rural Development (CDD)
Teams of Animateurs
Centers of Rural Expansion (CER)

APPENDIX F

LONG REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This annotated bibliography covers the literature in areas directly related to *animation rurale* insofar as it can be considered a type of nonformal education. The review covers several topics: first, the general theory of *animation rurale* as presented by its formulators and its most prominent critics; then, works of the economic and social development in general of Senegal, and of *animation rurale* in particular. This is followed by a similar treatment of Niger. The second major section covers background material on these case studies, including African Socialism, the French Catholic movement in economic and social development, the cooperative movement, community development and participation theories. Following this is a brief survey of literature on recent African history, with special attention paid to economic studies of West Africa. The third major section reviews the literature on education: trends in modern Africa, educational planning designs to meet particular learning needs, education in the context of rural development, and nonformal education.

The basic study on *animation rurale* by one of the participants is the doctoral thesis of the long-time director of IRFED, Yves Goussault, titled "Interventions éducatives et animation dans les développements agraires (Afrique et Amerique Latine)," 1971. This thesis has also been published in a less analytical style and without the material on

Latin America by the International Labor Organization under the title, *L'animation rurale dans les pays de l'Afrique francophone*, 1970. This book is a good introduction to *animation rurale*, though highly theoretical and uncritical.

Other significant articles by Goussault (published in French) which concern various aspects of *animation rurale* include "La participation des collectivités rurales au développement;" *Intégration structurelle des masses Africaines au développement*, 1964; "De l'éducation des masses a l'animation-participation," 1968; *Le tiers-monde: sociologie du développement*, 1975; and "L'éducation des masses paysannes dans les economies dépendantes," 1971, in which he replies to a published criticism of the theory of *animation rurale*.

Yves Goussault, Roland Colin and Guy Belloncle were the principle IRAM theorists and writers during the 1960s. Colin has published several journal articles expounding the theories and programs of *animation rurale*, among which the most significant are "L'animation: clé de voute du développement," 1965; "L'animation et le développement rural en Afrique Noire francophone," 1966; "Stratégie de l'éducation et méthode interdisciplinaire," 1971; and "Politique de participation et développement technologique," 1972. Also, Colin presents a method of sociocultural analysis in "Analyse du changement social et practique du développement," in *Esquisse d'une méthode d'analyse dynamique du champ socio-cultural*, 1970. Many of Colin's other publications deal with specific projects in West Africa.

Belloncle's articles are probably the most accessible, perhaps the most numerous, and certainly the most substantial in reference to specific events in Senegal and Niger. In 1976, he compiled many of these into three volumes, the first of which, *Formation des hommes et développement*, contains general articles on *animation rurale*, including one on its methods entitled "Le développement des collectivités rurales par la formation d'animateurs, Essais sur les méthodes de l'Institut IRAM," written in 1961. The second and third volumes of *Formation des hommes et développement* focus on cooperatives in Senegal and Niger respectively, where Belloncle served for over 12 years.

A more extensive list of the publications of Goussault, Colin, Belloncle, and other IRAM personnel is available from IRAM in the 1975 descriptive booklet on the institute's activities and in the "Bibliographie sur l'animation en Afrique Noire," published in the *Archives Internationales de Sociologie de la Coopération* in 1966. Despite its being ten years old, this is the most complete bibliography on *animation rurale*; it is divided into two sections, one general and the other on specific Francophone African countries. Most items on both of these lists--many of which are unpublished reports--can be found in the library of IRAM and IRFED in Paris.

In addition to the specific studies mentioned above, several journals published during the late 1960s contained numerous articles on the theory and practice of *animation rurale* and other development projects in which the French were involved. Most notable is *Développement et Civilisations*, 57 volumes issued betweeen 1960 and 1974 by IRFED. Articles by Goussault, Colin, Belloncle and other IRAM and IRFED personnel appeared frequently in this journal, along with pieces by Lebret, Perroux and Mamadou Dia. Other similar journals are the *Archives In-*

ternationales de Sociologie de la Coopération, issued by the *Centre de Recherches Coopératives* in Paris, *Tiers-Monde*, a publication of the *Institute d'Etude du Développement Economic et Social* (IEDES) of the University of Paris. Significant in the 1950s and very early 1960s were the French Catholic Liberal magazine, *Esprit*, and Perroux and Lebret's first periodical, *Economie et Humanisme*. These discuss ideas at the root of *animation rurale* theory.

Finally, one important critic of *animation rurale* has published a book, and a series of journal articles in which he specifies at length his objections to the program. These are the works of the Swiss educator, Albert Meister: *Participation, animation et développement*, 1969, and "Développement communitaire et l'animation rurale en Afrique," published in 1970 in the journal, *L'Homme et le Société*. In these, Meister recounts his own experiences with *animation rurale* and compares it with the community development practices of the English-speaking world.

On *animation rurale* in Senegal, there are two descriptive articles in English; one, a translation of an article by Ben Mady Cissé: "Animation rurale: Senegal's road to development," 1964; and the other by an American, David Hapgood: "Rural Animation in Senegal," 1964. This was updated in 1970 as a chapter in his book, *Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow*. Both of these articles focus mainly on the theory and structure of the program in Senegal, but also mention briefly its results and problems.

Three papers published in 1961-62 by IRAM discuss the plan for the *Animation* program in Senegal: "Animation et participation des masses au plan quadriennal du Sénégal," "L'Animation rurale au Sénégal," and "Problèmes d'adaptation des structures au développement socialiste." The article by Belloncle mentioned above, "Le développement des collectivités rurales par la formation d'animateurs," focuses on Senegal, and his collection of papers, Coopération et Développement en Afrique Noire, volume II, L'expérience du Sénégal (1960-65), though primarily about cooperatives, has much to say about Belloncle's work with animation rurale.

Published outside of IRAM and the Senegalese government, several doctoral theses have covered rural development in Senegal and animation rurale. In English, Schumacher's study, "Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Senegal," 1975, is principally concerned with party politics, but is valuable because of the wealth of details on the legislation and events of animation rurale. Also in English, Gellar's study, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," 1967, is important because it covers the whole history of the country through 1965 and includes an excellent section on the events of early independence. In French, there are two comparative studies: Serreau's comparison of rural development in Dahomey (Benin) and Senegal, "La Développement à la Base au Dahomey et au Sénégal," 1964, and DeDecker's comparison of national and community development in Guinea and Senegal, Nation et Développement Communitaire en Guinée et au Sénégal, 1967. Both these studies have substantial sections of description and some analysis of animation rurale. In 1972, Furter wrote for the International Council for Educational Development (ICED) a critical study of animation rurale in Senegal. This study includes a thorough introductory section on the economic development problems faced by Senegal and the way in which animation rurale tried to attack those problems. Furter made his investigation in 1971, just after *Animation* had been moved from the Ministry of Rural Development to the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Brochier's "La Diffusion du progrès technique en milieu rural sénégalais," 1968, and Cottingham's "Clan Politics and Rural Modernization," 1970, are case studies of local politics in Senegalese rural development which present analyses of the work done by *animation rurale*.

The bulk of documentation on Senegal has been published by the government of Senegal and is available in the National Archives in Dakar. The most important documents are the initial studies of the economic, political and social situation of the nation at the time of independence, particularly the 1960 report of the *Compagnie d'Etudes Industrielles et d'Aménagement du Territoirre* (CINAM) and the *Société d'Etudes et de Réalisations Economiques et Sociales dans l'Agriculture* (SERESA) and each of the consecutive national development plans. The current activities and plans of *Promotion Humaine*, including *Animation Rurale et Urbaine*, are described in the "Note d'Information" of 1976.

A general survey of the policies and plans of Senegalese leaders during early independence is the subject of a special edition in 1962 of *Développement et Civilisations*' entitled *Sénégal "An 2" par lui-meme*. This volume includes articles by Senghor: "Socialisme africain et développement"; by Dia: "Un socialisme existential"; and by Cissé: "L'Animation des masses, condition d'un socialisme authentique."

The three most important items on Senegal's national development policies are Fougeyrollas' *Où va le Sénégal?*, 1970, the chapter on Senegal in Amin's *L'Afrique de l'Ouest Bloquée*, 1971, and the chapter on Senegal in Dumont's *Paysanneries aux abois*, 1972. Dumont's work focuses particularly on policy and activities in the agricultural sector.

The literature on *animation rurale* in Niger is more limited than that on the program in Senegal, but much of what has been written about the cooperative movement in Niger is relevant to *animation rurale*. Most of the documents have been issued from the Nigerien government and from IRAM personnel working for the government. As in the case of the Senegal documents, the authors of government and IRAM publications are often the same people, since many government posts were held by IRAM personnel. Specifically on *animation rurale* are several articles by Belloncle, including "Notes prises pendant la session des Animateurs-Délégues des arrondissements de Magaria et Matameye," 1966; "La Promotion humaine au Niger: objectifs-méthodes-résultats," 1968; "La méthodologie de l'Animation Nigerienne," 1970; and "Formation des hommes et développement au Niger: Introduction a la problematique nigerienne," 1972. Unpublished articles by Colin, available at IRAM, include "L'Animation du développement dans la Republique du Niger," 1967; and "Analyse sociologique et méthodes de l'animation an pays haoussa du Niger," 1968.

Articles on the cooperative movement, which was closely tied to the work of *animation rurale* in Niger, are certainly relevant here. The most comprehensive book is the doctoral thesis of Dominique Gentil, "Les Coopératives Nigeriennes," 1971. This contains a wealth of statistical data, survey reports and analyses, although it suffers somewhat from defensiveness, since the author seems not to have been able to separate himself from the cooperative movement. An effective summary of Gentil's thesis is available in his article, "Méthodologie de l'Implantation du nouveau système coopératif au Niger," 1973. Belloncle's best articles on Niger are in Volume III of his anthology, *l'Experience du Niger (1966-1973)*, 1976: "Une experience d'animation coopérative au Niger," 1967, and "Pédagogie de l'implantation du mouvement coopératif au Niger," 1968.

Two excellent articles in English on Niger, one on *animation rurale* and the other on the functional literacy campaign within the cooperative movement have been written by Peter Easton, an American who worked in Niger for seven years. The critical analysis of *animation rurale* is "Rural adult education in a dependent African economy," 1973, in which the literature on economic development in West Africa, particularly in relation to *animation rurale*, is synthesized. The functional literacy campaign is described and analyzed in "Functional literacy and cooperative education: Growth of the project, 1969." This report includes a theoretical analysis of how such a project develops, and an application of the analysis to the case in Niger.

The only thorough study of *animation rurale* in Niger that does not come from those directly involved in the project is the work of Charlick, "Power and participation in the modernization of rural Hausa communities," 1974. In this "examination of a theory relating political participation to rural economic modernization," Charlick presents a large body of empirical data to argue that the *Animation* program did not really succeed in getting peasants to participate to any significant extent in planning the policies which governed their own economic and political communities. Although the scope of the study is much broader than animation rurale, that program is central to the theory of political participation under question, and as such, merits a very thorough analysis.

Few general books and articles on the recent history of Niger have been produced. In addition to Charlick's dissertation, Thompson presents an account of Niger's political history prior to independence and up to 1964 in her article entitled "Niger," 1966. A French sociologist, Guy Nicholas, has written several anthropological studies on Nigerien development, and American anthropologists M.G. Smith and P. Hill have written on the Hausa, the tribe living in Southern Niger and Northern Nigeria toward which a large portion of Animation programs were directed. L'Histoire du Niger, 1965, by Sere Du Riviere, is a comprehensive book on the country.

The following section of the literature review will cover selected items on the historical and theoretical background of animation rurale: African Socialism, the Liberal French Catholic movement, the cooperative movement, community development and participation theory.

The best published sources of information on African Socialism as it was characterized in Senegal are the writings of Senghor and Dia; in particular, one of Senghor's works has been translated into English, African Socialism, 1959. Dia's most significant statement is in "Les voies d'un socialisme africaine," which was his 1961 address to the Senegalese National Assembly. Friedland and Rosberg's collection of articles in African Socialism, 1964, covers the variations of Socialism in Africa and includes translations of statements by both Senghor and Dia.

Just as fundamental as African Socialism to the concept of *animation rurale* is the school of thought known as the French Catholic Liberal movement in the 1950s. The principal participants of this movement were Perroux and Lebret. The essence of their philosophy can be found in the journal, *Economie et Humanisme*, which they founded; in *Esprit*, a Catholic journal representing that movement; and in IRFED's *Développement et Civilisations*. Both Lebret and Perroux have also written books, the most significant of which, in relation to *animation rurale*, are *Dynamique Concrète du Développement*, by Lebret, 1961, and *l'Economie du XXe Siècle*, by Perroux. Also of interest to English-speaking readers are the books and articles by Denis Goulet, a Frenchman who participated in the Liberal Catholic movement, and who now resides in the United States; his writing describes well the concepts of the Perroux-Lebret school of thought in terms of modern development theory and practices. His most recent and notable work is *The Cruel Choice*, 1971.

The cooperative movement, though not as central to the theoretical roots of *animation rurale* as African Socialism and the Liberal Catholic movement, was closely related to the evolution of *animation rurale*, especially during the mid-1960s in Niger. The cooperative movement in Africa was modeled on the movement in Northern Europe, and the single most important influence in West Africa was a Frenchman, Henri Desroche, who wrote *Coopération et Développement*, 1964. He has also directed the preparation of monographs on the cooperative movement in various African countries, including "Le Mouvement Coopératif au

Sénégal," by Laville and Belloncle, 1964. Desroche directs the Centre de Recherches Coopératives in Paris, where the Archives Internationales de Sociologie de la Coopération are published. He has worked closely with IRAM and IRFED, and it was under his tutelage that Gentil wrote Les Coopératives Nigeriennes. For a broad historical study of the cooperative movement, an article by Joseph Schifflers, "Cooperative teaching and rural development in Africa South of the Sahara," leads the way to further references. Oriezet's article, "The cooperative movement since the First World War," 1969, is also a good introduction.

Community development, the Anglophone counterpart to Francophone animation rurale, has been written about extensively, both as a theory and in particular case studies. It is only necessary to mention here those items on community development which have been particularly useful as frames of reference for this study. The most important one is Meister's Participation, animation et développement à partir d'une étude rurale en Argentine, 1969, an account of community development programs in Latin America and Africa. The book includes a typology of community development schemes, including animation rurale, and good theoretical analyses of each type. Meister's bias against the tenets of Socialism is reflected in his writing.

Two items on community development by Brokensha, "African Peasants and Community Development," 1969, and Community Development: An Interpretation, 1969, help to place animation rurale on the spectrum of community development efforts.

This review would not be complete without some indication of the general works on Africa used in this study. Of particular interest are the principal books of three French-speaking development experts, Samir Amin, Rene Dumont and Albert Meister. Amin, an economist, presents his perspective on West Africa's development in *L'Afrique de l'Ouest Bloquée*, 1971. Dumont's most illustrative study on agricultural development practices in Africa is *L'Afrique Noire est mal partie*, 1962. Meister's economic, political and social analysis is *L'Afrique, peut-elle partir?*, 1966. These three books characterize the French leftist appraisals of current events in Africa.

Two highly critical accounts of economic and social policies implemented by Europeans in Africa are Andreski's *The African Predicament*, 1968, and *Essays on the Political Economy of West Africa*, which is a collection of articles written from a Marxist economic perspective, edited by Arrighi and Saul in 1973. Finally, among the many volumes in English on recent African history are four short, but readable and insightful, books: *Politics in West Africa*, 1967, by W.A. Lewis; *Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow*, 1970, by Hapgood; *The New States of West Africa*, 1964, by Post; and *Which Way Africa?*, 1967, by Davidson, who writes about the whole continent but has particularly interesting observations on recent West African history.

On education in Africa, three books describe educational innovations in the same category as *animation rurale*. The broadest survey is Ponsien's *Educational Innovations in Africa: Policies and Administration*, 1972. This book includes descriptions of both formal and nonformal education programs, and has a good theoretical introduction to educational innovations. Limited more to rural non-formal education programs in French-speaking Africa is Cruiziat's *Economie et éducation en milieu* *rural*, 1974, the first volume of which is a systematic descriptive list of programs, country by country, and the second of which contains two strategies of rural education by Cruiziat and Magnen. The third relevant book has an even more specific subject--an evaluation of the *Maisons Familiales* in Senegal and Chad. Entitled *L'Association des Paysans Moyen de Formation et d'Animation dans les villages africains*, 1976, this is an account of one of the programs of *Promotion Humaine* in Senegal.

One more book on education in Africa which should be read is a brief one by John Wilson, called *Education and Changing West African Culture*, 1963. It begins with a review of the Phelps-Stokes Report on Education in Africa, and recalls that five decades ago, Westerners were aware of the irrelevance to the needs of Africans of their own kind of schooling, and recommends a kind of education which is strikingly similar to the kind advocated today. The book puts into a sharp historical perspective those ideas, plans and programs in rural education which educators tend to think of as novel, and it forces one to consider the power of resistance to such plans and programs which continue to be designed again and again but with rare success.

A thorough review of the literature on participation theory is found in Charlick's thesis on the modernization of rural areas in Niger. Relevant studies on participation come from the disciplines of political science, economics, humanistic and industrial psychology. In political science, theoretical studies of participation as a factor in the modernization syndrome include those by Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*, 1967; by Lerner, *Passing of Traditional Society*, 1958; and by Pye, Aspects of Political Development, 1966. Other studies have focused on the role which participation plays in the modernization of non-Western rural nations. These include Modernizing Peasant Societies, by Hunter, 1969; Political Order in Changing Societies, by Huntington, 1968; and The State of Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa, by Lofchie, 1971. The latter includes an introduction to the historic relationship between participation and social change. Empirical studies on modernization and its relationship to factors such as participation have been collected by Uphoff and Ilchman in The Political Economy of Development, 1972; by E. Rogers, Modernization Among the Peasants: Impact of Communication, 1969; and by Inkeles, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, 1973.

Charlick's summary of relevant works in psychology include the school of industrial psychologists--Lewin, Likert, McGregor, Blumburg and Gellerman (presented in Marrow, Management by Participation, 1967). Their research led to the hypothesis that individuals who participate in making decisions which effect their own work are more interested in, take more responsibility for, and internalize decisions better than those who do not. Likewise, humanistic psychologists such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow found that participation in decisions and activities of one's social groups can increase one's sense of autonomy and competence and make one more willing to accept an innovation, since change is seen as less of a threat. A summary of the works of these two psychologists as they apply to political life appears in Politics and the New Humanism, by Anderson, 1973.

Another discipline in which the concept of participation has recently become increasingly important is education. In line with the trend (of which animation rurale is a part) to consider more seriously in educational planning and programming the needs of the learner as he perceives them, the notions of participation and decentralization of educational planning have attracted interest. Since animation rurale falls outside of the formal education sector and the auspices of school-system planners, the literature in this area is not always directly applicable to it. The issues, however, are critically relevant, especially as they encompass nonformal as well as formal educational endeavors, and since an essential part of animation rurale's strategy has been to encourage the peasants to identify their "felt needs," in educational as well as other social and economic domains.

Most of the literature on participation in educational planning and programming is written in the context of rural development, since the major criticism of traditional planning methods is the failure of high-level planners living and working in urban centers to appreciate the needs and conditions of people in rural areas. David Evans, in "Responsive Educational Planning: Myth or Reality," 1976, has carefully surveyed this literature in his study of the conflict between trends of centralized planning and of decentralized planning based on learners' needs--a variation on the "top down"-"bottom up" conflict. Items discussed by Evans which are pertinent to this study include four on education and rural development: The Rural World: Education and Development, by Malassis, 1976; "The Educational Needs of Farmers in Developing Countries," by Watts, 1973; the volume of articles in which the latter appears, Education and Rural Development, the World Yearbook of Education, edited by Foster and Sheffield, 1973; and Curriculum Development for Basic Education in Rural Areas, by Postlethwaite and King, 1975. Two discussions of the issues involved in local participation in educational planning are "The Participatory Planning Process for Education," by Hayward, 1974, and Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experiences from East Africa, by Chambers, 1974. The latter extends beyond education to all sectors of rural development, and the former includes urban as well as rural education.

The literature on nonformal education is extensive and rapidly increasing. It is sufficient here to refer to some broad approaches to the subject, from which further references can be obtained. The most noted case studies have been edited by Coombs et al., in Attacking Rural Poverty and Education for Rural Development. Case studies in Africa are found in Sheffield's Nonformal Education in African Development, and Wood's Informal Education in Africa, 1974. Two series of books and papers on nonformal educational theory, case studies and materials come from Michigan State University in East Lansing and the University of Massachusetts in Amherst. For an understanding of the ideological roots of nonformal education as an alternative to the cultural oppression of schooling, one should read the works of Paulo Freire, particularly Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 1972, and of Ivan Illich, notably Deschooling Society, 1970. Detailed bibliographical material is found in Paulson's Nonformal Education, 1972.

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